Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI952
2009-05-21 14:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: SECURITY SITUATION AT THE MTSKHETA

Tags:  KNNP MNUC KCRM PARM PINR GG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0064
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0952/01 1411405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211405Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1608
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFITT/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/NSA US WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0048
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000952 

SIPDIS

DOE/NNSA PLEASE PASS TO CATHERINE KENNEDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC KCRM PARM PINR GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SECURITY SITUATION AT THE MTSKHETA
RADIOACTIVE STORAGE FACILITY

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000952 SIPDIS DOE/NNSA PLEASE PASS TO CATHERINE KENNEDY E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2019 TAGS: KNNP MNUC KCRM PARM PINR GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SECURITY SITUATION AT THE MTSKHETA RADIOACTIVE STORAGE FACILITY Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D ¶1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 7. ¶2. (C) Summary and Comment. The radioactive storage facility in Mtskheta, the permanent storage facility in Georgia for disused radioactive sources, is in need of a strengthened security guard presence, according to local experts and police. The Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration/Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program has done a tremendous job in upgrading the physical infrastructure and security procedures of the facility, and will be further upgrading the alarm system this summer. However, one area in the overall system still in need of improvement is guard security procedures and manning. While post does not consider the current situation an immediate threat, the facility is widely known to house radioactive material and is easy to access, located just off the main highway north of Tbilisi and not far from the embassy. In order to provide more robust security at the site, the Government of Georgia could designate the facility a site of strategic national importance, which would in turn require the government to provide state protection for the facility. End Summary and Comment. CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION ¶3. (C) The radioactive storage facility is on the property of the decommissioned nuclear reactor in Mtskheta, a few miles north of Tbilisi. It is maintained by the E. Andronikashvili Institute of Physics (IOP),which is part of the Ministry of Education and Science. The current security system components that GTRI has provided include deadbolt locks for doors; security lock boxes for key control; a two-person rule procedure in which each storage room door requires two independent keys and personnel to open it; siren/strobe light alarms; fixed and mobile duress buttons; motion sensors for each storage room and access entry; balanced magnetic switches on the doors; CCTV cameras, monitor and digital recording system; backup power via a diesel generator; exterior lighting; central alarm station room; and vibration sensors to detect penetration in the road side exterior wall. GTRI also ensures that personnel at the facility have been trained and a response plan for the facility developed. GTRI �
00A;contracts for warranty and maintenance visits on a quarterly basis. GTRI will be upgrading the alarm system this summer with the ability to conduct surveillance of the facility at off-site locations, thereby providing redundancy to the primary security system described above. ¶4. (C) Currently, the IOP has a private contract with the Security Police Department (SPD) to provide security guards. The current contract between SPD and IOP allows for six guards from their Mtskheta Division to be on site 24/7. Their main responsibility is to perform perimeter checks of the entire territory, which is about three hectares, consistently throughout the day and night. However, according to IOP personnel and as observed by poloff, the guards spend a majority of their time stationed at the main Qguards spend a majority of their time stationed at the main entrance to the property and do not even have direct line of sight to the storage facility, whose back wall is exposed to the road. IOP personnel claim that the guards are inexperienced and turn over frequently. IOP requested that the guards perform the perimeter checks, but were told that this would cost more money. Neither the IOP nor the Ministry of Education, which controls IOP's budget, has the financial resources to meet the increasing demands of the SPD. IOP employees told poloff that they often take it upon themselves to "guard" the facility due to the lack of acceptable security procedures exhibited by the guards. On 20 May, at the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program Scenario-Based Workshop, an official with the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) also discussed the issue of security at the facility, noting especially the lack of expertise displayed by the current security guards. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT ¶5. (C) Mamuka Komakhia, the Deputy Chair of the Security Police Department, whose department provides the current security guards to the site, also raised concerns regarding TBILISI 00000952 002 OF 002 the current situation. Due to the line of sight constraints from the main entrance, he recommended that a control post be established at the entrance of the storage facility with a static guard presence. He also suggested a barrier be erected at the entrance as a deterrent. However, without a financial increase in the contract, he would not be able to make these changes. ¶6. (C) The IOP has repeatedly appealed to the Government of Georgia for at least eight years, through letters to the Prime Minister, that it declare the facility a site of strategic importance, which would afford it state protection by specially trained guards. Besides acknowledging receipt of IOP's letters, the Prime Minister's office has not responded to IOP's requests. According to post's understanding of the law entitled "Engineering and Geodetic Control and Safety of Units (or Locations) Deemed Strategic and of Special Importance," the storage facility does qualify for this protection. Article 4 of the law states that facilities that are considered of strategic importance include buildings/facilities of those plants that use radioactive or toxic material as well as manufacturing, scientific-construction, military, customs and border control facilities that are necessary to provide for the country's security protection. Further, article 9 states that State Supervision protection of such facilities is exercised by Ministry of Defense, Special Protection Service, State Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, State Surveillance Service, Border Protection Service - within the area of their competence. ¶7. (C) The IOP has asked the Embassy to express USG support in order to designate the facility a GOG site of strategic importance. Post requests Department guidance in responding to this request. TEFFT

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -