TFH01: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF WHA A/S THOMAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 001085 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI HO SUBJECT: TFH01: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF WHA A/S THOMAS SHANNON REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1081 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 1080 ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 1058 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Tegucigalpa warmly welcomes the October 28-29 visit of Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Craig Kelly, and National Security Council Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs and Special Assistant to the President Daniel Restrepo. We are at a critical moment for finding a resolution to the political crisis that has beset Honduras since the coup d'etat carried out on June 28. Significant progress was achieved during the talks and both sides reached agreement on all, but one, of the points of the Guaymuras Accord, which was based on the San Jose Accord mediated by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. The outstanding issue is, of course, the most difficult one on which to obtain agreement: the restoration to office of President Jose Manuel "Mel" Zelaya. ¶2. (C) The Guaymuras negotiations are stalled, but there has been continuing contact between the two commissions to the talks. As of late as October 25, the two commissions had proposed texts for the Article 6 that were very similar, proposing Micheletti resign, a national unity cabinet be formed and the restitution issue be reviewed by Congress, with input from the Supreme Court. Zelaya pulled back from this proposal late October 25, due in large part to his fear he will not get the support in Congress necessary to be restored, and a caretaker reconciliation government headed by the Minister of Governance would remain in place through elections and beyond -- in effect, the "third option" proposed by Micheletti supporters early on. Zelaya put forward a "counterproposal" the evening of October 25 which is the original San Jose Accord proposal on restitution. ¶3. (C) While the political landscape has shifted enough to move the Micheletti side closer to resolution, more work can be done to close the gap and bring Micheletti all the way. U.S. pressure has thinned the hard core support for Micheletti, but his inner circle continues to urge him to hang on. A creative solution to restitution may be the best way to approach the issue. ¶4. (C) Meanwhile, Zelaya now perceives his position as very weak, which means he is willing to be flexible, but not to the point of relinquishing his restitution (Ref B). For him to close the gap, he must understand that a deal will be accepted by the other powers, namely the Congress and Court, and that he can be assured of his restitution in some form. ¶5. (C/NF) Micheletti supporters and public opinion will be the keys to reaching a desirable conclusion to the crisis. The de facto regime has been very keen to present themselves as defenders of democracy and the Constitution, but public perception has started to shift away from them, in part due to their stringent controls on public gatherings and freedom of expression. The latest polls show the public remains divided, even ambivalent on the way forward. While a firm majority of Hondurans believe the coup was wrong, they do not support Zelaya's restitution in equal measure. The business community, which has been a vital base of support for the regime, while clearly aware of the damage the crisis has done to business and investment resources, remains unconvinced that Zelaya's restoration is the solution to their concerns. They still hold out the hope that the November elections will provide the way forward. While our pressure on them has accentuated the costs of supporting a coup, including our revocation of U.S. tourist visas, they perceive Zelaya as the great threat. ¶6. (SBU) We have prepared a full schedule including meetings with President Zelaya, Micheletti, the commissions to the Guaymuras negotiations, the presidential candidates, business leaders, civil society representatives, and the Supreme Court. We suggest that interaction with the press be limited until right before departure and have organized a press conference for that time. LLORENS