TFHO1: ZELAYA UNWILLING TO RETURN TO SAN JOSE -

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001138 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2119 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO SUBJECT: TFHO1: ZELAYA UNWILLING TO RETURN TO SAN JOSE - TEGUCIGALPA PROCESS TEGUCIGALP 00001138 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador and DCM met with President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya November 9 in an attempt to convince him to continue to participate in the process set up by the San Jose - Tegucigalpa Accord (TSJA),specifically to participate in the naming of a government of national unity. Zelaya was unyielding in his position. He said that he was unwilling to return to the talks with the Micheletti regime as he did not believe that it was acting in good faith. He said he believed that de facto regime head Roberto Micheletti was not interested in stepping down and would do everything in his power to ensure that Zelaya would never be restored. He stressed that if he was not restored the elections would not be legitimate and chaos would follow. Zelaya appeared out-of-touch, seemingly believing that the future of Honduras rested singularly on his restoration before the elections. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a meeting with President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya November 9, the Ambassador and DCM attempted to convince him to return to the San Jose - Tegucigalpa process and participate in naming a government of national unity. (Zelaya's wife, Xiomara, also sat in the meeting.) The Ambassador urged Zelaya to return to the table and commit to fully implementing the TSJA. The Ambassador argued that ending the Honduras crisis was a step-by-step process that required the creation of a government of national unity, and the resignation of Micheletti. The Ambassador pointed out that once Micheletti resigned, it was more likely that Congress would be in a position to have a constructive debate and vote on his restoration. The existence of the unity government and Micheletti's resignation would create a new political dynamic, the Ambassador argued, that would be more conducive to a positive vote in Congress. ¶3. (C) Zelaya refused to budge from his position saying that the accord had no meaning if Micheletti was unwilling to take action to put it into effect. He said that Micheletti had no intention of ever allowing him back into office. Therefore he said that he would not reenter the process, would call for a boycott of the election, and would stay in the Brazilian embassy until a new government was inaugurated on January 27, at which time he might request safe passage to a third country. ¶4. (C) Zelaya said that the November 29 election would prove a disaster without a political accord in place beforehand, including his restitution. He predicted social chaos and breakdown of political legitimacy. The coup leaders would be stigmatized by their actions. Zelaya said that the Honduran people would not bestow legitimacy upon any newly elected government and that it would not be recognized by other nations. To the Ambassador's questions on how this situation could be avoided, Zelaya said that there had to be a return to the original San Jose Accord, which called for his immediate restitution. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador told Zelaya that an attempt by himself and his supporters to boycott the elections could backfire. He noted that polls showed that 80 percent of the Honduran people, whether pro or anti-Zelaya, believed that elections were a key element to the solution. The Ambassador said that the Honduran people yearned for a new beginning and a better future. Zelaya countered that an elecion without his restitution would be a defeat fo the OAS and the United States, showing that thedemocratic community had not been unable to defed democracy in the region, even to a small countr with which it had close ties. ¶6. (C) Comment: elaya appeared totally focused on himself and wa adamant that the solution was immediate restoratin or nothing. Although friendly and affable as lways he was unyielding that he no longer sees th TSJA as a viable way forward. Worse he predictd chaos and violence in the absence of his retur and offered no practical suggestions on how to void it. With Zelaya no longer engaging, we beliee the most likely way forward is for the Micheleti side to seize the initiative and take a bold dcision that will TEGUCIGALP 00001138 002.2 OF 002 completely change the political landscape and create the best possible conditions for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections. LLORENS