TFH01: WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S MEETING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001129

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S MEETING
WITH HONDURAN CIVIL SOCIETY FIGURES

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1103

B. TEGUCIGALPA 1067

C. TEGUCIGALPA 989


1. (SBU) Summary: WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon
met with two separate groups of civil society representatives
on October 29 to discuss the status of the Guaymuras talks,
the urgent need to reach a negotiated accord, and the
readiness of the USG to support the elections process if an
accord could be reached. At the first meeting, members of
the Zelaya cabinet, anti-coup Members of Congress and
anti-coup "resistance" organizers described their opposition
to the coup as a peaceful movement and accused the de facto
regime of creating an environment that was antithetical to
free and fair elections. They agreed an accord was urgently
needed. In the second meeting, representatives of the
anti-Zelaya civil society elements expressed at least tacit
support for signing an accord, because they felt it would
shift the national focus from the political crisis to
economic and social development. The group expressed the
need for a plan for Honduras to recover from the social and
economic damage brought about by the crisis. End summary.

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Zelaya Cabinet and Anti-coup Figures
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2. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted a meeting for Assistant
Secretary Shannon and National Security Council Senior
Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs Daniel Restrepo with
members of the Zelaya government and other prominent
anti-coup figures on October 29. Participants were: Liberal
Party (LP) congressman and former Zelaya Defense Minister
Edmundo Orellana, Vice Foreign Ministers Eduardo Rosales
Ramirez, Beatriz Valle and Patricia Licona de Reina,
Democratic Unification (UD) congressman Marvin Ponce, and
anti-coup resistance leader Rafael Alegria. Canadian
Ambassador to Honduras Neil Reeder, who is resident in San
Jose, and ranking resident Canadian diplomat Daniel Arsenault
also participated in the meeting.


3. (SBU) The Ambassador opened by explaining that the purpose
of A/S Shannon's visit was to encourage all sides to conclude
an agreement to restore constitutional and democratic order
in Honduras. The Ambassador said that the delegation's
meetings had been intense and productive, and that the
delegation was eager to hear from the group. A/S Shannon
noted that the parties were on the verge of an accord, and
that the United States was very interested in a successful
resolution soon. He added that the United States was ready
to provide robust support for elections if an accord could be
reached, but conversely, if no accord was reached before
elections, the United States position was that successful
elections would be difficult to carry out and difficult to
recognize as legitimate. The Assistant Secretary
acknowledged that the political crisis was very dramatic, and
there were strong feelings on both sides of the conflict.


4. (SBU) Rosales noted that the crisis was both political and
social, and that the reality of the conflict was very
different from what the de facto regime was portraying. He
said the regime was placing many restrictions on freedom of
expression and opinion. Ponce added that opponents of the
coup have been required to request permission from the de
facto authorities to be able to march and protest, and do not
always receive it. He said these were historic times, when a
peaceful resistance movement was standing up to aggression by
security forces which defend an undemocratic regime. He told
the Assistant Secretary that the grassroots movement had
stood its ground for four months despite detentions and
torture at the hands of the security forces. Ponce stressed
that it was the Congress who committed a coup -- a political
(versus military) coup, but a coup nonetheless.


5. (SBU) Orellana stated that the opponents of the coup fully
supported a transparent process to reach a resolution of the
crisis, which he characterized as arising out of two illegal
acts: first the forcible removal of President Zelaya from the
country, then his deposal from office by the Congress.
Orellana noted that while both sides were on the verge of

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reaching a political solution, much work would remain to heal
the social wounds brought on by the crisis.


6. (SBU) Orellana then highlighted the sense of urgency to
resolve the crisis noting there were almost 300 congressional
candidates and 200 municipal candidates who were prepared to
renounce their candidacies if no accord were reached by
November 1. He said if this many candidates were to drop
out, the validity of the elections would be placed in serious
doubt. Orellana expressed the anti-coup movement's desire
for a rapid resolution and subsequently a strong
international observer mission for the elections. (Note: No
candidates have yet renounced.)


7. (SBU) Licona stated that although the crisis was caused by
Hondurans and was an internal conflict between Hondurans,
they welcomed international support to resolve it. She said
elections held without an accord beforehand would be a
legitimization of the coup, because the regime had placed so
many restrictions on freedoms necessary to hold elections.
Licona noted that despite repealing a decree that had placed
limits on gatherings of more than 20 people, forbade any
public criticism of the regime and ordered the closure of
media outlets who encouraged resistance to the regime, many
of the restrictions remained in force (See Reftels B and C).
She then presented a document she claimed had been sent out
by the Armed Forces to all mayors in the country, requesting
the names and contact information of local resistance
leaders, as well as leaders of the (pro-regime) Civic and
Democratic Union movement. (Note: On October 29, an Armed
Forces spokesman gave a radio interview denying the document
had been issued by the Armed Forces, and telling any mayors
receiving the document to disregard it. End note)


8. (SBU) Valle stated President Zelaya had shown his
willingness to resolve the political crisis. She stressed
the solution would be a political one and not a legal one as
de facto leader Micheletti had suggested. Valle also
observed that the U.S. position had appeared to evolve and
soften from its original, unequivocal demand for immediate
restoration of President Zelaya to support for negotiation
with the de facto regime to reach a solution without
preconditions.


9. (SBU) Resistance leader Rafael Alegria explained that the
resistance movement, which was actually four different groups
working together, had begun the day following the coup. He
stressed its peaceful goals and approach, despite aggressive
tactics to suppress it by the regime through the police,
military and other intimidation tactics. Alegria noted that
same day, six demonstrators had been injured by security
forces and hospitalized. (Note: Post was able to confirm
this claim with police contacts later in the day. End note.)
Alegira stated that the movement's goal was restoration of
the constitutional order, which he defined as the restoration
of President Zelaya to power. Alegria said that because all
the national powers supported the coup, none of them was now
legitimate. Alegria concluded that without restoration of
the constitutional order, elections were illegitimate.
Alegria asked A/S Shannon what the U.S. position would be if
an agreement were signed, the restitution question went to
Congress and then languished there until after elections.


10. (SBU) A/S Shannon reiterated the U.S. position that the
need to sign an accord was urgent, noting that any further
delays would signify a lack of good faith to reach an
agreement, and that the United States would have to consider
the negotiation process a failure. He stressed also that the
United States did not see a way for legitimate elections to
take place in the absence of an agreement. However, he
noted, the solution to the crisis will be a political one,
and therefore it required negotiation. Restrepo said that
the United States would have to deal with the Honduran
situation whether there was a resolution of the crisis or
not, and that the chief U.S. concern would be to promote
progress toward democratic principles and institutions.


11. (SBU) Reeder noted that the issue of constitutional order
was not about a person, but about the constitutional
institutions, and eventually about a peaceful transfer of

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power to a government selected by the Honduran people. He
stressed that a deal was on the table, but time was running
out because legitimate elections under the current regime
appeared very unlikely.

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Anti-Zelaya Civil Society
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12. (SBU) Following the meeting with the Zelaya cabinet and
supporters, the Ambassador hosted a similar meeting for the
delegation with representatives of anti-Zelaya civil society
groups. Guests were: Armida Villeda de Lopez Contreras of
the Civic Democratic Union (UCD),Juan F. Ferrera, also UCD
and former head of the National Anti-corruption Council, Ines
de Zablah of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of
Tegucigalpa (CCIT),Adolfo "Fito" Facusse, head of the
National Association of Industrialists (ANDI),and
Epaminondas Marinakys of the Honduras National Chamber of
Tourism.


13. (SBU) The meeting began with the USG representatives
explaining the purpose of their visit and reminding the
attendees that if an accord was signed, the international
community and the USG could begin to provide support for the
upcoming elections. Facusse retorted that it would not be
possible to accomplish their task in such a short amount of
time since Congress was in recess, to which Villeda rebutted
that various members of Congress told the UCD that they were
on "stand-by" to go to Congress if the accord was signed.


14. (SBU) Villeda continued that the UCD supported a
resolution that fell within the Honduran constitution and
legal system, but did not want the international community to
pressure Honduras to reform its constitution. She said that
their goals were to protect the electoral process, return to
normalcy, and shift the focus to social development. A/S
Shannon responded that the United States agreed that the
conflict over Zelaya's proposed constitutional assembly was a
tragedy, but pointed out that the best option for promoting
social development was for both sides to sign the accord.
A/S Shannon emphasized the urgency of reaching a solution,
saying that his delegation would leave on October 30 and that
the OAS delegation would also leave soon if no agreement was
signed. De Zablah expressed the CCIT's support for the talks
and said they saw a signed agreement as the way to shift the
focus towards economic development and job creation. A/S
Shannon agreed, saying that the political crisis had an
impact on the Honduran economy.


15. (SBU) Facusse shifted the conversation, asking what
guarantees the USG would provide to ensure that President
Zelaya would not resume the campaigns he pursued before June

28. A/S Shannon responded that the USG had made many
attempts over the course of several months to get Micheletti
to tell the USG what actions it could take to ensure the
constitutional transfer of power on January 27, 2010, but
that Micheletti had not provided any specific requests.
Facusse responded that Zelaya was not the problem, rather
"his owner - Chavez" was the problem.


16. (SBU) Ferrera stated that Honduras would need a special
plan to recuperate from the crisis. He cited the three
biggest problems as poverty, corruption and insecurity,
noting that each one exacerbated the other, similar to a
vicious circle. Ferrara continued that the business
community wanted to revamp the now dormant development and
job creation programs. Villeda added that the brunt of
economic impact of the June 28 coup was borne by the poor.
She said that they would welcome international assistance,
even suggesting naming it the "Clinton Plan," and said they
were ready to provide suggestions. She said that her
organization was planning to sign a "social pact" with the
presidential candidates on November 3 (septel).


17. (SBU) A/S Shannon concluded the meeting by telling the
participants that Honduras could serve as an example to other
countries in the region where democracy was weak or in
danger. He said that if the accord was signed, it would
demonstrate that one cannot simply get rid of a leader

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unconstitutionally. A/S Shannon reiterated that it was
possible to resolve the crisis peacefully and democratically.
Furthermore, he recognized that Honduras had many more
problems besides the political crisis and that although
signing an agreement would not resolve all those problems, it
was a necessary first step.


18. Assistant Secretary Shannon cleared this cable.
LLORENS