TFH01: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF WHA A/S THOMAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 001085

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF WHA A/S THOMAS
SHANNON

REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1081

B. TEGUCIGALPA 1080

C. TEGUCIGALPA 1058

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (SBU) Embassy Tegucigalpa warmly welcomes the October
28-29 visit of Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Craig Kelly, and National Security Council
Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Special
Assistant to the President Daniel Restrepo. We are at a
critical moment for finding a resolution to the political
crisis that has beset Honduras since the coup d'etat carried
out on June 28. Significant progress was achieved during the
talks and both sides reached agreement on all, but one, of
the points of the Guaymuras Accord, which was based on the
San Jose Accord mediated by Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias. The outstanding issue is, of course, the most
difficult one on which to obtain agreement: the restoration
to office of President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya.


2. (C) The Guaymuras negotiations are stalled, but there has
been continuing contact between the two commissions to the
talks. As of late as October 25, the two commissions had
proposed texts for the Article 6 that were very similar,
proposing Micheletti resign, a national unity cabinet be
formed and the restitution issue be reviewed by Congress,
with input from the Supreme Court. Zelaya pulled back from
this proposal late October 25, due in large part to his fear
he will not get the support in Congress necessary to be
restored, and a caretaker reconciliation government headed by
the Minister of Governance would remain in place through
elections and beyond -- in effect, the "third option"
proposed by Micheletti supporters early on. Zelaya put
forward a "counterproposal" the evening of October 25 which
is the original San Jose Accord proposal on restitution.


3. (C) While the political landscape has shifted enough to
move the Micheletti side closer to resolution, more work can
be done to close the gap and bring Micheletti all the way.
U.S. pressure has thinned the hard core support for
Micheletti, but his inner circle continues to urge him to
hang on. A creative solution to restitution may be the best
way to approach the issue.


4. (C) Meanwhile, Zelaya now perceives his position as very
weak, which means he is willing to be flexible, but not to
the point of relinquishing his restitution (Ref B). For him
to close the gap, he must understand that a deal will be
accepted by the other powers, namely the Congress and Court,
and that he can be assured of his restitution in some form.


5. (C/NF) Micheletti supporters and public opinion will be
the keys to reaching a desirable conclusion to the crisis.
The de facto regime has been very keen to present themselves
as defenders of democracy and the Constitution, but public
perception has started to shift away from them, in part due
to their stringent controls on public gatherings and freedom
of expression. The latest polls show the public remains
divided, even ambivalent on the way forward. While a firm
majority of Hondurans believe the coup was wrong, they do not
support Zelaya's restitution in equal measure. The business
community, which has been a vital base of support for the
regime, while clearly aware of the damage the crisis has done
to business and investment resources, remains unconvinced
that Zelaya's restoration is the solution to their concerns.
They still hold out the hope that the November elections will
provide the way forward. While our pressure on them has
accentuated the costs of supporting a coup, including our
revocation of U.S. tourist visas, they perceive Zelaya as the
great threat.


6. (SBU) We have prepared a full schedule including meetings
with President Zelaya, Micheletti, the commissions to the
Guaymuras negotiations, the presidential candidates, business
leaders, civil society representatives, and the Supreme
Court. We suggest that interaction with the press be limited
until right before departure and have organized a press
conference for that time.
LLORENS