GEORGIA: EUR DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PM BAKRADZE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000604

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EUR DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH PM BAKRADZE,
MINISTER SHASHKIN ON MARCH 13, 14

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: EUR DAS Matt Bryza met with Speaker of
Parliament David Bakradze and discussed the future of the
UNOMIG, OSCE, and EUMM monitoring missions as well as
domestic politics. Minister of Corrections and Legal
Assistance Dimitri Shashkin explained his vision for
revamping the penal system as well as his role as the point
man in the GOG to facilitate democratic reform. End Summary.

PM Bakradze on Monitoring Missions and U.S. - Russian
Relations


2. (C) Bakradze said that as a baseline, no monitoring
missions in Georgia are preferable to compromises that would
serve to give South Ossetia and Abkhazia some sort of
recognition as independent entities. Bakradze said he
thought the Greeks put forth a stronger effort than he
expected as OSCE chair-in-office, but the Russians would
never agree to any realistic compromise to continue the OSCE
mission to Georgia. Bakradze hoped that OSCE members would
make clear that the Russians were solely to blame for killing
the OSCE mission in Georgia, given Georgia,s continuing
support for "status neutral" proposals of Greece (and Finland
in December). The Speaker said that with respect to
Abkhazia, any workable solution would have to
internationalize the police and security situation in the
breakaway region which he described as "getting out of
control." Bakradze expressed his fear that the EU would cave
to Russian pressure on monitoring issues and that without a
workable UN mandate in Abkhazia, the situation could explode.


3. (C) Bakradze was not concerned about the reset in
relations between the U.S. and Russia. DAS Bryza recounted
Secretary Clinton,s statement that any reset did not change
U.S. policy towards Georgia, namely, U.S. opposition to
Russian mistreatment of its neighbors and attempts to
dominate energy export routes to Europe. Bakradze mentioned
that he was very pleased with public comments by both
Secretary Clinton and Vice President Biden regarding Georgia
and unwavering U.S. support for Georgia,s territorial
integrity. Nevertheless, Bakradze was skeptical as to how
much the Russians would reset their relationship to work
constructively or in good faith with the United States
regarding either Georgia or Iran. The Speaker believed that
the Russians were starting to regret their decision to occupy
and recognize the breakaway regions. In Bakradze,s opinion,
the Russians would try desperately to "legalize" their
occupation, and he urged the U.S. to continue to work to deny
the Russians occupation any international legitimacy.

Bakradze - Ready to Work with Opposition but Fears the Worst


4. (C) Bakradze opened the discussion on the domestic
political scene by requesting that U.S. representatives treat
former UN Ambassador and current opposition leader, Irakli
Alasania in the same manner as other opposition leaders.
Bakradze explained that Alasania (and his camp) had been
using access to U.S. officials as a way to initiate rumors
suggesting the U.S. supports the overthrow of Saakashvili and
would like to install Alasania as president. Bakradze said
that he understood these rumors were absurd, but said they
were nonetheless widely believed. (Reftel) Bakradze said he
regarded Alasania as a friend and respected him a great deal
but thought that Alasania had a lot to learn as a politician
and had been making dubious political decisions, namely
joining David Gamkrelidze (New Rights) and David
Usupashvili,s (Republicans) parties. He questioned whether
QUsupashvili,s (Republicans) parties. He questioned whether
Alasania could salvage his political reputation if he makes
the short-term decision to support the demnds of the most
radical members of the non-parliamentary opposition.


5. (C) Bakradze said that Nino Burjanadze had become
unexpectedly radical. Bakradze was disappointed that
virtually no non-parliamentary groups joined the election
legislation working group. He added that he expected no
further progress with the increasingly radical non-opposition
until after the April 9 protests. Bakradze said that he
would always leave the door open should anybody change their
minds, but he did not sound optimistic about the path of the
non-parliamentary opposition. Bakradze felt that many among
the non-parliamentary opposition only wanted confrontation
and were looking for ways to provoke violence. (Embassy
Note: A similar feeling is prevalent among the parliamentary
opposition, and Alasania himself shared the Speaker's view.
End Note.). Bakradze said the problem was not peaceful
people in the street, and that the GOG welcomed the prospect
of large numbers of peaceful protestors voicing their views.
Rather, he feared potential violence that could be stoked by
a few provocateurs in the crowd, which could force the GOG to
react to a mob storming Parliament or the Presidential
Administration.

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6. (C) Bakradze said that neither he nor President
Saakashvili would resign their offices no matter how many
protestors gathered in the street. Bakradze said he
understood that a number of reasonable people were
dissatisfied with the GOG, but he did not sense a similar
feeling of acute anger in the air as he did in November 2007.
Bakradze said he thought the non-parliamentary opposition
felt the same way, making Bakradze more fearful that certain
protestors would try to spark anger by provoking a GOG
crackdown. Bakradze indicated that the GOG knew this and
would not respond like it had in the past. Lastly, Bakradze
said that a recent internal UNM poll showed Saakashvili,s
rating at 45 percent positive versus 39 percent negative.
Bakradze said support for UNM members and the GOG had dropped
somewhat, but the only opposition figure that received any
substantial support was Christian Democratic Leader Giorgi
Targamadze.

Dmitri Shashkin On Reforms


7. (C) Former IRI Chief of Party and current Minister of
Corrections and Legal Assistance Shashkin stated that the GOG
viewed the media; private property rights; judicial system;
and the penal system as the four areas in which to focus its
reform efforts. On the media, Shashkin said that he was
working with NGOs to develop objective criteria to evaluate
progress or lack thereof concerning media freedom (septel).
Shaskin stated that probation reform was a priority and
explained that his ministry did not have an accurate list to
track those on probation. Shaskin mentioned improving health
care for the incarcerated and living conditions among his
other key priorities, with the Ministry of Health reluctant
to take on this responsibility.


8. (C) On larger political issues, Shashkin said that the
GOG had formed a task force to work through scenarios to plan
a coordinated response to the April 9 protests. He said that
the GOG planned a hands off, non confrontational approach as
much as reasonably possible. Having painted themselves into
a corner, Shashkin feared that the non-parliamentary
opposition would try to provoke violence. Shaskin said he
was trying to engage non-parliamentary leaders to find a
constructive and face saving way out. Shashkin said that
unfortunately, many non-parliamentary leaders had staked
everything on April 9, so he was not optimistic that his
efforts would be fruitful. Shashkin stressed that the GOG
would seek to avoid violence at all costs. He noted that the
special prison forces under his command were perhaps the most
effective crowd control personnel in Georgia. For precisely
this reason, Shahskin planned to keep them off the streets on
April 9. "These guys know and want to do only one thing beat
people. We will therefore keep them away from the
protestors."
TEFFT