GEORGIA: DFM NALBANDOV ON UN, OSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000843 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 TAGS: PREL OSCE GR RS KZ GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DFM NALBANDOV ON UN, OSCE REF: A. TBILISI 760 ¶B. TBILISI 821 TBILISI 00000843 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Nalbandov summoned the Ambassador April 29 to request further U.S. help in encouraging the UN Secretary General to title his report "Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia." He also identified particular redlines for Georgia in the negotiations for a new UN mandate or UNSC resolution: the language must retain reference to Georgia's territorial integrity; the six-point cease-fire agreement is the only document in force and therefore needs to be referenced; and the Geneva process is the only operating venue for talks and must be affirmed. He added that Georgia opposed any appearance in New York by Abkhaz de facto "government" representatives. Regarding the May 18-19 meeting of the Geneva process, Nalbandov said Georgia sought a plenary session. In connection with the OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference in June, Nalbandov explained Georgia's position regarding the agenda language. The Ambassador agreed to convey Georgia's concerns to the Department. End summary. UN NEGOTIATIONS ¶2. (C) Following up earlier comments (ref A),Nalbandov restated Georgia's request that the United States encourage the UN Secretary General (UNSYG) to title the upcoming report something along the lines of "Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia." Nalbandov said he had the impression that the UNSYG himself would be deciding on the title, so it would be important to convey our encouragement directly to him or his staff. ¶3. (C) Nalbandov also listed some of Georgia's redlines in the negotiation of a new UN mandate and resolution, although he cautioned this was not necessarily an exhaustive list. First, a resolution must retain reference to Georgia's territorial integrity. That reference would preferably be explicit, but at the very least must be via citation of earlier resolutions (such as UNSCR 808) that use the phrase. Second, the August 12, 2008 six-point cease-fire agreement, as the only agreement relating to the conflict still in force, must also receive reference. Third, any resolution must also make reference to the Geneva process, which is the only functioning venue for international negotiations. Nalbandov noted that the inclusion of the internally displaced persons issue within the framework of the Geneva process was one reason it was so important to Georgia. ¶4. (C) In his final point about the UN process, Nalbandov reiterated Georgia's opposition to any involvement or appearance by the Abkhaz in the discussions in New York, in a formal or informal capacity, including an Arria-style meeting. GENEVA AND OSCE ¶5. (C) Nalbandov told the Ambassador that Georgia supported the holding of a plenary session at the May 18-19 session of the Geneva process. He noted that the Abkhaz de facto "government" representatives have still not committed to participating, but the holding of a plenary session is more important to Georgia than the participation of the Abkhaz. He said Georgia had communicated this preference to EU Special Envoy Pierre Morel. ¶6. (C) Nalbandov also offered an explanation of Georgia's position on the agenda for the OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC),to be held in June (ref B). After QConference (ASRC),to be held in June (ref B). After reviewing the history of the negotiations over the text, Nalbandov noted two key points for Georgia. First, the language that Georgia originally proposed, "with special focus on the armed conflict in August 2008," used text approved by the entire OSCE at the Helsinki Ministerial in November 2008, and should therefore be non-controversial. Second, Georgia is concerned that, if the language does not unambiguously refer to the Georgia-Russia war, the 2010 chairman-in-office of the OSCE -- Kazakhstan -- could have an easier time avoiding a discussion of the war when it sets the agenda for the 2010 ASRC. (Nalbandov added that this second issue is very sensitive, and he would not want it discussed openly.) Thus, Georgia would be willing to accept a compromise along the lines of "with special focus on the one (conflict, a word used earlier in the sentence) that took place after the 2008 ASRC," but the current Greek version -- "with special focus on serious developments that led to the TBILISI 00000843 002.2 OF 002 deterioration of the security situation since the 2008 ASRC" -- left too much room for future avoidance of the August 2008 war itself. TEFFT