GEORGIA: TIME TO MOBILIZE ON NEW UN MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000625 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS UNSC UNOMIG KBTS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: TIME TO MOBILIZE ON NEW UN MISSION REF: A. USUN 266 ¶B. TBILISI 484 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. UN Special Representative Johan Verbeke offered the U.S., French and German ambassadors additional details on his ideas for a new UN mission in Georgia, as well as a readout of recent trips to Washington, London, Moscow and Prague. He urged western countries to weigh in as soon as possible, because he is preparing his report now, which will inform the Secretary General's May 15 report to the UNSC (required by UNSCR 1866). He expressed concern about Russian willingness to accept key elements of any reasonable plan, and urged western countries to prepare to apply pressure to Russia directly. The Ambassador noted that Verbeke's ideas provided a good security regime, but insufficient human rights protection -- and a human rights flare-up was just as likely as a security incident to ignite a broader crisis. We agree, however, that now is the time to coordinate with our friends and take the initiative to shape a productive proposal. End summary and comment. VERBEKE'S THOUGHTS ¶2. (C) On March 25, Verbeke briefed from a revised non-paper from the Peacekeeping Office in New York, a copy of which we received March 27 (see paragraph 4). He expanded on ideas already summarized in an earlier non-paper distributed in New York (ref A). Verbeke urged the western countries to offer feedback as soon as possible, because he is in the process of preparing a report to the Secretary General (SYG) that will form the basis of the SYG's own report to the UNSC, due May ¶15. Verbeke expected to finalize his own report by mid-April. ¶3. (C) The additional details on his ideas include the following. -- Regarding the two zones mentioned in the earlier non-paper, the first would be between two and a half and six kilometers wide on either side of the Abkhaz administrative boundary line (ABL). Although he had first supported the narrower version, his military experts informed him that a wider boundary would be required because certain weapons of concern have considerably more than a five-kilometer range and could cover the 2.5 kilometers on both sides of the ABL. Although Verbeke would therefore support a wider zone, he understands that the width would have to be negotiated -- and two and a half kilometers would be the minimum to be effective. (The revised non-paper does not include a range, but settles on 6 kilometers.) The second zone, a "confidence zone," would be between six and eight kilometers wide, which would reach Zugdidi and Gali, but not the military bases in Senaki or Ochamchire. In addition, there would be a restricted naval zone extending 12 kilometers into the Black Sea and 8-12 kilometers on either side of the ABL. -- The inner zone would limit the sides to no armed forces, no heavy equipment such as tanks, artillery or anti-aircraft guns, and only a specified number of armored personnel carriers (APCs),and the latter would not be allowed to carry any weapons. The outer zone would also exclude tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns, but allow guns up to 80 mm in caliber. There would also be restrictions on air movements over the zones, including for reconnaissance (see paragraph 6). -- Rules of notification would have to be established for all Q-- Rules of notification would have to be established for all parties. This would presumably also apply to Senaki and Ochamchire. -- Some kind of accommodation would have to be reached for what Verbeke called "border guards" and law enforcement officials, who would provide security along the ABL and inside the zones and ensure secure and free movement of people across the ABL. He proposed that such officials should not be allowed to carry heavy weapons. -- UN monitors would continue to monitor the inner zone actively, as they do now. There would also need to be a provision for monitoring the Kodori Gorge, although perhaps not as frequently as along the ABL. -- One question Verbeke posed is whether the ABL should extend as far as the Russian border. He was inclined to oppose such a move, although he was still pondering the issue. He said doing so might make it easier to link the TBILISI 00000625 002 OF 003 Kodori Gorge to the rest of the UN mandate's territory, but it could also solidify a sense of the ABL as an established border and give Russia the sense that it can completely seal Georgia off from its Abkhaz territory. -- Although some have raised the idea, Verbeke did not think that the EU and UN monitoring missions would merge, but would retain independent roles. ¶4. (SBU) Th afternoon of March 27, Verbeke provided post with a copy of the revised non-paper (entitled "NON-PAPER: elements for a security regime and UN role," provided electronically to EUR/CARC). It provides additional details on the above proposals, including concrete limits on troop levels, but reflects the same basic approach. Verbeke informed the Ambassador that copies of the revised non-paper were provided to USUN, and the SYG himself was currently in Moscow and would provide Russia with a copy. RUSSIA'S RESPONSE ¶5. (C) Verbeke said that he had discussed some of these ideas in Moscow with Andrei Kelin of the MFA and MOD personnel and received the following responses. In general terms, the Russians said they accepted the principle of symmetry, but Verbeke noted their specific positions seemed at odds with that statement. Verbeke did not raise the issue of monitoring the human rights situation or of ensuring freedom of movement across the ABL. -- Russia accepts the idea of zones on the south side of the ABL, and in fact proposes extending the outer zone to 24 kilometers, which would include Senaki base, but does not see the need for any zones at all on the north side of the ABL. -- Russia does not see the need for monitors on the north side of the boundary. AMBASSADOR'S CONCERNS ¶6. (C) The Ambassador raised a few points and questions in response. First, he said it is at least as important to monitor the human rights situation as the security situation; a new crisis could erupt just as easily as the result of sudden or increased human rights violations as from a security incident. The Georgian government has also expressed the importance of this element of a mission, and UN executive police could fulfill this function. Verbeke answered that neither the Russians nor the Abkhaz will accept the idea; the Abkhaz are willing to accept a continuation of the civilian UN police mission with 20 staff, but not executive police. It will therefore be necessary to push the Russians on this point. German Ambassador Patricia Flor was not sure whether Berlin would be willing to make this effort. ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the proposed restrictions on aircraft would apply to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). He also noted that there had been proposals in the past for the UN itself to run reconnaissance UAVs in an effort to improve its monitoring of the situation, and that they could perhaps extend the UN's insight into areas even beyond the security zones, such as the Senaki and Ochamchire bases. At the time of the meeting Verbeke had not considered the issue, but the revised non-paper includes a prohibition on all reconnaissance flights, including by UAVs, for both zones, although it does not address the possibility of UN UAVs. GENEVA IN APRIL? ¶8. (C) Regarding the Geneva process, Verbeke said Kelin suggested Russia might be willing to accept the next round of meetings toward the end of April. Georgian interlocutors, Qmeetings toward the end of April. Georgian interlocutors, however, told Verbeke they did not believe Russia would cooperate with the incident prevention mechanism agreed to in February (ref B). In broader terms, Verbeke thought the UN in Geneva will eventually take over the process itself from the EU. COMMENT: CARPE DIEM ¶9. (C) On the whole we agree with Verbeke's strong proposals on the security side. We are somewhat concerned that he has not put sufficient emphasis on the protection of human rights. Under his "guiding principles," for example, he includes as a key objective "addressing the needs of the population," but does not offer much specificity on what those needs are, nor how substantial and urgent they are. TBILISI 00000625 003 OF 003 Under the "UN Role," he mentions the continuation of a UN Human Rights office and the "facilitation of provision of humanitarian assistance," but these steps strike us as insufficient. The Georgians, who plan to share their own thoughts on a mandate within the next few days, have likewise expressed concern that Verbeke's non-paper does not even mention IDPs. ¶10. (C) On the tactical side, however, Verbeke is absolutely correct that the sooner we (meaning the west) clarify our position and push Russia on the crucial elements of a new mandate, the harder it will be for Russia to take the initiative and get the conversation going down the wrong path. We also agree with Verbeke that countries will need to weigh in bilaterally with Russia on those crucial elements -- not least because Verbeke himself may not be our strongest advocate in Moscow. Finally, providing input to Verbeke in the next few weeks will go a long way toward ensuring that the SYG's report to the SYG -- which will presumably play an important role in the final negotiations in New York -- is as strong and as specific as possible. TEFFT