Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI2009
2009-11-16 05:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:  

GEORGIA: PROGRESS ON ELECTION CODE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM GG PREL 
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FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2418
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002009 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PRELGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: PROGRESS ON ELECTION CODE

Classified By: DCM KENT LOGSDON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 002009

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PRELGG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: PROGRESS ON ELECTION CODE

Classified By: DCM KENT LOGSDON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).


1. (C) Summary: Opposition parties and the ruling United
National Movement (UNM) have announced agreement on a number
of key issues regarding the new electoral code, paving the
way for a Venice Commission review. Behind the scenes
negotiations within the UNM, amongst the opposition, and
between the opposition and UNM paved the way for general
agreement on the question of a threshold for the direct
election of the mayor of Tbilisi, the make-up of the Central
Election Commission (CEC) and how the Tbilisi city council
will be elected. This agreement could signal a healthy start
to the May 2010 electoral cycle, although opposition leader
Irakli Alasania may decide to continue his fight for a higher
threshold for the Tbilisi mayor's race. According to the
UNM, a final version of the electoral code should be ready
for Venice Commission review by the end of the week of
November 16 -- or by month's end at the latest. End Summary.


2. (C) Comment. Reaching an agreement on a number of
issues, especially the makeup of the CEC and removal of the
current CEC chair can be viewed as a significant concession.
The replacement of the CEC chair and composition, and the
direct election of the mayor of Tbilisi had long been on the
opposition wish list. The agreement will likely not appease
the radicals or Alasania himself but it does represent
significant progress through negotiation. In the end,
Alasania looks to have been too clever by half. The UNM was
unlikely to ever agree to a 50 percent threshold but had
Alasania stuck with the parliamentary opposition Christian
Democrats (CDM),he might have been able to get the UNM to
concede at least few more percentage points and possibly more
directly elected mayors in other key cities in Georgia -- a
key demand of the CDM. End Comment.

What Was Agreed


3. (C) UNM chief negotiator and chairman of the
Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee Akaki Minashvili
briefed the diplomatic corps November 13 on the current
status of negotiations on the electoral code. He said the
agreement was the result of intense behind-the-scenes
negotiations including negotiations within the UNM. The ELWG
participants unanimously agreed to elect the Tbilisi city
council by dividing the 50 seats into 25 direct mandate
majoritarian districts and 25 elected by party lists. The 25
majoritarian districts would have a 30 percent threshold
which was only opposed by representatives from two minor
parties Jondi Baghaturia (Georgian Troupe) and Paata Davitaia
(We Ourselves). The group also unanimously accepted the UNM

proposal to dismiss current CEC chairperson Levan
Tarkhnishvili, effectively agreeing to a long time opposition
demand. The UNM proposal envisions a CEC of thirteen
members, five of whom would be selected by Parliament and
seven by political parties (those parties which cleared the
parliamentary threshold in the last elections). The Chair of
the CEC would be selected by the opposition from a list of
three candidates nominated by the President. The CEC
proposal received unanimous agreement. The ELWG also agreed
on a 30 percent threshold for the election of the Tbilisi
mayor. This proposal was only opposed by the three parties
represented in Irakli Alasania's Alliance.

How We Got Here


4. (C) Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) representatives
and representatives from Alasania's party (United Georgia -
Free Democrats) have been talking since before the April
QFree Democrats) have been talking since before the April
protests on a potential common strategy. CDM told Alasania
their analysis of the political situation; namely that
Alasania's natural electorate is a moderate, centrist voter
and that he was not a natural radical. CDM tried to persuade
Alasania not to participate in the rallies and instead pursue
dialogue on concrete issues where Alasania's and CDM's
political interests coincided. Though Alasania ultimately
declined, he made the decision once the protests stopped to
pursue a more moderate route and engage the GoG. Both CDM
leader Giorgi Targamadze and Alasania understood that
together they represented a challenge to the UNM because both
enjoy significant popular support unlike the vast majority of
the other opposition. Both realized that if they could come
to an agreement between them, many other opposition would
likely support them giving them significant bargaining power
vis--vis the UNM.


5. (C) An Embassy contact told Poloff that Targamadze and
Alasania had a deal in principle (or so thought Targamadze)
that CDM would tacitly support Alasania in Tbilisi. In talks
with the UNM, CDM would support his 50 percent threshold
demand for the mayoral election as a negotiating point. In
return, Alasania would fight the CDM priority of direct

TBILISI 00002009 002 OF 002


elections of mayors in Batumi, Poti, Kutaisi and other
cities. Talks between Targamadze and Alasania were an open
secret around Tbilisi. For Alasania, the 50 percent
threshold was viewed as a necessity as it would serve to
protect his flank against the radical opposition who are
likely to run a candidate or two (or more) to dilute his
vote. Former Speaker of Parliament, Nino Burjanadze
(Democratic Movement - United Georgia),has never hid her
contempt for Alasania and she sees him as having blocked her
"right" to the top job. Burjanadze has a vested interest in
scuttling Alasania's political aspirations and the political
savvy and resources to potentially do so. Former
presidential candidate and opposition leader Levan
Gachechiladze also has little to gain in supporting
Alasania's bid for mayor. If Alasania wins and moves the
arger opposition off the streets, Gachechiladze will have
little political role to play.

Threshold Question for Mayor - A Loss for Alasania or Good
Progress


6. (C) In the current electoral climate, a 50 percent
threshold helps only Alasania, which made it easy for the
other opposition to agree to the lower 30 percent mark once
it became obvious Alasania was not prepared to go to bat for
other opposition priorities. If Alasania were to come in
first or second in May elections to face UNM incumbent Gigi
Ugulava (which under current circumstances would be a likely
outcome),Burjanadze and other radicals would be
marginalized, with opposition-leaning Tbilisi likely to
support Alasania in the second round. Thinking they had a
deal, Alasania's announcement that he would run for mayor and
focus only on Tbilisi caught CDM completely off guard. MP
Nika Laliashvili (CDM) told Poloff that CDM leaders were
frustrated with Alasania because they believed they had the
makings of a solid plan that would benefit both Alasania and
CDM and increase their collective bargaining strength. CDM
moved forward with the other opposition at the ELWG and
agreed to the 30 percent threshold in exchange of other
concessions they deemed more important such as the
composition of the CEC and selection of its chair.
BASS

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