GEORGIA: ALASANIA STILL BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000644 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ALASANIA STILL BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE REF: A. TBILISI 618 ¶B. TBILISI 463 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Head of the opposition Alliance for Georgia ("Alliance") Irakli Alasania requested a meeting with the Ambassador on March 30 to discuss plans for the April 9 protest. Alasania has been in discussions with the UNM ruling party regarding a possible dialogue to overcome the current standoff and defuse the plans of the more radical opposition to remain on the streets until Saakashvili resigns. Specifically, Alasania indicated he has been trying to convince the non-parliamentary opposition to limit the April 9 protest to one day. Alasania hoped that a strong one-day showing would give the non-parliamentary opposition more leverage in negotiations with the GOG, although he feared the non-parliamentary opposition had become a hostage to its own rhetoric and many would not agree to negotiate anything, but the resignation of the President. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: Privately, Alasania is engaged in trying to broker some way out of the impasse, though he seemed less than optimistic that there was any good way out of the "mess". He is well aware of the difficult political situation he faces trying to strike a moderate course while maintaining credibility among an increasingly radical group. So far Alasania has managed to remain on the fence without alienating either GOG officials willing to compromise or the non-parliamentary opposition, but this window appears to be closing. In spite of his very moderate, measured, and thoughtful tone in private, Alasania recently signed on to a non-parliamentary opposition manifesto calling for President Saakashvili's resignation and new elections. Various GOG representatives have pointed out Alasania's tendency to talk a good game privately but to turn around and publicly support the most radical demands of the non-parliamentary opposition. Nevertheless, the GOG remains willing to negotiate, at least for the time being. It is unclear how long the GOG will engage on Alasania's private waffling and public ultimatums. Alasania's plan is to pursue a one-day protest followed by a call for dialogue. Even Alasania admits he is unsure whether he can get the non-parliamentary opposition to agree to a one-day protest much less a unified negotiating agenda. Alasania appears to understand he has little room to maneuver and is hardly enthusiastic about any of his options. End Comment. These Guys Are Irrational About April 9 ¶3. (C) Alasania told the Ambassador that he had been attempting to limit the April 9 protests to one day. Alasania reasoned that showing that the non-parliamentary opposition could organize 100,000 people and peacefully disburse them would send a strong message to Saakashvili. Alasania said that he thought he was making some headway with the non-parliamentary crowd, but he was unsure if they would agree to a one-day event. So far, only fellow members of his Alliance, David Gamkrelidze (New Rights) and David Usupashvili (Republicans) had signed on to the plan. Alasania said that he understood Saakashvili would not resign, and the non-parliamentary opposition needed to have an alternative plan. Alasania lamented that most in the non-parliamentary opposition took it on faith that the protests would bring Saakashvili's government down. ¶4. (C) According to Alasania, his non-parliamentary allies were almost "suicidal" and completely unrealistic; none of them had given any thought to an end game other than Saakashvili resigning and them being swept into power. QSaakashvili resigning and them being swept into power. (Embassy Note: Poloff has heard rumors that a contentious issue between the non-parliamentary opposition is between Eka Beselia (United Georgia) and Koba Davitashvili (Party of the People) as to who will get to be Prosecutor General when Saakashvili resigns. Alasania ally, David Usupashvili recently told Polchief that he needed to start focusing on economic policy issues, apparently convinced that he would be holding a high ranking office soon. End Note.) Alasania reiterated that he had explained to his non-parliamentary allies that Saakashvili was unlikely to resign, and that they needed an alternate course of action. Alasania said his fear was that April 9 would fail, in that a small radical rump group of non-parliamentary opposition would protest indefinitely, weakening their message, alienating potential supporters and making a farce of the whole protest. Alasania told the Ambassador that he saw the wisdom in the GOG strategy of leaving the non-parliamentary group alone to discredit themselves. Alasania expressed hope that he would be able to get at least some of the non-parliamentary crowd to think about alternatives, but also said many -- he especially cited Levan Gachechiladze -- were becoming more radical by the minute. TBILISI 00000644 002 OF 002 One Day of Protests - Then What? ¶5. (C) Alasania was unsure what he would do if the non-parliamentary opposition did not agree to his idea of a one day protest. Alasania sought out the Ambassador's views on how he could "get out of this mess" and inquired if the USG would play the role of a guarantor in any GOG/non-parliamentary dialogue. The Ambassador replied that he would do all he could to facilitate dialogue but could not solve Georgia's internal political problems. Alasania said he understood but asked rhetorically a number of times during the conversation, "what is the way out of this mess?". Alasania said that if the protest went as he hoped and was limited to one day, he would present a demand to President Saakashvili for dialogue. Alasania said he understood the futility of presenting another ultimatum to the President. (Embassy Note: Despite his private misgivings about the utility of ultimatums, on March 27 Alasania signed on to the non-parliamentary manifesto calling for Saakashvili's resignation and new elections. End Note.) ¶6. (C) When the Ambassador inquired as to whether Alasania would be in a position to speak on behalf of the non-parliamentary opposition, Alasania said he did not know. The Ambassador noted that this dynamic sank GOG discussions with the non-parliamentary group in the past. Alasania answered that he understood that he had to be able to deliver something in order to negotiate with the GOG. Alasania said he hoped he would be able to convince a sizable group to follow him but was doubtful some of the more radical members would agree. (Embassy Note: Alasania, while understanding that an ultimatum for the President's resignation was a non-starter, did not appear to have clearly thought out what his demands would be. End Note.) GOG Ready to Talk but Is Alasania Ready to Walk the Walk ¶7. (C) Alasania indicated that he was unsure if President Saakashvili was serious about a dialogue, but had recently met with Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze and discussed a "deal". Baramidze said that the UNM was open to a number of issues (constitutional reforms - democratic reforms writ large) and hinted that early parliamentary elections were on the table, but not for 2009. Baramidze said that Alasania would have to publicly distance himself from the April 9 protests. Alasania declined as he believes politically he can not simply walk away from the April 9 demonstrations. Alasania also said he was not going to accept UNM,s dictated terms without a more concrete understanding of what UNM was ready to deliver. ¶8. (C) Alasania told the Ambassador that he and Baramidze agreed to speak again soon. Ambassador suggested that Speaker of the Parliament David Bakradze might also be a useful interlocutor as soon as Bakradze returns from abroad. Despite the contact between Alasania and GOG representatives, Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria expressed a view to EUR DAS Bryza and the Ambassador that is likely held by many in the GOG. Bokeria said that Alasania represented himself privately as a moderate willing to talk but never missed a chance to call for Saakashvili's resignation in public. Bokeria previewed the GOG position (which Baramidze presented) that if Alasania wanted to talk, he needed to present a moderate public face as well. Bokeria noted that although Alasania was in contact with the GOG about a dialogue, his public actions belied his private words. Nevertheless, Bokeria said the GOG remained open to discussions. TEFFT