Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA1103
2009-11-03 23:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

TFH01: TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT SIGNED

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM HO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001103 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA
CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY WHA A/S TOM SHANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2010
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT SIGNED

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001103 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY WHA A/S TOM SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2010 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO SUBJECT: TFH01: TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT SIGNED Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly, and National Security Council Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs during an October 28-30 trip to Honduras met with President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya, de factor regime leader Roberto Micheletti, the commissioners to the Guaymuras negotiations, the presidential candidates, the Canadian Ambassador to Honduras, business and civil society leaders, and the G-16 donors group. The delegation obtained agreement from President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya and de facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti for resumption of the negotiations, which were launched by A/S Shannon and OAS Political Secretary Victor Rico on October 28, culminating in signature on October 29 of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: The early meeting with the two commissions provided them with the impetus to seek an agreement. On its second day, the team split into two, with A/S Shannon and Restrepo meeting various groups to urge support of the agreement while PDAS Kelly participated with the OAS in negotiations with the delegations. Word from the groups on the need to move forward reached the negotiators and added additional impetus to move forward. The accord represents an historical reversal of a Latin America coup through peaceful negotiation. Work remains to implement the accord, but we believe the political will exists to do so. End Summary. ¶3. (C) Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) Thomas Shannon, accompanied by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly, and National Security Council Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs Daniel Restrepo, visited Honduras October 28-30 to support the Guaymuras dialogue being facilitated by the Organization of American States (OAS). A/S Shannon obtained agreement from President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya and de facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti for resumption of the negotiations and A/S Shannon and OAS Political Secretary Victor Rico re-launched the negotiations on October 28. The commissions representing President Zelaya and Micheletti reached agreement on the article in
the agreement regarding restitution of President Zelaya and signed the agreement very late on October 29. The agreement provides that the issue of restitution will be decided by the National Congress in consultation with pertinent institutions, such as the Supreme Court. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador hosted a lunch for A/S Shannon, PDAS Kelly, and Restrepo on October 28 with the commissioners representing President Zelaya and Micheletti at the Guaymuras dialogue. A/S Shannon told the commissioners that the future of their country, as well as its role in the international community, was in their hands. He said the only way to find a lasting solution to the Honduran political crisis was for Hondurans themselves to identify the resolution and asked the commissioners how the U.S. could be of assistance. PDAS Kelly reminded the commissioners of the regional impact of the Honduran crisis. Micheletti commissioner Arturo Corrales said all the elements were on the negotiating table to allow for signature of the agreement. Micheletti commissioner Vilma Morales and Armando Aguilar Cruz urged resumption of the negotiations. Lead Zelaya negotiator Victor Meza said there was a sense that time was running out for Honduras and for democracy. Meza said willingness to negotiate was different from willingness to find a solution. He said it was imperative that the Congress decided on restitution of President Zelaya to office because that would be in keeping with the San Jose Accord. ¶5. (C) A/S Shannon, accompanied by PDAS Kelly, Restrepo, and the Ambassador held a frank, open exchange of views with President Zelaya on October 28. A/S Shannon told President Zelaya that his visit was a final push to encourage the two sides to reach an agreement before the general election scheduled for November 29. A/S Shannon encouraged President Zelaya to direct his commissioners to return to the Guaymuras negotiations. Zelaya said he was willing to accept an agreement that included limitations on his powers as long as TEGUCIGALP 00001103 002 OF 004 he was allowed to return to the office of president. Zelaya condemned the de facto regime's violations of human rights and press freedom as well as the harassment to which it had subjected him and his supporters in the Embassy of Brazil. Zelaya said Micheletti was betting on the elections to "cleanse" his actions since June 28, but that any election without his restitution would be fraudulent and not recognized by a large part of the Honduran people as well as by the international community. Zelaya urged the U.S. to freeze de facto regime accounts as a means of further pressure. In a private pull-aside with A/S Shannon and the Ambassador, Zelaya said that, if necessary, he would accept a return to office after the elections. ¶6. (C) A/S Shannon, PDAS Kelly, Restrepo and the Ambassador had an equally frank discussion with Micheletti on October ¶28. A/S Shannon told Micheletti that the U.S. could provide guarantees to ensure compliance with any agreement reached. Micheletti said the election was the solution to the political crisis and that no one would be allowed to disrupt the electoral process. He asked the U.S. to support the electoral process and added that if the U.S. recognized the elections, other countries, with the exception of the ALBA members, would follow suit. A/S Shannon told Micheletti that the San Jose process was launched to allow Hondurans themselves to conduct a dialogue and find a solution to their crisis. A/S Shannon said the U.S. did not want to impose a solution, but believed that the commissioners should return to the negotiating table with clear instructions from President Zelaya and Micheletti to reach an agreement, thereby paving the way for Honduras' return to the international community. Micheletti responded by blaming the Zelaya commissioners for the negotiations' suspension. Micheletti concluded the meeting by noting the close ties that exist between the U.S. and Honduras and requesting that the delegation pass on his greetings and wishes for a successful administration to President Obama, whom he said he respected. ¶7. (C) All six presidential candidates had dinner at the Ambassador's Residence on October 28 with five of the six presidential candidates: Elvin Santos of the Liberal Party, Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo of the National Party, Bernard Martinez of the Social Democratic Innovation and Unity Party (PINU), Cesar Ham of the Democratic Unity Party, and independent candidate Carlos H. Reyes. Felicito Avila of the Christian Democratic Party could not attend and was represented by Adela Echevarria. OAS Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs Victor Rico and former President of Honduras Carlos Flores also attended the dinner. Rico said the OAS would not be able to continue supporting the Guaymuras dialogue if an agreement was not reached soon. But, he said that if an agreement was reached soon, the OAS would be ready to send an electoral observer mission to Honduras. Rico told the candidates that they could play an important role in finding a solution by encouraging both parties to come to an agreement. Martinez called on national interests to be placed above individual ones. Lobo said recognition of the electoral process should not be tied to a solution to the political crisis. All candidates indicated that if the issue of restitution were referred to the Congress, they would abide by that decision. Lobo said the parties should discuss the issue before it is placed before the Congress. ¶8. (C) At a breakfast with A/S Shannon and his delegation at the DCM's residence on October 29, business leaders expressed support for a negotiated political solution to Honduras' crisis. They said that Honduras has been hard-hit by the global economic downturn and that the country's political crisis has exacerbated the situation. While the business leaders have continuing concerns, including reservations about some aspects of the draft accord and worries that President Zelaya and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez will stir up trouble if Zelaya returns, they told the delegation that an agreement represents the best way out of the crisis. They provided the delegation with a public statement of support for the negotiation process. ¶9. (C) A/S Shannon, Restrepo, the Ambassador, and the DCM met on October 29 with Ambassador Neil Reeder of Canada, who is TEGUCIGALP 00001103 003 OF 004 resident in Costa Rica. A/S Shannon told Ambassador Reeder that the Brazilians were eager to restore Zelaya to power and to have him depart the Brazilian Embassy. The Assistant Secretary said the U.S. and the rest of the donor community would have to rethink assistance strategies following an agreement, since Honduras has been changed both politically and socially by the June 28 coup d'etat and its aftermath. Ambassador Reeder said Zelaya would emerge from the Brazilian Embassy shaken by his experience and that the international community would need to provide some confidence building for him, on both a political and psychological level. ¶10. (SBU) A/S Shannon, Restrepo, and the Ambassador were joined by Canadian Ambassador Reeder in a meeting with members of President Zelaya's Cabinet and other opponents of the coup, including members of Congress and Resistance leader Rafael Alegria. The Assistant Secretary stressed that the U.S. stood ready to robustly support the electoral process if an agreement were reached and foresaw a difficult environment for successful elections to be carried out in the absence of an agreement. Vice Foreign Minister Eduardo Rosales said Honduras was suffering from a social crisis as well as a political one and that even after a political resolution is achieved, much work remains to heal social rifts. Former Zelaya Minister of Defense Edmundo Orellana said there was urgency in reaching an agreement, noting that 300 congressional candidates and 200 municipal candidates opposed to the coup were prepared to renounce their candidacies if an agreement were not in place by November 2. All participants agreed a resolution was needed right away, but they expressed concern about an agreement that did not ensure the restoration of President Zelaya. ¶11. (SBU) A meeting with anti-Zelaya civil society representatives followed, at which most participants expressed at least tacit support for a negotiated agreement, as this would shift the focus from Honduras' political crisis to its economic situation and social development. They expressed concern about the possibility that Zelaya (and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, whom businessman Adolfo Facusse termed Zelaya's owner) would cause trouble if Zelaya returned as President. A/S Shannon said that the U.S. was prepared to provide guarantees for important and effective implementation of the accord. He told the group that the U.S. made many attempts over the course of several months, without any success, to have Micheletti suggest the U.S. actions that could reduce the "fear factor." He hoped Micheletti would be more forthcoming now. ¶12. (SBU) While Shannon and Restrepo engaged with these groups on October 29, PDAS Kelly worked with the OAS and the two delegations to hammer out a final text. After the Tegucigalpa/San Jose agreement was signed on October 29, Micheletti made a televised announcement in a very statesmanlike manner and called for unity. A/S Shannon and OAS Political Secretary Rico held a brief press statement/conference in the hotel were the negotiations were held and the agreement was signed. A/S Shannon credited the work and democratic commitment of the Honduran people and pledged U.S. support. Many of the journalists present were moved and grateful to the U.S. A/S Shannon, PDAS Kelly, Mr. Restrepo, the Ambassador, and the DCM met separately the evening of October 29 after signature of the agreement with Micheletti and President Zelaya. Micheletti thanked President Obama and the Secretary for their support and the work of A/S Shannon and his delegation. He pledged to cooperate with the U.S. and the OAS in implementing the agreement. Zelaya was pleased and pleasantly surprised by Micheletti's acceptance of the agreement; although he noted that its implementation will be difficult. He expressed gratitude to President Obama and the Secretary for their support for democracy in Honduras. ¶13. (U) On October 30, the G-16 donors group hosted a breakfast meeting with A/S Shannon and Mr. Restrepo. A/S Shannon hailed the historical significance of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose agreement signed on October 29 by the commissions representing President Zelaya and Micheletti at the Guyamuras Dialogue, which was achieved through dialogue and with multilateral consensus. A/S Shannon said the U.S. would now focus on assistance for the November 29 general TEGUCIGALP 00001103 004 OF 004 elections, normalize consular and anti-narcotrafficking activities and gradually resume assistance over the coming months and as the agreement is implemented. A/S Shannon went over next steps, including the imminent return of the OAS to work on the verification committee and the agreement's approval by the Honduran Congress. He said he had already asked the OAS to deploy an electoral observation mission. Restrepo highlighted the key role of the OAS, both in helping reach the agreement and its implementation. A/S Shannon and Restrepo said there will likely be challenges ahead, but there is significant positive momentum and good faith that should allow Hondurans to overcome them. G-16 representatives were congratulatory of the U.S. role in restarting the negotiations and facilitating a Honduran solution to the crisis. Questions were raised about amnesty, approval of the agreement by the Honduran Supreme Court, and the possibility of pushback from extremist elements on both sides. Several G-16 representatives said they would look to the OAS for signals before restarting electoral and other assistance. The UN and Sweden indicated that they had already consulted or would consult their headquarters on restarting suspended elections assistance. Other donors, including Canada and the EC, said they would see how they could quickly materialize elections support. ¶14. (U) The delegation held a press conference the morning of October 29, urging support for the talks and stressing the importance of an agreement for Honduras to move past the crisis. The conference was broadcast simultaneously in the Embassy and the Department, with questions coming from reporters at both locations. A/S Shannon and Restrepo than briefed Washington reporters by telephone the morning of September 30, recapping the successful conclusion of the talks the previous evening. ¶15. (C) In a show of support for the agreement, the Embassy, after consulting with the Department, has announced that it is reopening its Non-Immigrant Visa Section. We are also preparing to further reengage on such priority activities as the antinarcotics front. We will recommend the reversal of other sanctions as the process moves forward. ¶16. (C) Comment: The agreement represents the first time in Latin American history that a coup has been reversed by peaceful dialogue. A/S Shannon, Restrepo, and PDAS Kelly's intervention convinced both parties that they had to come to a deal now or send Honduras into an even more uncertain future, with an election unlikely to be recognized by much of the world community. Much work remains to be done and success is not guaranteed, but we believe that the political will has been created to move forward. LLORENS

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