GEORGIA: VERBEKE ON WAY FORWARD FOR UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000040 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: VERBEKE ON WAY FORWARD FOR UN REF: 08 TBILISI 2123 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. UN Special Representative for Georgia Johan Verbeke offered the Ambassador initial thoughts on the prospects for renewal of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). He believes Russia would prefer to see the mission closed, but might not want to risk international condemnation over its closure; the Abkhaz would prefer to see it stay open, but it is not clear how much they can influence Russia's decision. The mission could be salvaged in some form, but it will not be easy; Russia will almost surely block a technical rollover, and will likely reject a strengthened mandate as well. In Verbeke's view, the most feasible approach might be to change the basic structure in a way that all sides could accept, such as a main office outside Georgia (such as Vienna) and two satellite offices in Sukhumi and Tbilisi. If the substantive issues can be resolved, Verbeke thinks the name will not be a dealbreaker. Given the serious incidents and humanitarian difficulties that continue along the Abkhaz administrative boundary -- which UNOMIG has documented as originating almost exclusively on the Abkhaz side -- an international presence on both sides remains an important stabilizing factor. Considering the remarkable restraint Georgian forces have demonstrated in the face of those attacks, Georgia deserves a forceful, coordinated effort to find a way to maintain the UN mission. End summary and comment. ¶2. (C) In a meeting on January 8, Verbeke gave an overview of the range of possibilities for a renewal of the UN's mandate in Georgia. The most basic would be a technical rollover of the existing mandate, as occurred in October 2008; although this is currently the most discussed option in New York, he thought the Russians would almost surely block a second rollover. Another approach would be to maintain the existing basic structure, but revise the monitors' authorities either up or down. He thought the Georgian side would not accept a weakened mandate, while the Russian side would not accept a stronger one. A more radical revision would change the existing structure. Establishing a mission in Abkhazia only, or two separate missions in Abkhazia and in Georgia, would please the Russians and the Abkhaz, but be unacceptable to the Georgians. Another radical reviion would be to take the approach proposed by Finland to revise the OSCE mission to Georgia: to establish a base office outside Georgia, most likely in Geneva, with two satellite offices in Sukhumi and Tbilisi. Although Russia rejected this approach for the OSCE mission, Verbeke thought it might ultimately prove acceptable, if not palatable, to all sides. ¶3. (C) On tactics, Verbeke warned against pursuing a technical rollover -- toward which, he thought, many western friends seem to be drifting -- because Russia would most likely oppose a rollover and allow the mission to expire. He explained that Russia went along with the rollover in October without a substantive discussion of the mission, but would probably demand such a discussion this time around -- and would end up rejecting the rationale for the mission in its current form. He also warned against starting with a discussion of the mission's name, which could get bogged down Qdiscussion of the mission's name, which could get bogged down in politicized exchanges and prevent consideration of the real issues. He advised tackling those first -- i.e., the basic parameters and structure of the mission -- in order to see if there is a deal to be made. If there proved to be enough political will to find a solution to the substantive issues, he thought the name issue could ultimately be finessed. One approach on the name might be to use a thematic designation, such as "UN Stabilization Mission," with no mention of the country. ¶4. (C) Regarding Russia's attitude to the discussion, Verbeke expressed more pessimism than optimism. He thought Russia might end up going along, because it would be awkward for Russia, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to be seen as removing a UN mission from Georgia at this sensitive time. He acknowledged, however, that Russia already showed itself willing to weather criticism for such a stance at the OSCE. He even thought Russia might make the calculation that any damage sustained for obstructionism at the UN might not compound the damage from the OSCE stance very much; perhaps the international community would mark down Russia's decisions as one black mark, not two. Another important lesson Verbeke drew from the OSCE decision was that Russia was willing to play harder ball than most observers expected; it did not want an international presence in the territories, TBILISI 00000040 002 OF 002 and its actions in Vienna may well be the first step in a long-term plan to remove all international monitors (the "slice-by-slice" approach described in reftel). Verbeke noted that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin recently asked him why monitors were needed on both sides of the administrative boundary, since the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) covers the south side and Russia provides security on the north. Verbeke suggested this question indicated that Russia perceives the EUMM as serving its interest of keeping the spotlight on the Georgian government and its actions, instead of Russia and the de facto Abkhaz authorities. In other words, Russia would be content to have no monitors in Abkhazia and only the EUMM outside it. ¶5. (C) Verbeke also pointed out that the EU faced its own internal difficulties on the EUMM, because there is no unanimity on the importance, or even the need, for a continued presence in Georgia. Ironically, both the "softies" and the "hardies" -- i.e., those who are wary of supporting Georgia and those who want to do as much as possible for Georgia -- have reasons to question the EUMM's continuing presence. The "softies" never understood why the EU should play a role in Georgia in the first place. The "hardies" perceive that under its current limitations of not being able to enter the territories, the EUMM actually hurts Georgia and helps Russia. He suggested the EU faced some tough discussions in the near future. (He also noted this internal dissent within the EU was very sensitive and asked not to be quoted in this regard.) ¶6. (C) Unlike the Russians, the Abkhaz want to see a continued UN presence, according to Verbeke. He said they see the UN as a counterweight to Russia. Although they would prefer a mission to Abkhazia alone, Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" Sergey Shamba told Verbeke in a December 24, 2008 phone call that he understood the UN's position that any mission would have to be on both sides of the boundary. (Abkhaz de facto "President" Bagapsh recently told British Ambassador Denis Keefe, however, that Abkhazia would never agree to a UN mission under the current name.) More generally, Verbeke said his recent conversations with the de facto authorities indicated that the initial euphoria after Russia's recognition of Abkhazia had died down, that they were now experiencing more than a little buyer's remorse. He said this was also true among representatives of Abkhaz civil society, who, without spelling it out, have been suggesting that they will not accept independence at any price. They have expressed specific concerns about Russia's economic influence, for example, and the potential environmental impact of the Russian presence. A week after Verbeke met with Shamba in mid-December, Karasin called Verbeke for a readout of the meeting -- suggesting to Verbeke that Russia is trying to keep close tabs on its client's actions regarding the UN. COMMENT: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARY ¶7. (C) While UNOMIG patrolling efforts have been hampered in recent months, post continues to consider the UN mission in Georgia a vital deterrent to increased violence or renewed hostilities in western Georga. Post likewise sees the UN as an important source of information about such topics as living conditions and human rights in Abkhazia, which is now more isolated than ever. In recent months, UNOMIG has Qmore isolated than ever. In recent months, UNOMIG has documented the persistence of the attacks against the Georgians from the Abkhaz side of the boundary -- and the Georgians' remarkable restraint in not responding in kind. We believe it is, therefore, worth making strenuous and creative efforts to secure a continued UN mandate -- as long as it does not lend any legitimacy to the separatist Abkhaz regime. President Saakashvili has consistently insisted that Georgia will not agree to any long-term arrangement that could come back to haunt it in future negotiations or lend any legitimacy to the Abkhaz, and the potential benefits of a renewed UN mandate are not worth any further weakening of Georgia's already difficult position. If Abkhaz statements to Verbeke are sincere, it is possible the Abkhaz themselves might be the biggest proponent of a continued UN mission, as long as we can find a formulation they and the Georgians can deal with. Post believes that Verbeke's formulation -- or another creative approach -- that would keep UNOMIG in business is worth the effort. The big question is whether the Russians are ready to discuss the issue, or are committed to closing down UNOMIG. TEFFT