TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT ZELAYA DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001080 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL HO SUBJECT: TFH01: AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT ZELAYA DISCUSS HONDURAN CRISIS TEGUCIGALP 00001080 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (b & d) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador and President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya spoke the evening of October 22. They discussed the status of the negotiations. Zelaya blamed regime leader Roberto Micheletti for the failure of the Guaymuras Dialogue. The Ambassador agreed that Micheletti had not engaged in good faith, but that the two delegations had made progress and that 95 percent of an agreement remained on the table. The Ambassador encouraged Zelaya to consider creative solutions to solve the crisis. Zelaya was open to an innovative proposal that would entail him traveling overseas and agreeing not to return to take the reins of the presidency until after the elections. Zelaya was calm and measured, retains his keen political antennae and is looking to find a way out of his dire predicament. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador spoke to President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya the evening of October 22 to discuss the status of the negotiations. Zelaya said that the talks were at an end. Zelaya said the latest text proposal of Article 6 (covering restitution) from the Micheletti side offered nothing new. He said that the two paragraph proposal included language that essentially stated that what happened on June 28 was fully consistent with Honduran law and the Constitution. Zelaya said that the text justifying the coup was an insult to him and the international community and reflective of the arrogance of Micheletti and his inner circle. Zelaya added that the Micheletti proposal requiring consultation with the Supreme Court sought to ensure that his restitution would be found to be inconsistent with Honduran law. Zelaya added that he had engaged in good faith negotiations beginning with the mediation of President Arias dating back to last July. He said he had given every concession beginning with the original San Jose Accord back in July and now in these latest negotiations. The conditions established in San Jose/Guaymuras involved severe restrictions on his presidential authority. He recognized that some of his past actions had created concerns with many Hondurans and understood that these restrictions were necessary to create confidence. However, Zelaya insisted that he would not back away from the principle that had been advocated by the U.S., OAS and international community, which called for the restoration of the legitimate government. He said if this did not happen, then those who had carried out the coup would triumph and prove that they would be able to defy the international community. Zelaya argued that if the coup was allowed to stand this would have negative repercussions throughout Latin America. ¶3. (C) Zelaya claimed that following his meeting with Secretary Clinton on September 3, the ALBA countries had distanced themselves from him. He had put himself in the hands of the OAS and the U.S., and that he had supported the Foreign Ministers initiative, as well as the Guaymuras Dialogue. However, he made clear that these talks were at an end. He noted that he had submitted one final proposal for Article 6 that was consistent with OAS and UN resolutions, and was similar to the original restitution article in the San Jose Accord. He said he was open to the idea that the Article 6 proposal be sent to the National Congress for its consideration. He made clear that he was no longer going to play into Micheletti's strategy of running out the clock and had established a deadline of midnight October 23 for the Micheletti regime to accept his proposal. (Note: This deadline has passed. The Micheletti regime has since submitted a counterproposal earlier this morning). End Note). ¶4. (C) The Ambassador agreed with Zelaya that Micheletti and his inner circle had acted in bad faith. However, the OAS Foreign Ministers' initiative had been positive and that the two negotiating teams had engaged in good faith negotiations and been able to obtain agreement on 95 percent of the text of an agreement. Although no agreement had been reached on the key issue of restitution, it was not a minor achievement that two sides were so close to a deal. The Ambassador stressed that what was needed was the political will to close on the Accord. The Ambassador recommended that both sides remain open and that creative proposals be put on the table TEGUCIGALP 00001080 002.2 OF 002 to resolve the crisis. ¶5. (C/NF) The Ambassador and Zelaya had a frank discussion of what some of those creative options might be. They discussed the idea suggested by Zelaya's Minister of Governance Victor Meza. (Note: This proposal would entail the signing of a basic draft of the Guaymuras/San Jose Accord that would have Micheletti resign and Zelaya assume the presidency. However, under this proposal, Zelaya would request that the National Congress give him a leave of absence to travel to international capitals and seek financial and development assistance support from donor nations. In the meantime a government of national reconciliation would be created with a caretaker head of state. Under this proposal, Zelaya would return and assume the presidency only/only some time (possibly in early December) following the November 29 elections (which would be strongly backed by an international observer contingent) and the announcement of the winner in the Presidential race. Zelaya's role would be a transition figure running the national unity cabinet until the inauguration of a new head of state on January 27, 2010. End Note). Zelaya told the Ambassador that if Micheletti proposed such an agreement he would carefully review it but would be inclined to accept it (please protect). He stressed that the two conditions that made this deal possible were the restitution of his presidency (reversal of the coup),and that the Accord was signed prior to the elections, which would guarantee strong international support for the elections process. ¶6. (C) Zelaya threatened to boycott the elections and encourage his supporters to peacefully protest against the process if a deal was not reached. He predicted that in the absence of an agreement the abstention rate would be the highest since Honduras returned to democracy 28 years before. ¶7. (C) Comment: Zelaya was remarkably calm despite the announcement that the talks had failed. He was disappointed but also almost relieved that what he perceived was a humiliating process had come to an end. However, Zelaya knows he is in an inferior position and is willing to consider a creative way to get himself and his wife out of the Brazilian Embassy and back to the presidency. LLORENS