EFFORTS TO GET TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT BACK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001124 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO GET TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT BACK ON TRACK REF: TEGUCIGALPA 1122 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary. President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya announced on November 6 that de facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti had violated the letter and spirit of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord and that it was defunct due to the failure to establish a government of national unity and reconciliation by November 5. The Ambassador attempted to dissuade President Zelaya from this course of action, but Zelaya said he was convinced that Micheletti would not resign and had no intention of allowing Zelaya to be restored to office. President Zelaya called Verification Commission member former President of Chile Ricardo Lagos to inform him of his decision and told the Ambassador that he would also call Verification Commission member U.S. Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis. Zelaya asked that Organization of American States (OAS) representatives Ambassador Jose Bordon and Enrique Correa remain in Honduras to consult with the Ambassador and, with Honduran Verification Commission members Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina and Arturo Corrales, to come up with a creative solution that accomplished the same purposes as the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord, which Zelaya now considers dead. At our request, Micheletti has agreed not to swear in a national unity government. End Summary. ¶2. (C) As reported in reftel, the Ambassador and Organization of American States (OAS) representatives Ambassador Jose Bordon and Enrique Correa were unable to convince the parties to the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord to issue a communique stating that they had reached agreement on the mechanism for choosing the members of the national unity and reconciliation government and that they would begin discussion of the names in order to reach agreement on a cabinet. The objective was a "step by step" approach that would first have the parties reach agreement on the members of the cabinet and subsequently discuss and agree upon the mechanism for swearing them into office. The U.S. view was that once a government of national unity was constituted, the de facto regime would cease to exist, paving the way for the U.S. and the international community to ask de facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti to step down and also making it more likely that the Congress would vote to restore President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya to office. ¶3. (SBU) On November 5, President Zelaya refused to submit a list of names to be considered for appointment to the national unity government. Micheletti did have a list that his representative on the Verification Commission, Arturo Corrales, was authorized to share with the Zelaya representative on the Commission, Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina, and with the Ambassador and the OAS representatives. Zelaya tried to link Articles 1 and 5 of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord by insisting on immediate restoration to office before creation of a national unity government and subsequently modifying that demand to having the Verification Commission request that Congress set a date for its consideration of his restoration to office. Nonetheless, the Zelaya and Micheletti representatives on the Verification Commission had reached agreement on November 5 on the way forward on implementation of the accord. ¶4. (U) On November 6, President Zelaya issued a statement declaring that the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement was defunct due to the failure to establish a government of national unity by November 5, as provided for in the Agreement. Zelaya's statement said the government of national unity had to be presided over by the democratically elected President of Honduras and accused Micheletti of failing to abide by the letter and spirit of the accord in not convening the National Congress to decide on the issue of Zelaya's restoration. The statement said the electoral process would not be recognized. It concluded by thanking the international community, former President of Chile Ricardo Lagos, U.S. Labor Secretary Hilda Solis, and the OAS for its support. ¶5. (C) Micheletti took a series of actions during the week of November 2 which contributed to the current situation. On November 3, the day the Verification Commission was installed, Micheletti chief of cabinet Rafael Pineda Ponce sent a letter to "Mr. Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales" stating TEGUCIGALP 00001124 002 OF 003 that under instructions from "the Constitutional President of the Republic" Roberto Micheletti, he was asked to submit without delay a list of ten citizens to form part of the national unity and reconciliation government. The de facto regime reportedly also sent letters to political parties asking them to propose names. This gave the impression that Micheletti was planning to assemble and preside over the national unity government. Micheletti then unilaterally announced at midnight on November 5 that he had formed a government of national unity, but did not release its members' names. Micheletti did not inform the members of the Verification Commission that he planned to take this action. In fact, Micheletti's representative on the Commission, Arturo Corrales, admitted to the Ambassador that he was surprised by the announcement and blamed it on the influence of Micheletti's inner circle. (Note: Although Micheletti named Corrales as his representative on the Verification Committee, Corrales is not a member of Micheletti's hard-line inner circle. End Note.) ¶6. (C) The Ambassador attempted to get the Agreement back on track on November 6. The Ambassador and OAS representatives attempted to convince both sides to issue a constructive statement acknowledging that substantive differences existed between them on implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement, but expressing their willingness to continue discussions to reach agreement on formation of a national unity and reconciliation government. The Ambassador met with Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina, Zelaya's representative on the Verification Commission, and with Rodil Rivera and Mayra Mejia, who were both members of the commission representing President Zelaya at the Guaymuras talks. The Ambassador explained to Reina, Rivera, and Mejia why the step by step approach to implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement would be best and urged them to return to the table to continue its implementation. They agreed, noting that they saw no other alternative, and said they would go see President Zelaya to attempt to persuade him. Reina, Rivera, and Mejia met later with the Ambassador and the OAS representatives and reported that President Zelaya had rejected their proposal. They said Zelaya instructed them to inform the Verification Commission that the talks had collapsed, the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement was dead, and Zelaya was abandoning negotiations. Zelaya's team and the OAS representatives asked the Ambassador to intercede with President Zelaya. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador called President Zelaya and in a lengthy conversation underscored that the U.S. and the inter-American community were committed to helping Honduras, noting the engagement of U.S. officials, as well as OAS Secretary General Insulza and OAS Foreign Ministers. The Ambassador told President Zelaya that the Guaymuras negotiations, under the framework of the San Jose Accord, had been a success and freely accepted by both sides without coercion. The designation of a sitting U.S. Cabinet member, Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, to the Verification Commission was proof of President Obama's and Secretary Clinton's commitment to the success of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord. The Ambassador said the Verification Commission, with the participation of former President of Chile Ricardo Lagos, in addition to Secretary Solis, was a prestigious body, which had been created on schedule and would propel continued implementation of the Accord. The Ambassador told President Zelaya that once a mechanism was established on how to swear in the government of national unity, the de facto regime would in effect disappear and that Micheletti would have to resign. ¶8. (C) President Zelaya said he appreciated the support of the U.S. government over the last four months, especially from President Obama and Secretary Clinton, as well as other senior USG officials. He also expressed appreciation for the support of Labor Secretary Solis. However, Zelaya claimed that he was in constant contact with Micheletti over the last few weeks through mutual friends and he has realized that Micheletti has no intention of leaving office and will not agree to Zelaya's return to office, even for a short period before the inauguration of a new president. Zelaya told the Ambassador that Micheletti is mocking the international community and is trying to set himself up as head of the national unity government. President Zelaya noted that the TEGUCIGALP 00001124 003 OF 003 Rio Group had issued a statement on November 5 that his immediate restoration was imperative. Zelaya said the Congress did not take the Verification Commission seriously because Jose Alfredo Saavedra, who replaced Micheletti as President of Congress, refused to meet with the Commission and was unwilling to set a date for discussion of Zelaya's restoration to office. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador pressed Zelaya for a few more days to permit discussion and agreement on a national unity government and for the international community to convince Micheletti to resign. Zelaya responded that he was convinced that Micheletti would never resign and that allowing for more time for implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord would be humiliating. Zelaya did ask that the OAS representatives remain in Honduras and that they remain in contact with the Ambassador and Reina and Corrales to see if a creative solution can be crafted outside of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Accord framework. The Ambassador suggested to President Zelaya that Zelaya needed to call President Lagos and Secretary Solis to explain his decision; Zelaya agreed. ¶10. (C) After his phone call with President Zelaya, the Ambassador met with Reina, Corrales, and OAS representatives Bordon and Correa; all agreed that the accord was in serious jeopardy. Correa said he spoke to former President Lagos who confirmed that he had just spoken to President Zelaya. Lagos told Correa that Zelaya was not going to change his decision. Lagos suggested that the Verification Commission needed to issue a statement from Tegucigalpa, approved by him and Secretary Solis, which stated that Micheletti had broken the spirit and letter of the accord by unilaterally announcing the creation of a national unity government and that this action had, regrettably, prompted President Zelaya to declare the accord defunct. Lagos said the statement should say that the Verification Commission members remain ready and willing to resume work. (Note: Later in the afternoon, President Lagos changed his mind and decided not to issue the statement. End Note.) The Ambassador asked Corrales to brief Micheletti. At our request, Micheletti agreed not to swear in the national unity government, which he had reportedly planned to do on November 6, and to keep a low profile in the coming days. LLORENS