GEORGIA: NDI POLL SHOWS PUBLIC OPINION REMAINS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000023 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: NDI POLL SHOWS PUBLIC OPINION REMAINS STABLE REF: TBILISI 1987 TBILISI 00000023 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary/Comment: A new NDI poll taken in November 2008 shows that Georgian public opinion remains largely unchanged from earlier post-war polling by IRI and Greenberg, Quinlan, and Rosner Associates. The NDI poll shows some potential softening of support for President Saakashvili and the GOG but not to the benefit of any other politician or political party. Georgians appear to have little appetite for more political instability and are therefore more or less satisfied with Saakashvili. While not perfect, Saakashvili is perceived to have delivered tangible results to the Georgian public. Although the issue of territorial integrity remains important, the NDI poll, like the others, indicates that Georgians do not blame President Saakashvili for August's events. Georgians continue to lack enthusiasm for early elections. This reinforces Post's view that the non-parliamentary opposition strategy of focusing on pre-term elections and criticizing Saakashvili's handling of the war without acknowledging what is taken as a matter of fact by most Georgians, that Russia is squarely to blame, is a losing proposition. Besides territorial integrity, the overwhelming majority of Georgians are concerned about their own personal economic circumstances. Once again, President Saakashvili's sense of the public pulse has been ahead of his rivals. In public Saakashvili has focused in recent weeks on the domestic and international economic situation, and recent cuts in defense spending have been diverted to social and welfare spending. Judging by the polls, President Saakashvili seems fairly secure at this point. Both the polling data and his own actions suggest, however, that he has a potential Achilles heel should widespread economic discontent surface by spring, this could change the political landscape quickly. End Summary/Content. SAAKASHVILI DROPS - STILL STRONGER THAN THE REST ¶2. (C) According to National Democratic Institute (NDI) November poll results, President Saakashvili's favorability rating dropped from 59 percent (April 2008) and 64 percent (July 2008) to 49 percent (November 2008). At the same time, his unfavorable numbers also decreased, going from 31 percent and 26 percent to 24 percent for the same periods. Thus, while his favorability numbers have dropped, the difference between his favorable and unfavorable ratings remained consistent from April to November ( 28 and 25),with a brief high in July of 38. Public opinion seems not to have turned against President Saakashvili since the August events, but a larger segment of society (14 percent who "do not know"(DK) and 13 percent who did not respond (NR)) are reassessing their feelings toward the President. The favorability drop is even less significant when viewed in the context of other politicians. The NDI poll shows the same phenomena for all major political figures: all show dropping favorability numbers and a similar increase in DK and NR responses. This across the board drop in favorability ratings perhaps indicates that the Georgian public has become more skeptical of all politicians in the wake of the August war rather than any politician in particular. ¶3. (C) The numbers for only three individuals have fared better than President Saakashvili's (49 percent favorable, 24 percent unfavorable, 14 percent DK, 13 percent NR): Ombudsman Sozar Subari (60 percent favorable, 12 percent unfavorable, 17 percent DK, 11 percent NR),Christian Democrat Leader Q17 percent DK, 11 percent NR),Christian Democrat Leader Giorgi Targamadze (52 percent favorable, 21 percent unfavorable, 16 percent DK, 10 percent NR),and former UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania (51 percent favorable, 15 percent unfavorable, 24 percent DK, 10 percent NR). Considering that Subari and Alasania, while capable government officials, are untested in the political realm with the benefit of no track record, Saakashvili's numbers are strong. In addition, both Subari and Targamadze have seen a drop in their favorable ratings of April and July (Subari 66 percent favorable in April, 69 percent in July; Targamadze 63 percent in April, 57 percent in July; Alasania was not polled previously). Saakashvili's main out-of-office rivals all lag in terms of favorability numbers (in descending order): David Gamkrelidze (39 percent favorable, 31 percent unfavorable),David Usupashvili (31 percent, 30 percent),Nino Burjanadze (30 percent, 42 percent),Levan Gachechiladze (27 percent, 41 percent),Shalva Natelashvili (24 percent, 47 percent),Zurab Noghaideli (12 percent, 53 percent). While every opposition figure showed a drop in popularity from NDI's April and July results, Nino Burjanadze's drastic drop from 54percent approval in July to 30percent in November indicates that launching her political party did not improve her standing. All of the results track with the September International Republican Institute (IRI) poll, which also show Saakashvili enjoying better favorable ratings than his rivals. TBILISI 00000023 002 OF 004 WAR IS NOT THE ANSWER ¶4. (C) Although criticized both internally and internationally on his conduct during the war, President Saakashvili still gets good marks from the Georgian public (12 percent of the public thought he performed very well, 31 percent well, 26 percent neither well nor badly, 11 percent poorly, and 4 percent very poorly with 10 percent DK and 5 percent NR). The numbers of the most recent IRI poll, although a differently phrased question, show only 19 percent evaluated Saakashvili's war time performance as somewhat to very negative as compared to 15 percent in the NDI poll who viewed his performance negatively. The IRI poll found that 77 percent viewed Saakashvili's war performance as somewhat to very positive, which broadly corresponds to the 68 percent in the NDI poll who viewed his performance as good or adequate. The wartime "rally around the President" mentality might have dissipated some, but those who view his wartime performance negatively has been consistent. ¶5. (C) Territorial integrity remains a top issue for the Georgian public according to the NDI poll. However, Saakashvili is not viewed as starting the conflict. Of the total, 59 percent think Russia initiated the conflict, 11 percent Georgia, 5 percent South Ossetia, 1 percent US, 1 percent Abkhazia, with 21 percent DK. While an imperfect comparison, IRI's numbers in the immediate aftermath of the war, where 84 percent blamed the Russians/South Ossetians and 7 percent blamed Georgia, seem to indicate the a fair portion has gone from blaming Russia to a more uncertain stance. Wherever the ultimate blame lies, the new NDI data seems to reconfirm that opposition statements accusing Saakashvili of starting the war or sharply criticizing his performance fly in the face of public opinion and may do more political damage to the speaker than to Saakashvili. NEW ELECTIONS AND STREET PROTESTS - BAD IDEA ¶6. (C) Although a desire for new elections can change rapidly with a changing domestic political scene, calls for new elections have not become more popular. According to the NDI poll, only 7 percent of those polled want either Parliamentary or Presidential elections now and 14 percent support elections in the spring (15 percent for Parliamentary),with 46 percent preferring elections in January 2013. Another 7 percent support elections sometime between this spring and January 2013 (6 percent for Parliamentary),with 22 percent who were uncertain (23 percent for Parliamentary). Similarly, only 21 percent of the public thought the November 7th, 2008 protests were justified, 27 percent thought they were unjustified, 24 percent considered them neither justified nor unjustified, and 24 percent did not know. Of this group, only 10 percent expected positive results to occur due to the protests. This data also tracks with the previous IRI poll (52 percent found demonstrations acceptable - 42 percent did not) which shows the public finds the protests more or less acceptable but pointless. Public opinion finds street protests leading to a revolution overwhelmingly unacceptable (84 percent against, 5 percent for, 7 percent DK). In the current environment, the radical opposition's stated strategy to engage in constant street protests to trigger early elections is tone deaf at best and probably counterproductive. IT'S THE ECONOMY STUPID ¶7. (C) The overriding concern of Georgians is employment. Roughly half of Georgians (47 percent) list jobs as the most important issue over the interconnected issues of territorial Qimportant issue over the interconnected issues of territorial integrity (42 percent),NATO (29 percent),and relations with Russia (28 percent). Rounding out important issues to Georgians are Pensions (26 percent),Poverty (25 percent), Health Care (17 percent) and Wages (17 percent). The NDI data indicate that since 2004, the government gets decent to good marks on economic issues. The results are consistent with a transition economy, in which some people find themselves comparatively worse off and others decidedly better, depending on their market-based skills. Between 2004 and August 2008, overall GDP growth was robust; the data also indicates, however, a large segment of society does not feel that it has benefited from that growth. With roughly 26 percent of Georgians at or below the poverty level, an economic downturn that negatively affects the middle class could potentially put Saakashvili and the UNM on the defensive. Not surprisingly, the President has been working diligently in recent weeks on both policy and a publicity campaign to avoid such a scenario. ¶8. (C) Recently, Saakashvili has been focusing almost exclusively on an economic message. Saakashvili has been warning the public preemptively about an economic slowdown TBILISI 00000023 003 OF 004 and hard times ahead, but is adamant there will be no crisis. Saakashvili and the GOG always discuss the expected domestic slowdown as a result of the global downturn, pointing out that Georgia's projected 2 percent growth is a comparatively good result. A serendipitous by-product of the August war is that Georgia is on line to receive $4.5 billion in aid, which will help soften the effect of the global crisis. Saakashvili also notes that the situation in Ukraine and Russia is much more dire, hoping that much like the August conflict, the Georgian public will not place blame on him but rather forces outsde of his control. In fact, Saakashvili is framing the issue to be a political winner, setting the stage for him to claim that he handled the economy better than most. Saakashvili has been so active in the public arena, opening businesses and factories, announcing new social packages, visiting construction sites and so on, a wry editorial described it as being worse than a campaign, but indeed that is what Saakashvili is running. The campaign may prove unsuccessful, but Saakashvili has so far managed to offer proactive answers to economic criticisms before the opposition can lodge them. ¶9. (C) The GOG has also taken numerous policy steps to show that it is responding to the crisis. While its macroeconomic policies remain intact, the 2009 budget shows an uncharacteristic shift to increased social spending. The Defense budget will be cut by over 500 million dollars (roughly 40 percent) and diverted to increased monthly subsistence payments. Finance Minister Gilauri announced the government's intention to keep unemployment at 14 percent. Gilauri hopes that large infrastructure projects will provide new job opportunities during the downturn. Whether or not the GOG can deliver, it clearly is focused on the employment issue and views it as a political vulnerability. Even former Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze (noted for his staunch neo-liberal economic views) told us in August that the GOG understood the political risk of having 26 percent of the population living at the poverty line. Gurgenidze, who was fond of saying he never saw anybody get wealthy off a handout, said they all understood that social "transfer" payments must increase to keep this segment of society from becoming politically active against them. Another key NDI finding is that 77 percent of the population thinks that the situation with pensions has improved since 2004, with only 6 percent saying it has gotten worse. Saakashvili understands the importance of this demographic, and keeping the pensioner in the government's fold is good insurance against political upheaval. COMMENT: NOT MUCH TRACTION FOR THE OPPOSITION -- WITH ONE EXCEPTION ¶10. (C) Much to their frustration, the opposition still is getting very little noticeable political traction. The boy who cried wolf factor is partially at play. Opposition leaders have been unbending in their criticisms; adamant in their constant calls for new elections; and unwilling to do the groundwork at the local level to reach out to voters. This has resulted in a public which largely tunes them out. The major issues the opposition focuses on -- the election code, media openness, Saakashvili's decision-making process, and the fairness of previous elections -- are not seminal issues for most of the public, as confirmed once again by the NDI results. Secondly, the vast majority of the opposition is focused on short-term tactics, rather than long-term strategies that build credibility and strength over time. Qstrategies that build credibility and strength over time. Additionally, opposition leaders by and large share the same economic philosophy as Saakashvili, and in many cases (e.g., Burjanadze and Noghaideli) were instrumental during their government service in promoting GOG policies, which makes attacking Saakashvili on the economy a difficult sell. Because Georgia does not have well-developed economic interest groups (except for pensioners, who are happy with the GOG),tailoring a message to any economic constituency is also a largely fruitless endeavor -- though a solid message on job creation could resonate. Even though Saakashvili and the GOG are vulnerable on the economy, it is unclear if any opposition leader is in a position to take advantage. ¶11. (C) The NDI poll once again shows the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) as continuing to gain traction. The NDI poll shows that if Parliamentary elections were held tomorrow, the UNM would get 27 percent, CDM 8 percent, Burjanadze 3 percent, New Rights 3 percent, Labour 3 percent, For United Georgia 3 percent with 38 percent DK/RA. Most interesting in the data is that 25 percent would vote for CDM as a second choice putting their total at 33 percent which is higher than UNM as a first or second choice at 32 percent. Favorability ratings as a party show CDM with 31 percent favorable versus 17 percent unfavorable, 28 percent neutral and 23 percent DK/RA. The UNM's numbers are 36 percent favorable, 19 percent unfavorable, 27 percent neutral and 18 TBILISI 00000023 004 OF 004 DK/RA, which demonstrate the gains this relatively new party has made in a short period. By contrast, Labour and Republicans enjoy a 12 percent favorable rating with negatives at 33 percent and 25 percent respectively. The upward movement for the CDM corresponds with earlier IRI findings. The public seems to consider the CDM a legitimate opposition party and support its decision to take its parliamentary seats. Giorgi Targamadze has a slightly higher favorability rating than Saakashvili -- the only current politician in Georgia who does. It is starting to become more clear through the numbers that the CDM's strategy of constructive opposition, attacking Saakashvili on policy rather than personality, and party building is showing positive results. TEFFT