GEORGIA: NINO BURJANADZE -- WHAT'S THE GAMEPLAN?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000502 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NINO BURJANADZE -- WHAT'S THE GAMEPLAN? REF: A. A. TBILISI 0378 ¶B. B. TBILISI 0089 ¶C. C. 2007 TBILISI 2050 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze, who has a long-cultivated and well-deserved image of moderation both domestically and internationally, has expressed her intentions to play a prominent role in the planned April 9 protests calling for President Saakashvili's resignation and new elections. However, rumors are circling Tbilisi about Burjanadze's motives, and newfound resources. Post has heard from a number of government and non-government officials that Burjanadze is accepting funding from Russian sources for her party. Members of Burjanadze's team emphatically denied that Burjanadze would accept money from Georgia's enemies and Burjanadze herself expressed anger that anyone could think that she would accept Russian money to visiting EUR DAS Bryza on March 14. Burjanadze admitted that she has become much more radical, but stated that President Saakashvili's government left her no choice but to engage in radical behavior. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: Burjanadze's most recent radical turn leaves it open as to what her political game plan is, and some members of the Tbilisi political elite are openly suggesting that she has become desperate enough to cooperate with interests in Russia to bring down the Saakashvili Government. Post does not discount the self-serving nature of many political actors in repeating this rumor to Embassy officials. Certainly, President Saakashvili and his supporters have motive and opportunity to spread the line that Burjanadze is on the Russian take. However, accusations that Burjanadze is taking money from Russian sources come from government and opposition sources and it is clear that she has been spending significant sums of money to expand her organization. In spite of Burjanadze's disavowal of the rumors, her staff has acknowledged the reality of her situation; she is running out of money and her polling numbers are very low. This desperate situation may help explain her shift to the radical side of Tbilisi's political spectrum. Since jumping to the opposition, Burjanadze has not engaged the GOG or less radical opposition on specific policy issues; most recently, her party decided not to take part in a working group on election code reform. It seems that Burjanadze is painting herself into a corner where she will have to take more and more radical measures if she is to accomplish her stated objective of ousting Saakashvili this spring. End Comment. Moderation No More ¶3. (C) Burjanadze has become increasingly strident in her calls for President Saakashvili's resignation and has been sharpening the tone of her public rhetoric. Burjanadze stated that the referendum idea advanced by the Alliance for Georgia, aka the "Alliance" (Former UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania's political team),was generally a good way to solve problems, but not in Georgia. Burjanadze recently called for civil servants to stage a work stoppage to force the Government to shut down. (Embassy Note: Burjanadze claimed to DAS Bryza that she only called for politicians to leave UNM and for civil servants to not engage in any illegal activity. Burjanadze said her comments were misreported and part of a "smear" campaign. End Note.). Burjanadze also claimed in a recent interview that Russia wanted Saakashvili to remain as President, a view that seems to fly in the face of Russia's stated intentions of regime change. Qof Russia's stated intentions of regime change. ¶4. (C) Burjanadze has become the most vocal member of the non-parliamentary opposition in calling for protests beginning on April 9, publicly positioning herself as the leader of the effort. Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria, and Speaker of Parliament David Bakradze both told the Ambassador that Burjanadze has approached Patriarch Ilia II and asked for his support in removing Saakashvili from power. According to them, Burjanadze is trying to convince the Patriarch that the Russians are planning another attack, and it would be better to have her in charge as she can deal with the Russians. If true, Burjanadze appears to be playing a dangerous game, using the external Russian threat for her own political gain. Her increasingly radical rhetoric and dubious decisions are causing many to raise some uncomfortable questions about her motives and associations. Burjanadze - The Face of the Rally ¶5. (C) Burjanadze seems to be positioning herself as the public face of the rally. Although it was not initially her proposal, she is the most prominent politician who has declared his or her intention to participate in the protests planned for April 9 (Embassy Note: Other groups who intend TBILISI 00000502 002 OF 003 to participate are the Conservatives (Kakha Kukava, Zviad Dzidziguri),Industrialists (Zurab Tkemaladze),Party of the People (Koba Davitashvili),Movement for a United Georgia (Eka Beselia) and a number of smaller parties including Salome Zourabichvili's Georgian Way. End Note.). Ironically, Burjanadze's participation in the protests thus far has cooled the willingness of other non-parliamentary groups to participate. Shalva Natelashvili (Labor) has stated repeatedly that his party would not participate in any rallies in which Burjanadze is involved. Former PM Zurab Noghaideli told the Ambassador that he had not decided whether to participate or not. Alasania (Alliance) has also not committed to the protests. Alliance members have stated repeatedly that they would not be held to any "artificial" timetables. While leaving their options open, the Alliance has been indicating it would not participate in the protests. Burjanadze commented that she disdained having to sit at the same table as Beselia, Kukava, and Zourabichvili (whom she described as the best of a terrible group). Somewhat strangely, she blamed President Saakashvili for this "unfortunate" turn of events and steadfastly refused to acknowledge her current situation had anything to do with her own decision making. ¶6. (C) Rumors of Burjanadze's disdain for Alasania are rife. She and her staff have told us that she had hoped to work together with Alasania -- but they could not reach agreement on who would head their efforts. She publicly stated that she made multiple offers to Alasania and the Alliance to cooperate, but the fact that no consensus was reached was "not my fault". Burjanadze went on to state that she had no problems taking "joint steps with other political parties, but Mr. Alasania chose another strategy." She publicly ridiculed the Alliance's referendum idea, and has vowed to move on without them. Privately, Burjanadze fumed at Alasania at one point accusing him of being a UNM project. She told EUR DAS Bryza that she was extremely angry about Alasania forming the Alliance and that he did so "behind her back". Burjanadze went on to say that it was "Irakli's fault for not accepting the number two position in her party." Burjanadze came back to the point that Alasania had ruined everything by not accepting her offer to join her party numerous times over the course of the meeting. Burjanadze is now in the unexpected position of leading a protest with the most radical members of the non-parliamentary group who have been harshly critical of her role in Saakashvili's government over the course of nearly six years before her resignation in May 2008. While some sort of marriage of mutual convenience is still possible before April 9, Burjanadze's recent radical turn has resulted, at least temporarily, in more infighting, mutual recriminations, and dysfunction among the various non-parliamentary groups. Russian Money Rumors Abound -- But Who Benefits? ¶7. (C) Post has been hearing from senior Georgian officials that Burjanadze has been taking money from Georgians in Moscow -- namely from Georgian businessman and Moscow resident Mikheil Khubutia, who has actively worked with Russian officials since the conflict -- to support her political party and finance the April 9 protests. Parliamentary opposition leaders Giorgi Targamadze (Christian Democrats),and Paata Davitaia (We Ourselves) both told poloff that they were certain Burjanadze was taking Russian money and that she planned to pay protesters to show up on April 9. Targamadze told poloff that Burjanadze has been QApril 9. Targamadze told poloff that Burjanadze has been able to open a number of regional offices and a new Tbilisi office in an high rent district recently after complaining for months that she had insufficient resources. Targamadze added that "everybody" was interested in this apparent newfound source of funds. Local IRI representative told poloff that she had heard the same rumors and additionally, that Burjanadze's husband, former director of the Border Guards Badri Bitsadze, was organizing (and funding with either Russian or his own funds) dismissed border guards to act as provocateurs during the April 9 rallies. Gia Tortladze, an MP from the minority party Democratic Party of Georgia and chairman of the Anti-Crisis Committee, publicly stated that a lot of money is flowing from Russia to finance the rallies and the opening of new offices (Embassy Note: Tortladze did not say directly that Burjanadze was accepting Russian money but it was clear to whom he was referring. He additionally said that "Russia is ready, in case of turmoil, to come into Georgia under pretext of protecting democracy - whose democracy should Russia protect? Nino Burjanadze's democracy?" End Note.). Tortladze claimed tha activists are being paid GEL 2000 - GEL 3000 (USD 1150-1750) to stir up trouble. ¶8. (C) Burjanadze representative Thea Gogvadze-Apfel vehemently denied all such allegations, stating that she would quit if she believed that Burjanadze was accepting Russian money. For her part, Burjanadze expressed her TBILISI 00000502 003 OF 003 profound anger at being questioned about her funds saying "(y)ou (DAS Bryza and Ambassador Tefft) should know better." Nevertheless, Burjanadze did not explain how she has been able to fund her expanding political movement, nor did she categorically deny the allegations. When asked specifically about rumors about her or her husband receiving funding from Khubutia, Burjanadze became very uncomfortable and asked for "proof" of the allegations. While Burjanadze blamed the government for the rumors, she speculated that Alasania and David Gamkrelidze were active in peddling the negative rumors regarding Russian funding to Embassy officials (Embassy Note: Neither party has approached Embassy officials regarding this matter. End Note.). ¶9. (C) Most Georgians take as a matter of faith that the Kremlin plays an active role in funding certain political figures. Against this backdrop, a political commentator told poloff that it was an easy charge to make -- that somebody is taking Russian money -- and as old as Georgian politics itself. The commentator stated that Burjanadze's checkered and shadowy financial past (reftel C) made her an easy target for such a charge, and that proof or not, many would simply believe the rumor. If the GOG is pushing this rumor as Burjanadze claims, her self-declared elevation to the leader of the protest provides the GOG with an almost perfect scenario to exploit. As the face of the protest, if it becomes widely believed that Burjanadze is taking Russian money to organize the rallies, the one major beneficiary appears to be President Saakashvili and the UNM. If such a story line were to unfold, the UNM would be able to dismiss the non-parliamentary opposition as tools of Russian bad intentions, dismiss the protests out of hand, and finish off Burjanadze's once promising political career. An Alternative Explanation ¶10. (C) Burjanadze could be pursuing a different tactic. It is undeniable that she has been spending conspicuously to open a new Tbilisi office and offices in the regions. Her decision to maintain two offices in high-rent Tbilisi districts may simply reflect her well known high-end tastes and the fact that her family does have its own resources. Gogvadze-Apfel told poloff that she and the rest of the staff had not been paid in over two months and admitted that she was being forced to consider new employment options. Burjanadze might have decided to spend a large portion of her personal wealth on an "all in" bet, hoping that she can be the face of the non-parliamentary opposition protests that bring down President Saakashvili. According to Gogvadze-Apfel, Burjanadze is well aware of her low popularity. However, among the non-parliamentary opposition, she is the most experienced politician and the only one among them that has held high level elective office. Perhaps sensing that her long-term political prospects are slim, betting everything on near term elections might be the best play of a poor hand. Towards the end of her conversation with EUR DAS Bryza, she stated that she had approached various European officials (she did not specify) and asked them to intervene and try to convince Saakashvili to resign. Burjanadze suggested to EUR DAS Bryza and the Ambassador that U.S. officials should do the same. Both indicated that her request was improper. In the extremely unlikely event that Saakashvili decided to resign, it would not be inconceivable that Burjanadze would be lifted to the Presidency by default, since she, a former Acting President, would be an obvious Qsince she, a former Acting President, would be an obvious candidate. This scenario is a longshot, but if Burjanadze has indeed calculated her long term political prospects as dim, it is not an irrational tactic. TEFFT