Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TEGUCIGALPA1034
2009-10-09 19:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Cable title:  

TFHO1: OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS DELEGATION BRINGS TWO

Tags:  PGOV PREL HO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001034 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA A/S TOM SHANNON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL HO
SUBJECT: TFHO1: OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS DELEGATION BRINGS TWO
SIDES IN HONDURAN CONFLICT TOGETHER

Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEGUCIGALPA 001034 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA A/S TOM SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL HO SUBJECT: TFHO1: OAS FOREIGN MINISTERS DELEGATION BRINGS TWO SIDES IN HONDURAN CONFLICT TOGETHER Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b & d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The visit to Honduras of a high-level delegation of OAS member country foreign ministers and other high-level member state government officials, including WHA A/S Tom Shannon, on October 7-8 provided a space for negotiations to resume between teams representing deposed President Zelaya and the de facto regime for the first time since July. Following a cordial public opening session, the two teams, working without the OAS in the room, hammered out an agenda for further negotiations, the first sign of progress in some time. During delegation visits to Zelaya and de facto president Micheletti, however, both leaders took a hard line, with Micheletti essentially repeating the position he has held since June 28, saying Zelaya's return was not negotiable, while Zelaya questioned the legitimacy of the talks and imposed an October 15 deadline to come to an agreement. The OAS FMs pushed back on both, consistently repeating the message that this was a unique opportunity for Honduras to get out of this crisis, and that with the November 29 elections fast approaching, time was running out. A delegation dinner with Honduran presidential candidates, and A/S Shannon's breakfast with them, served to encourage them to play a leading role in pushing the negotiations ahead and overcoming the intransigence of the opposing leaders. End Summary. -------------- "Dialogo de Guaymuras" -------------- ¶2. (U) With a large media presence, de facto Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez Contreras opened the inaugural session with a legalistic, technical discourse, noting the de facto regime's respect for the international community, but asking for reciprocal respect for his government and their position on the removal of Zelaya. He referred to the talks as the "Dialogue of Guaymuras," a name being pushed by the de facto regime to emphasize the Honduran nature of any possible agreement (Guaymuras is the name used for Honduras by Spanish explorers, and its use is intended to refer to a time before foreign colonialization). OAS Secretary General Insulza struck a positive tone, stating that the OAS's goal was to bring Honduras back into the international fold by restoring the democratic and constitutional order under t
he San Jose Process. (His reference to the June 28 coup drew a smattering of boos from some in the audience.) He encouraged both sides to examine closely the provisions of the San Jose Accord and to work to mold them to their mutual satisfaction, and to give true negotiation authority to their teams. He also pushed the de facto regime to allow the Zelaya team unfettered access to the deposed President and to lift the state of exception still in effect. ¶3. (U) Canadian Minister of State for the Americas Kent emphasized the friendship between OAS member states and Honduras and Honduras' thirty-year tradition of democracy. He hoped that the dialogue would allow for the preservation of the democratic advances made by Honduras, and noted that a resolution to the crisis would allow for a return of international aid, including election support. He, too, said that the San Jose process was the best way forward, and believed that time was running out to find an exit. Zelaya Minister of Governance and Justice Victor Meza complained of the ongoing suppression of civil rights in Honduras and de facto limitations on access to the President, but the overall tone of his remarks were conciliatory. He bemoaned the fact that thirty years of Honduran institution building had failed to create a culture of democracy in Honduras, but said that every crisis contained the seed of a new opportunity, and that Honduras' tradition of consensus and dialogue would allow talks to proceed constructively. -------------- Talks Begin at Last -------------- ¶4. (C) The delegation and negotiating teams then retired to an informal working lunch, allowing them to mingle and build a comfort level among the participants. The two teams began a two-hour, closed door initial negotiation session, with no TEGUCIGALP 00001034 002 OF 003 OAS or other representatives present. (Note: the two sides have changed players since the initial San Jose Accord talks. For the de facto regime, Arturo Corrales and Vilma Morales remain, but Mauricio Villeda has been replaced by attorney Armando Aguilar Cruz. On the Zelaya side, all the players are new: Victor Meza, an elder statesman and intellectual of the left and Zelaya's Minister of the Interior equivalent; Juan Barahona, a labor leader, dressed casually in jeans and a baseball cap, who seemed somewhat out-of-place at the negotiations but whose participation would add credibility among the "resistance" to any agreement; and Mayra Mejia, the Zelaya Minister of Labor.) ¶5. (C) The teams then briefed the OAS FMs. After discussions that both sides characterized as "tough," they had agreed to continue the dialogue with the various team members rotating as "chairman" of each session, and had come up with a three-point agenda as their guide: the signing of the San Jose Accord as the appropriate framework for their discussions; addressing each point of San Jose one-by-one and in great detail in order to provide for its implementation; and attempting to formulate a new "socio-political pact" to address the underlying problems that lead to this crisis. The OAS congratulated the two sides on their progress and agreed to provide logistical and administrative support as the talks continued. -------------- Leaders Show Inflexibility -------------- ¶6. (C) The heads of each country representative and SYG Insulza then visited de facto regime president Micheletti and President Zelaya. Micheletti greeted the delegation at the Presidential Palace in a nationally-televised meeting. His manner was gruff, defiant and inflexible. Micheletti repeated that Honduras would not accept any solution to the crisis imposed from outside Honduras, and said that Zelaya's return to the Presidency was not a negotiable point. He again offered to resign if it was determined that his presence impeded progress towards a solution. Each of the FMs and heads of delegation spoke in turn, giving the consistent message that this was the time for a solution, that democratic and constitutional order must return, and that the OAS and international community were there to help with the negotiations, not to impose a solution. A/S Shannon made an eloquent plea to Micheletti to seize the historic opportunity to bring Honduras out of the crisis and back into the international democratic community, saying the OAS came with a hand extended to help Honduras. (Comment: Micheletti was clearly playing to his domestic audience, but came across as angry, stubborn and somewhat incoherent, while the FMs, who spoke for most of the meeting, appeared reasonable, engaged and creative. End Comment.) ¶7. (C) The delegation found President Zelaya in a similarly unproductive mood. In contrast to the Micheletti meeting, Zelaya did most of the talking. He questioned the sincerity of the de facto regime's intentions, doubting they planned to negotiate in good faith. He said that Micheletti was not serious about coming to an agreement, guaranteeing that whatever the two commissions came up with would fail. Zelaya added that if an agreement on his restitution was not made by October 15, he would withdraw from the process, and that elections could and would not happen. The FMs repeated their message of the urgency of the need to deal, that time was running out, and that threatening the elections was not productive. -------------- -- The Real Leaders: the Presidential Candidates -------------- -- ¶8. (C) At a dinner with the delegation October 7, four major presidential candidates (Pepe Lobo, Elvin Santos, Cesar Ham and Felicito Avila) exchanged views on the crisis and the likelihood of success of the current negotiations. The Ambassador hosting a breakfast with the candidates the next morning in order to give them the opportunity for a direct, private dialogue with A/S Shannon. At the breakfast, attended by Lobo, Santos, Avila and PINU candidate Bernard TEGUCIGALP 00001034 003 OF 003 Martinez, the candidates expressed their gratitude for the Embassy's role in bringing them together as a unit to allow them to address the crisis in a constructive way. The Ambassador praised their leadership in having met Costa Rican President Arias and for reaching out to Micheletti and Zelaya. A/S Shannon appealed to them to act quickly and decisively as the real leaders of the country. He said the elections were being manipulated by Zelaya and Micheletti for their own purposes; the candidates should take ownership of the elections back from those two failed leaders and help the country move beyond Zelaya and Micheletti's failures and intransigence. The candidates agreed to issue a communique urging the two sides to seize the moment and negotiate quickly and in good faith. They also planned to draft a letter to SYG Insulza, Secretary Clinton and key regional FMs, requesting support for the upcoming elections. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The OAS FMs visit went fairly well. Despite an early October 8 threat from President Zelaya to derail negotiations, the teams continue to meet and address the points of the San Jose Accord. OAS's John Biehl remains on the ground to keep both sides focused and to put out fires, while the OAS administrative team continued to provide both with logistical support. The apparent broad agreement on moving forward within the San Jose framework (though without the mediation efforts of President Arias, who has lost some credibility due to his disparaging remarks about the Honduran constitution) is belied by the unhelpful actions of Micheletti and Zelaya, both of whom are failing the country as leaders. The presidential candidates appear to offer the best opportunity to move the country beyond the polarization they have promulgated. The ongoing negotiations are an historic chance to end this crisis; post is cautiously optimistic that they will succeed. LLORENS

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