GEORGIA: LONDON HOSTS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 001989 NOFORN SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY -- ADDED NOFORN PARA MARKINGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID CY EU GM RS UK GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: LONDON HOSTS ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY BRAINSTORMING SESSION REF: TBILISI 1575 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C/NF) Summary and comment. Participants at the October 14 meeting hosted by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office featured an open and candid exchange of views among Georgian officials, Quad and EU counterparts, and outside experts on other countries that have faced protracted political divisions. The goal was to generate ideas for the Georgians as they develop their own strategy for engagement with their occupied territories -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The experts' testimony on the experiences of the divided Germany, Northern Ireland, and Cyprus caught the Georgians' attention with a number of provocative issues. Key themes that emerged were the different levels of the conflict, the importance of focusing on people, the need for flexibility and patience, the question of how to present the strategy publicly, and the importance of strong leadership. The Georgians will now proceed with a number of steps to work on their strategy and suggested a follow-up session around December in Tbilisi. Their timeline to produce a final version and receive full government support by the end of the year, then produce an action plan in early 2010, may be overly ambitious, however. End summary and comment. THE IDEA ¶2. (C/NF) Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili has been talking about developing a strategy on the occupied territories since August (ref A),and USAID recently agreed to provide technical assistance in that effort. After a September 14 eeting between Yakobashvili and Quad (U.S., UK, France and Germany) ambassadors, the UK offered to host a brainstorming session to kick off the strategy development process, an offer that Yakobashvili welcomed. Although the Ministry is interested in drafting detailed guidance on both which programs should be chosen and how they should be implemented, the goal of the brainstorming session was to raise more general issues about the shape and goals of the strategy. The involvement of Quad partners reflected the Georgians' understanding that international partners will need to play a key role in the strategy; the involvement of outside experts reflected their interest in learning from the experience of other countries with divided communities. Although Yakobashvili explained that the strategy would apply to all of Georgia -- i.e., both Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- most participants understood that the opportunities for engagement are greater in Abkhazia than in South Ossetia, and so most of the discussion focused on possibilities in Abkhazia. ¶3. (SBU/NF) The Georgians indicated they would be working on a draft over the next two months, with a goal of finishing by the end of the year. They found the London format useful and said they would host a follow-up session in Tbilisi toward the end of the drafting process, possibly in December. Once the draft is complete, the government will draft an implementing action plan, probably in early 2010. Yakobashvili said he hopes to garner the full approval of the entire government for the strategy, so that it will endure as a guiding set of principles through future changes of government. THE IDEAS ¶4. (C/NF) Yakobashvili began by describing the strategy as an Q4. (C/NF) Yakobashvili began by describing the strategy as an effort to focus on the people of the occupied territories, explaining that Georgia needs to celebrate and protect its ethnic diversity. Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria noted in particular the importance of reaching out to the younger generations and students. At the same time, Yakobashvili saw serious threats to Georgia's security and territorial integrity, putting the internal conflicts in the context of the Georgia-Russia conflict. The strategy would therefore have to balance the need to protect against those threats while providing for engagement with the people. He characterized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "occupied territories" and expressly not "secessionist regions." Later in the day, however, Bokeria suggested the international conflict between Georgia and Russia should not be confused with the internal challenges within Georgia, and Yakobashvili acknowledged that Georgia cannot control the former, while it can have an impact on the latter. He encouraged all participants to think out of the box and get inventive on ways to engage, to be practical, and to lean more toward enabling rather than restricting engagement -- all the while remaining firm on non-recognition. Bokeria talked about the need to provide incentives to the regions to engage, while not crossing Georgian redlines. Both recognized that the international community, including NGOs, would need to play a big part in the process. ¶5. (C/NF) All other participants welcomed Yakobashvili's emphasis on people and agreed that there were two levels of the conflict. Sir Brian Fall, UK Special Representative for the South Caucasus, warned that focusing on the international level too much could have an impact on Georgia's ability to engage internally. He suggested that Georgia should think carefully about how it unveiled the strategy publicly, so as not to alienate the people of the regions. At the same time, he acknowledged that Russia has an interest in isolating Abkhazia, and one of the goals of the strategy -- and the international community -- should be to prevent such creeping annexation. EUR's Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts Office Director Ethan Goldrich noted the importance of continuing with democratic reform and economic development in parallel with the strategy. He also suggested that trying to address both international and internal levels of the conflict within one strategy might be too ambitious. Several participants noted the importance of "strategic patience"; UK Ambassador to Georgia Denis Keefe said that patience does not have to mean passivity, however, and suggested that Georgia was right to choose its battles carefully, looking for the right opportunities to reinforce its position, such as the IDP resolution recently passed by the UN General Assembly. ¶6. (C/NF) All non-Georgian participants emphasized the importance of remaining flexible, lest an overly dogmatic focus on redlines endanger the government's ability to engage successfully. One particular issue that came up several times and illustrates the difficulties in achieving that balance is travel documents. Yakobashvili raised the issue, suggesting that perhaps some creative solution, such as a UN-issued laisser-passer, could be found to enable travel while preventing locals from traveling on Russian passports. The other participants urged flexibility on this issue, suggesting that taking too strict a stance would endanger the engagement the strategy seeks to encourage. THE EXPERTS ¶7. (SBU/NF) The most provocative and animated portion of the day came with the testimony of outside experts on the cases of the divided Germany, Northern Ireland, and Cyprus. The Georgians, who had sought opportunities to learn from these experiences, were clearly struck by many of th parallels and asked several follow-up questions. Each case raised a number of thought-provoking themes. In the Germany case, West Germany decided in 1969 that isolating East Germany had made reunification more difficult, and so decided to establish some form of relations with its Communist neighbor. At the same time, external powers played a major role in the process; thus, West Germany consulted with Moscow before taking steps toward normalization, and felt empowered to do so because of its membership in NATO. Throughout the period of division, NATO troops in West Germany faced Soviet troops in East Germany, but the two militaries remained largely in Qin East Germany, but the two militaries remained largely in the background. Although NATO membership was important, West Germany's relationship with the broader community of nations was at least as important. Some in West Germany considered becoming neutral in order to pursue reunification, but this policy was rejected because it would have led to Germany's isolation from the community of nations. Finally, reunification itself occurred over forty years after the division, and twenty years after the rapprochement between West and East Germany, and was enabled by changes within the external power, the Soviet Union. ¶8. (SBU/NF) The Northern Ireland expert said there were three main elements that combined to enable peace in the region. First, the sides had to believe there was a better option than the one they faced in the existing situation. Second, the sides had to clarify exactly who they were and what they wanted -- but also had to acknowledge the other side's own assessment of the same issues. Although sides would generally not agree with each other's aspirations, they had to at least accept that those aspirations existed. Some issues were kept under the table and poisoned the atmosphere until they were brought onto the table, at which point they were out and could be dealt with openly. Finally, flexible leadership was essential to being ready to take the right steps at the right time. ¶9. (SBU/NF) The key theme from the Cyprus case that emerged was the transformative nature of Cyprus's entry into the EU, which instantly provided a huge incentive for the residents of the north to reunify with the rest of the country. Nevertheless, full resolution has still not happened, with peace talks getting bogged down on contentious status issues. There was a initial outpouring of optimism when the green line was opened, with many residents crossing back and forth during the first year, but since then the visits have tailed off, as residents of the north and the rest of Cyprus have discovered that many years of separation have reduced their commonalities. Property issues and restitution also presented an interesting parallel, with some Cypriots having successfully pursued cases against Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights over lost property in the north. The expert also noted that Cyprus has spent large amounts of money on its military, but this has not bought them anything, either in the peacemaking process or in security. COMMENT: A TRICKY TASK ¶10. (C/NF) The Georgian government has set for itself a laudable, but ambitious goal: articulating a strategy to re-engage with regions that have lived a separate existence for over 15 years, and that have now received recognition of their independence by three countries. The desire to re-engage seems sincere, but so do the concerns about ceding any more ground on Georgia's territorial integrity. The somewhat self-contradictory positions taken by the Georgians during the conference exemplify the inherent difficulty of the task. Our job will be to continue to encourage the Georgians to take the long view, to be as flexible as possible, and to learn the right lessons from other situations. ¶11. (U) This message was cleared by EUR/CARC Director Goldrich and coordinated with Embassy London. BASS