GEORGIA: READOUT OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000488 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV IRGG RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: READOUT OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO TEHRAN TBILISI 00000488 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Nalbandov told the Ambassador that his March 1-3 visit to Tehran concentrated on issues of bilateral cooperation. In Tehran, Nalbandov, together with Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, met with Chair of the Parliamentary Commission on National Security and Foreign Policy Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Hossein Sheikholislam, and Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. While the meetings were publicly touted as deepening the Georgian-Iranian relationship, Nalbandov said he felt many of the messages delivered to him were intended for the U.S. and that much of what was said by Iranian officials regarding the August conflict and Georgia had come directly from the Russians. END SUMMARY. BOROUJERDI ) U.S. TROOPS OUT, AFGHANISTAN A MESS ¶2. (C) Parliamentarian Boroujerdi told Nalbandov that while Iran welcomed the end of a dictatorship in Iraq, they supported an immediate removal of foreign armed forces from Iraqi territory. He said Iran deeply hopes that the new U.S. administration will quickly withdraw U.S. forces. Boroujerdi said Iran is increasingly concerned over the situation in Afghanistan, as they see a dramatic increase in drug production and trafficking, something that directly benefits and strengthens the Taliban and Al Qaeda. He stressed that NATO is ineffective in Afghanistan and that he is not convinced that President Obama,s decision to strengthen military operations will put an end to drug trafficking. Boroujerdi said that Iranian concern is growing over the Taliban-controlled sections of Pakistan -- and he directly tied the Taliban's resurgence to failed military operations in Afghanistan. He told the Georgians that conflict in the region was a result of failed Bush administration policies. Boroujerdi also raised the case of arms smuggler Ardabil whom Georgia extradited to the U.S., saying that Georgia should help repatriate him to Iran as a sign of its commitment to the Georgia-Iran relationship. SHEIKHOLISLAM ) RETURN ARDABIL AND MORE RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA ¶3. (C) Sheikholislam, who had been Nalbandov,s direct contact on Ardabil in the past, stressed that the arms smuggler must be returned. He went so far as to threaten that if Georgia did not act on this, "what options would Iran have?" Sheikholislam said that the U.S. is Georgia's partner and that Georgia should make the U.S. understand that extraditing Ardabil was not the right step and should be reversed. Nalbandov, however, stressed that he was in Tehran to talk about building a constructive relationship, something that should not fall victim to one incident. Sheikholislam said he understood, but that Georgia must understand the Iranian government is receiving pressure from Ardabil,s family and others. Sheikholislam expressed hope for a more constructive Obama administration. He said that Georgia made a fundamental mistake in &letting its territory be turned into a battlefield between two big states.8 Qinto a battlefield between two big states.8 ¶4. (C) Sheikholislam then launched into a series of questions that Nalbandov was certain the Russians had planted. He first said that the Russians had informed Iran that the U.S. was building military bases in Georgia to conduct military operations in the region. Nalbandov assured him that this was not the case, but that the Russians were building bases in the occupied territories. Sheikholislam said the Russians were concerned by Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. He also asked if there are any anti-Iranian military activities underway in Georgia, to which Nalbandov replied no. During lunch, Sheikholislam asked about the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, saying that the Russians had informed the Iranians that there is a secret attachment to the document. Nalbandov once again refuted the anti-U.S. Russian propaganda. Sheikholislam said that Georgia should look at a multinational security forum with Russia, and take into account Russian interests. Nalbandov said that this was very difficult to do when Russia occupied 20 percent of Georgian territory and had troops within 40 km of Tbilisi. FM MOTTAKI - SPEAKING FOR THE RUSSIANS TBILISI 00000488 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Nalbandov said the meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki focused mainly on Georgia's relationship with Russia and the August conflict. Nalbandov said when he arrived for the late evening meeting, the Russian Ambassador to Iran was conspicuously departing, solidifying Nalbandov,s belief that the Russians were instructing the Iranians on Georgia issues. Mottaki expressed strong interest in transit possibilities in the region, nominally for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but clearly, according to Nalbandov, for Iran as well. Mottaki asked if the Georgian transport system ) ports, railways, roads ) continued to experience any problems following the August conflict, to which Nalbandov answered no. Mottaki was also interested in the Georgian opinion on the Russian-Ukrainian gas problems from earlier this winter. Nalbandov stressed to him that this episode showed the Europeans that Russia is not a reliable partner and that they need diversification. Mottaki asked what the best possible future is for Georgian-Russian relations. Nalbandov said the Georgians are ready to discuss relations, but they can not sacrifice the territorial integrity of the country. Mottaki then asked if the European Union, United Nations, or United States intended to introduce sanctions against Russia, Nalbandov skirted the question, instead stressing that Georgia needs to have territorial integrity respected and restored. The two then discussed the Turkish stability platform proposal for the region aimed at preventing future conflict. Mottaki said this proposal made him nervous, and that &we8 in the region should solve our own problems without outside interference. FUTURE VISITS? ¶6. (C) Both Motaki and Sheikholislam raised the question of a visit to Iran by Georgian Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze, as well as the possibility of Georgian Prime Minister Nika Gilauri coming to Tehran. Nalbandov said he avoided mentioning any details, saying that Vashadze,s visit would not be expedient, and that the FM would come at the correct time. During a Vashadze visit they could discuss a possible PM trip. The Iranians appeared to welcome the message, noting that a FM trip would be best after the upcoming Iranian elections. Mottaki also said that Iran would be very interested in resuming a joint economic council with Georgia. Sheikholislam also discussed deepening the parliamentary relationship between the two countries. COMMENT: MESSAGES TO THE U.S., SPEAKING FOR THE RUSSIANS ¶7. (C) Nalbandov sensed that many of the messages the Iranian leadership delivered were meant for a secondary U.S. audience, and that they may have been directly dictated by the Russians. Key among these was the message that any new sanctions against Iran will fail. Boroujerdi, Sheikholislam, and Mottaki all mentioned the case of arms smuggler Ardabil, urging Georgia to do the &right thing,8 and ask the U.S. to return him and then hand him over to Iran. Nalbandov said that while several officials stressed that the future of Georgia's relationship with Iran was dependent on this, he QGeorgia's relationship with Iran was dependent on this, he felt their mentioning of this case was more of a check-the-box requirement than an actual impediment. Boroujerdi delivered the message that Iran wants U.S. troops out of the region immediately and that the U.S. is to blame for chaos in the region. The Russians also appeared to use Iran as a proxy to get answers to questions such as the possibility of sanctions and Georgia's thoughts on the future of the relationship. The Iranians, it appears, also seemed to use Nalbandov's visit to question Russian-spread information on supposed aggressive U.S. moves in the region including military bases in Georgia and anti-Iranian activities in Georgia. Nalbandov shared his personal impressions of the visit, in particular that he was surprised by the staggering poverty in Tehran. He added that while all official meetings were conducted in Farsi and Georgian, all side discussions, including with the Minister were conducted in English. TEFFT