GEORGIA: RUMORS OF A SPRING OFFENSIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 000408 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUMORS OF A SPRING OFFENSIVE REF: MOSCOW 0224 Classified By: AMBASSAOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In recent weeks, we have detected a marked increase in comments, both public and private, that the Russians plan to invade Georgia in the spring. These rumors have started to percolate into the press, assisted by Georgian parliamentarians such as Chairman David Bakradze who expressed fear on 24 February that "Russian aggression" in the spring cannot be ruled out. Possibly underlining these rumors are renewed comments by Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer of the likelihood of Russian military action in April 2009. MFA speculated that the source of the rumor could be a Russian special services disinformation campaign or it could be based on the fact of possible aggression as early as March. Regardless of the validity of the rumors and their lack of factual basis, these thoughts have been on the Georgian government's agenda recently. END SUMMARY. In Felgenhauer We Trust ¶2. (C) Georgian pundits, as well as officials in the Saakashvili government and in opposition, have been recently taking their concerns public about the possibility of renewed fighting in the South Caucasus. Georgian Parliamentary Chairman David Bakradze commented that another "Russian military aggression against Georgia" was possible, and that Georgian politicians needed to be aware of their responsibilities in the face of such external threats. Defense Minister David Sikharulidze joined the chorus, stating that Russia may "stage new acts of provocation." Perhaps laying at the base of this is Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer's articles stating his view that the Russians would invade in April 2009. Some are skeptical of Felgenhauer's pronouncements, with military expert Kakha Katsitadze stating that Felgenhauer was predicting war with Russian "in unison" with the Georgian government to distract the population from real problems in Georgia now. However, Felgenhauer's supposed prediction of the August 2008 war has taken on a life of its own in the Georgian elite, and thus his views are noted with interest amongst the punditocracy and government (see reftel). MFA Speculates About Russian Intentions ¶3. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on 26 February, Georgian MFA Director of the Russian Section Irakli Toronjadze acknowledged the rumors, and in a microcosm of the wide-ranging reactions of the government, first placed the blame on a Russian "special services" propaganda campaign, followed immediately by an acknowledgment that it could be true, again quickly followed by a recognition that no one really had any idea of its validity. Eventually, he settled on the fact that it was just likely rumors that have begun to feed on themselves, and that while an offensive in March could happen due to his belief that Russia certainly had war plans ready on the shelf, the Georgian government would just have to sit and wait to see what happens. He also expressed his belief that Russian leadership was increasingly disappointed that countries such as Belarus had not recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and it was the opinion in the MFA that Lukashenko would continue to lay the blame on Parliament as he pushed off making a decision for "years." ¶4. (C) During the talks in Geneva, poloff noted that Russia had alleged the Government of Georgia had placed 2,000 soldiers on the border with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with additional heavy equipment in support. Even after these allegations were refuted by the OSCE and EUMM, both the Russians and South Ossetians continued to make such claims, QRussians and South Ossetians continued to make such claims, further bolstering paranoia among the Georgians of a new Russian attempt to have a pretext for additional operations. Additionally, observers have noticed the continuing increase in time between talks in Geneva, with the next round notionally scheduled for June. This four-month break has been a sharp change from recent talks, which occurred in one month intervals or even slightly more frequent. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: A paucity of facts has not limited the willingness of the press or the pundits to spread the rumors of a renewed Russian offensive in Georgia in the spring. Public apprehension over the prospect of another Russian invasion in palpable in Tbilisi. Increasingly conversations with our interlocutors begin with a question: "do you believe there will be war?". In a society where rumors fly with great speed, we expect this fear to grow as long as the Russians continue to threaten Georgia militarily and with provocative statements. END COMMENT. TEFFT