GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA SNUBS INTERNATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000923 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SOUTH OSSETIA SNUBS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REF: A. TBILISI 808 ¶B. TBILISI 674 ¶C. TBILISI 908 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. South Ossetian de facto authorities' willingness to cooperate with the international community -- meager as it was -- took several steps backward in recent days. On May 7, they blocked the second meeting of the Incident Prevention Mechanism; on May 5, they blocked a visit from the Geneva process co-chairs to Tskhinvali; on May 1, a South Ossetian soldier shot directly at an EUMM patrol for the first time; and on May 8, South Ossetian soldiers threatened other EUMM monitors at the same spot. The South Ossetians surprised the EUMM with a seemingly cooperative attitude in a May 12 meeting, but in general their actions speak much louder than their words. With Russian border guards on the administrative boundary line, they likely feel quite confident in flouting the international community. Although their May 12 cooperative spirit may have been intended to make amends before the May 18-19 Geneva talks, it is clear that the de factos perceive no disincentive for non-cooperation. End summary and comment. SOUTH OSSETIA BLOCKS THE SECOND MECHANISM MEETING ¶2. (C) At the first meeting of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (JIPRM),all parties -- including South Ossetian representative Chigoev -- agreed that the second meeting would take place on Georgian-controlled territory (ref A),although they did not settle o a specific location. EUMM and OSCE participants attest that Chigoev even said he would be willing to go all the way to Tbilisi if necessary, but the basic agreement was to meet somewhere south of Tskhinvali. According to EUMM Head of Mission Hansjoerg Haber (most of the following is based on his account),on April 30, the EUMM sent invitations to all parties to meet at the Gori Hotel, which is just north of the city and has sufficient space to provide a separate room for each delegation (one element that was lacking at the first meeting). On May 4, the EUMM received a reply from South Ossetian de facto "presidential" representative Boris Chochiev (Chigoev's direct boss). Chochiev objected to the proposed location on the grounds that it did not accord with the provision in the Geneva document establishing the JIPRM that the meetings would be held in the so-called "security zone." (Note: The Geneva document contains no such provision.) Since Gori is well outside this zone, Chochiev proposed meeting back at the location of the first meeting. ¶3. (C) Noting that the Geneva document only states that the JIPRM would meet at locations "to be agreed," Haber explained that he made two key points to Chochiev in a May 4 reply. First, the original Georgian position was that the JIPRM meetings should alternate between territory controlled by Georgian and by South Ossetian de facto authorities, and the Georgian willingness to meet on the administrative boundary at Ergneti for the first meeting had therefore been a concession on their part. Second, the South Ossetian representative himself, Chigoev, had agreed to holding the meeting on Georgian-controlled territory. On May 5, Chochiev replied with a justification of the South Ossetian position based on the September 8, 2008 implementing measures, which Qbased on the September 8, 2008 implementing measures, which he cited as the foundation for the Geneva talks, and therefore the JIPRM. Although not entirely clear, his argument seemed to be based on the phrase "the areas adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia" used in that document; he suggested that Ergneti would fall into that category, but Gori (or its outskirts) would not. ¶4. (C) Haber countered on May 6 with an announcement of his intent to hold the meeting in Tirdznisi (about four kilometers from the boundary),even though the specific venue, a municipal building, was neither very comfortable nor appropriate. He did not ask for a reply. He also informed the Russian representative, Proshkin, who replied with a one-word answer: "Tak" ("Okay," or "Got it"). Chochiev did reply to Haber, however, reaffirming the position he took on May 5, stating that Tirdznisi was not in the adjacent areas, and that the de facto authorities would only meet in the "area of Ergneti." At that point Haber decided there was no point in pursuing the issue further and informed the sides of a decision to postpone the meeting. On May 7 the EUMM released a statement calling for "cooperation in getting together" for the Mechanism, adding that it was TBILISI 00000923 002 OF 003 "disappointing that we had to adjourn the meeting planned for today as one side changed its position on a suitable location as expressed during the initial meeting on 23 April." SOUTH OSSETIA BLOCKS VISIT OF GENEVA CO-CHAIRS ¶5. (C) EU Special Representative Pierre Morel, UN Special Representative Johan Verbeke, and OSCE Special Representative Charalampos Christopoulos -- the three co-chairs of the Geneva process -- visited Sukhumi on May 4, then planned to stop in Tskhinvali on the way back to Tbilisi the next day. South Ossetian de facto authorities agreed in principle to this itinerary beforehand. They informed the EU, however, that upon arrival at the administrative boundary, the delegations would have to exit their own vehicles and ride in de facto vehicles from the boundary to Tskhinvali. Representatives of all three organizations, who have traveled into South Ossetia on numerous occasions since the war, found this proposal unacceptable, including on security grounds; it was also counter to the practice followed in previous trips of all three representatives riding in their own vehicles all the way to Tskhinvali. SOUTH OSSETIAN SOLDIERS SHOOT AT ONE EUMM PATROL, THREATEN ANOTHER ¶6. (C) On May 1, an EUMM patrol approached the administrative boundary line between Dvani (on the Georgian-controlled side) and Muguti (on the South Ossetian side). A South Ossetian soldier stationed at a post on the South Ossetian side of the boundary, who appeared to be drunk, pointed his weapon at the patrol and fired five shots, none of which hit the patrol's vehicle. According to Haber, this was the first time an EUMM patrol had been "directly targeted." (Note: Post is aware of other incidents of shots being fired toward EUMM patrols (ref B); it is not entirely clear what distinction Haber sees between such incidents and the May 1 attack. End Note.) No one was hurt, and the patrol was not sure how close the shots came to their vehicle, but it immediately withdrew. Considering the incident an "isolated case" (i.e., the act of a single inebriated soldier, not a directed or coordinated attack),the EUMM decided not to make it public. When an EUMM patrol approached the same location on May 8, five South Ossetian soldiers took up firing positions, with one directly pointing an RPK rifle at the patrol. The patrol disengaged. Three hours later another EUMM patrol returned with the Gori EUMM chief to view the area. The South Ossetians again appeared threatening, and the patrol took video of the incident and the positions f the South Ossetians. AND NOW FOR THE GOOD COP ¶7. (C) EUMM set up a meeting with Russian Colonel Tarasov on May 12 to discuss the May 8 incident, bringing with them the videotape of the threatening behavior. Also in attendance was Chochiev, who took the EUMM delegation by surprise by stating that the behavior of the South Ossetians had been a mistake, the incident would be reviewed, and any individuals found to have violated rules would be reprimanded. He traced the threatening reaction of his troops to an incident earlier in the day, when a Georgian police Cobra APC had allegedly approached the checkpoint in a threatening manner before departing; he explained that the EUMM vehicle was mistaken for a Georgian COBRA. The EUMM gave the South Ossetians a Qfor a Georgian COBRA. The EUMM gave the South Ossetians a copy of the video, who promised to study it further. EUMM noted to the diplomatic corps on May 14 that the attitude on the other side of the table was quite constructive during the meeting, and the South Ossetians also shared details about the introduction of Russian FSB border guards to the boundary line. They stated that the Russians might select new positions to guard the boundary, as well as possibly construct new border posts as they deemed appropriate. Apart from an unacceptable South Ossetian request to have prior notification from the EUMM as to their patrols, EUMM officials characterized the meeting as "very different" from the past. COMMENT: ACTIONS, NOT WORDS ¶8. (C) Certainly a more constructive attitude in meetings would be welcome. Even if we accept the May 1 and 8 incidents as isolated aberrations, however, the recent snubs to the Geneva co-chairs and the JIPRM participants, which exceeded even the South Ossetians' own impressive level of obstructionism, would seem to be a more reliable indicator of their current attitude toward cooperation with the TBILISI 00000923 003 OF 003 international community. The regularity of security incidents has actually decreased considerably in recent days, a trend OSCE monitors trace to the presence of Russian border guards, for one of two reasons: either they have in fact established a more secure environment, or the Russians, South Ossetians and Abkhaz want the world to believe they can (and have therefore backed off the mischief). The South Ossetians may well want to convey such a message right now, in the context of the OSCE discussions and the upcoming Geneva talks, in order to suggest that Russia has effectively established security. In any case, it seems that the South Ossetians are feeling more secure with their Russian friends along the boundary, and therefore less obliged to make any concessions to the international community. As discussed in ref C, they -- and the Russians -- see no downside to their stance. TEFFT