GEORGIA: FOLLOW-UP COMMENTS ON CS-137 DISCOVERY

S E C R E T TBILISI 000912 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2019 TAGS: KNNP MNUC ASEC KCRM PARM PINR PREL GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: FOLLOW-UP COMMENTS ON CS-137 DISCOVERY REF: A. STATE 032944 ¶B. TBILISI 0449 ¶C. TBILISI 0314 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D ¶1. (S) As requested in ref A, poloff obtained additional information from the Government of Georgia regarding its response to the discovery of four Cs-137 sources buried near Kopitnari Airport. While not completely ruling out the possibility that the material was abandoned by smugglers, the government is not pursuing the case as a criminal matter. The road on which the sources were detected is a historic and modern smuggling route for many illicit activities, including narcotics and human trafficking. While the Nuclear and Radiation Safety Service (NRSS) was not fully confident that the material was buried without any intention of transporting it in the future, it stressed that this was unlikely. ¶2. (S) There are many other cases in Georgia of radioactive material discovered buried at previously unknown locations. This is especially true on former Soviet military bases, where containers would be emptied out to sell for scrap metal, and the radioactive sources simply buried as a means of disposal. For example, in 1997 at Lilo, eleven border patrol guards received serious injuries from radiation exposure when over ten Cs-137 sources were discovered after the property was transferred to the Georgians. Another example is at Vaziani in 1999, during transfer of the base to the Georgians, when a highly radioactive Cs-137 source was found buried under 30 cm of soil, and another fourteen sources of strontium found buried at a tank polygon. There are also several cases of Cs-137 being discovered buried at formerly state-owned property during the transfer to private ownership. According to NRSS, such burial of radioactive sources is usually linked to disposal of material and not to criminal intention. The February discovery of Cs-137 near Kopitnari Airport is assessed by NRSS to be a similar case; a matter of ignorant disposal and not criminal intent. ¶3. (S) As explained in ref B, the Georgians assess that the sources were buried two or three years ago, based on two pieces of evidence. First, an IAEA aerial survey conducted in 2000 covered the area, and no traces of radioactive material were detected at that time. Second, the sources were discovered buried next to a transformer that was installed about four or five years ago. The Georgians assess that if the sources had been buried at the location at the time of the installation, the sources would have been disturbed. NRSS now assesses that the sources are likely industrial sources, and because of the multitude of disused industrial sources located throughout the country, NRSS has little confidence that it could determine he origin. ¶4. (S) Comment. While they did not follow the procedure agreed upon in the Addendum to the Joint Document of Georgian and U.S. Delegations Georgia's Priority Needs to Improve Its Capabilities to Combat Nuclear Smuggling when responding to the incident, as detailed in ref A, the Georgians did successfully recover the radioactive sources and now seem Qsuccessfully recover the radioactive sources and now seem content to put the matter to rest. They sources have been transferred to the storage facility in Mtskheta, and the Government is not planning to pursue the case further. Lack of proper response procedures to such incidents is an ongoing problem in Georgia. This will likely be a main theme during the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP) Scenario Based Workshop scheduled for May 20-21 in Tbilisi, which will be a key event for the Georgians in learning how to improve these procedures. End comment. TEFFT