Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI314
2009-02-13 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: DISCOVERY OF ORPHAN RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

Tags:  PARM PGOV PREL KNNP DOE GG 
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VZCZCXRO1686
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0314 0441441
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131441Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0938
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/US CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 000314 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/ECC ACHURCH AND BGOLDEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019
TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL KNNP DOE GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DISCOVERY OF ORPHAN RADIOACTIVE SOURCE

REF: A. TBILISI 00019

B. TBILISI 00275

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 000314 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/ECC ACHURCH AND BGOLDEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2019 TAGS: PARM PGOV PREL KNNP DOE GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DISCOVERY OF ORPHAN RADIOACTIVE SOURCE REF: A. TBILISI 00019 ¶B. TBILISI 00275 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. On Sunday, February 8, customs officers discovered by chance an orphan radioactive source buried near Kopitnari airport, which is fourteen kilometers west of Kutaisi in western Georgia. Officials from the Nuclear and Radioactive Safety Service (NRSS) determined that the source is Cesium-137 and are working with officials from other relevant government agencies on a removal plan. The discovery of this source highlights the need for a western office of NRSS, but also reflects positively on Georgian efforts in this arena. End comment. THE DISCOVERY ¶2. (C) Around 4:00 p.m. on February 8, Customs Officers were on the Kutaisi-Samtredia central highway near Kopitnari airport in western Georgia, when one of the officer's personal radiation detection device, or pager, went off, indicating the presence of radioactive material (Note: The USG has donated hundreds of these pagers to the Border Services over the past 15 years. End note). The customs officer called a senior specialist at NRSS, and officials from NRSS traveled to the site near Kutaisi from Tbilisi the next day, arriving at 1:00 p.m. The specialists determined that the source was Cesium-137 buried approximately 50 meters from the side of the Kutaisi-Samtredia central highway. They proceeded to calculate the radiation level of the epicenter based on radiation readings from the area, and estimated the level to be 0.25 sieverts (Sv),which the specialist explained to poloff is equal to a human receiving twenty-five x-rays an hour. Officials with the NRSS, MOIA and other relevant agencies have been discussing an excavation plan and anticipate having a plan in place by Monday. HEALTH RISKS ¶3. (U) The closest source of population to the site is a gas station and farm, both about 50 meters away. The people living at the farm, the employees of the gas station, and the population of the closest village, which is some distance away, have been made aware of the situation. The site of the source has been cordoned off with sticks and tape and marked with warning signs. The specialist from NRSS explained that a safe distance from the site is 30-40 meters. He stated that if a person was to stand on top of the buried source for 24 hours, that person would receive amounts of radiation dangerous to his or her health. Furthermore, if a person was to hold the source for only a few minutes, he or she would receive radiation burns. However, he assured poloff that all citizens in the area were made aware of and understood the danger of approaching the site. THE GEORGIANS GET IT RIGHT, BUT THERE'S ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT ¶4. (C) Despite the Georgians not having a reliable response plan to incidents of detection (see reftel B),the officials involved in this particular incident did act and respond as their current response plan dictates. The customs officer was wearing his pager and did not ignore the alarm; he then called the experts at NRSS. However, from the time the source was discovered there was a delay of 9 hours until NRSS arrived. The lack of a western office and a reliable response plan are key reasons for this delay (see reftels A and B). The United States continues to support the efforts Qand B). The United States continues to support the efforts of the Georgian government to improve their ability to combat nuclear smuggling, including in establishing a western office of NRSS and developing an effective response plan. ¶5. (U) Please contact political officer Nicole O'Brien at obriennl@state.sgov.gov or o'briennl@state.gov for questions or clarifications on this report. LOGSDON

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