Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TBILISI1962
2009-10-30 14:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tbilisi
Cable title:
GEORGIA:COUNTERING RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF TERRORISTS IN
VZCZCXRO4812 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHSI #1962/01 3031449 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 301449Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2379 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001962
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA:COUNTERING RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF TERRORISTS IN
THE PANKISI GORGE
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001962
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA:COUNTERING RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF TERRORISTS IN
THE PANKISI GORGE
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: A visit to Pankisi revealed no evidence of
Russian claims of increased terrorist activity in the region.
Stopping in each village after reaching the gorge, CDM
leader Giorgi Targamadze facilitated discussion among locals,
police officials, and community leaders on the situation in
the Pankisi, and the lack of an Islamic extremist presence.
During a tour of the single Wahhabi mosque, residents in the
gorge unanimously commented that the gorge was thoroughly
devoid of militants, the border was virtually impossible to
cross, and the only important issue in the area was
unemployment. Georgian law enforcement stated that in
comparison to 2001-2003, the calm security situation had
allowed for a reduction of forces in the area, and their
primary focus was on petty crime. The assembled diplomatic
corps, along with an at least equal number of press, left
with the impression that the Russian accusations were
meritless. End Summary.
2. (C) Comment: With nearly every embassy in Tbilisi
sending a representative, and large numbers of press from
both inside and outside of Georgia, the mission was clearly a
success for the CDM party, while also providing an important
opportunity to publicly demonstrate Georgia's interest in
transparency in a region supposedly a haven for terrorists.
The impromptu nature of the travel, and the ability of
diplomats and press to talk privately with resdents in the
area, further contributed to the positive nature of the
visit. By the end, the Swedish representative openly toasted
Targamadze for the trip, saying it was clear that the next
time he came, he would be sure to bring his family given how
secure it was. While it is certainly not the last word on
the issue, and Georgian government officials expect continued
statements from Moscow, this initial attempt to push back on
the issue, employing the international community and media as
its outlet, will likely be looked upon as a successful
strategy in the future. End Comment.
--------------
GEORGIAN CONCERN
--------------
3. (SBU) Seeking to counter Russian claims of a terrorist
safehaven in the Pankisi Gorge of northern Georgia, the
Christian-Democratic Party (CDM) organized a tour of the
gorge on 29 October. Recent items in Russian press in
October regarding the possibility of terrorist activity in
the Pankisi Gorge, and the Russian belief that Chechen
terrorists were using the gorge as a safehaven have drawn
significant attention in Georgian media, government and
academic circles. In particular, FSB Chief Alexander
Bortnikov's reported statements received wide attention when
he accused Georgian security services with assisting
"Al-Qa'ida emissaries." In response, comments ranging from
denouncements of the statements as Russian propaganda to
concern about so-called "Wahhabism" in the Pankisi have
flourished in local media. Of note, opposition leadership,
including CDM party leader and MP Giorgi Targamadze and
Alliance for Georgia leader Irakli Alasania, appear to have
taken the lead in countering the Russian claims, with
Alasania calling on the government to organize a trip of
diplomats and journalists to the Pankisi, and Targamadze
doing just that.
4. (C) With Georgian admissions in 2002 that the Pankisi
was a safehaven for militants, the idea to counter claims
now, with Georgia/Russian relations near their nadir,
Qnow, with Georgia/Russian relations near their nadir,
achieved wide support across the political spectrum. While
Georgian government officials publicly state their lack of
concern about the "groundless accusations," privately they
note significant worries that these types of statements could
be used as pretexts for additional anti-Georgian diplomatic
efforts at the UN. Alasania told us of his concerns that the
Russian government could use old recordings or documents,
possibly fraudulent or forged, as new "evidence" of Georgian
complicity with Chechen militants. These concerns resulted
directly in the apparently unanimous support for a fact
finding trip to the Pankisi gorge with diplomats and
journalists.
--------------
OBSERVATIONS AND SECURITY
--------------
5. (C) Attended by over 20 foreign diplomats, including the
Ambassadors of Iran and China, as well as at least 30 members
of the press, Targamadze led a convoy of approximately 15
vehicles and one large tour bus into the Pankisi gorge.
TBILISI 00001962 002 OF 003
Prior to departure he made sure to conduct multiple media
interviews and appeared quite pleased with the turnout.
Stopping at the first large Pankisi village of Duisi,
Targamadze immediately gathered a crowd of villagers and
began asking questions about the security situation in the
Pankisi, and the villagers' thoughts on Russian comments
about Al-Qa'ida support. Of particular note was that while
it was clear, at least in the first village, that locals knew
the delegation was coming, Targamadze generally picked random
people from the street to ask questions, and encouraged the
diplomatic corps to talk with villagers on their own as well.
6. (C) In discussions with PolOff, locals made it clear
that they had significant concerns regarding the Russian
comments, worrying about everything from Russian provocations
at the border to a Russian military excursion in the area.
In a common trend, each villager noted the near impossibility
of crossing the border (some noted this with a hint of
disappointment, as it had obviously hurt the illicit economy
in the area),with Georgian border guards being exceedingly
strict, and Russian border troops not preventing the crossing
of any would-be travelers from the Pankisi area.
Additionally, they stressed that from November to March, the
small road, inaccessible to vehicles even during the summer,
was also nearly impossible to cross via horse or on foot.
Villagers also made it clear that the situation had greatly
changed from 2002, when shopping for grenades and
Kalashnikovs was as easy as going to the market. They tended
to credit the Saakashvili government for these changes, but
also stressed that unemployment was a primary concern of
residents, with some estimating that unemployment bordered on
90 percent. Residents in each village also made clear to the
assembled diplomats that, of the approximately 800 Chechen
refugees in the Pankisi, most had assimilated completely into
the Georgian and Kist communities, with intermarriage, joint
schooling (in Georgian),and joint worship at churches or
mosques.
7. (C) As the road show continued, Targamadze's decisions
on when to make random stops at different points appeared to
be solely based on when he saw villagers lingering on the
streets. Beyond the first village, it clearly was a surprise
for locals to see such a massive convoy. However, statements
and criticisms remained the same: the peace in the area was
better than it had been in at least ten years, and no
fighters had passed through in recent memory, nor would they
likely be able to without notice. Villagers seemed genuinely
surprised that there were reports of such travel, as most
Chechen refugees had given up even attempting tocontact
relatives in Russia due to the extreme difficulty in actually
traversing the border, by legal or illegal means. The
convoy stopped and toured the one Wahhabi mosque in the
gorge, a clearly well-built structure from 2001 (reportedly
from Saudi funds) that dominated the village. The Imam
provided answers to questions, stating that there were
approximately 7,000 Muslims in the gorge; 90 percent
Georgian, five percent Kist, and the remainder refugees from
Russia. Of these, approximately 150 Muslims prayed at his
mosque, with the majority being young men. There were three
other mosques in the Pankisi gorge; however, these followed a
less stringent version of Islam, and were clearly more
Qless stringent version of Islam, and were clearly more
popular and traditional among the locals. The Imam, in
response to a diplomat's question, stressed that the local
government had submitted a special order to not hinder any
activities of the mosque, which was much appreciated.
8. (C) In a private discussion, CDM MP Nika Laliashvili, a
former Ministry of State Security Colonel who worked
extensively in the Pankisi gorge in 2001-2002, emphasized the
changes since his time in MSS. He said that while he travels
frequently to the area, it still shocked him to view
firsthand the changes from the days of Al-Qa'ida influence.
Of particular interest to him was the lack of visible
weaponry (PolOff never saw any during this trip),whereas in
2002 one could buy heroin, grenades and RPGs as simply as
fruit at the local market. Stressing that he certainly was
not a strong supporter of Saakashvili, he said the changes in
this area clearly were a victory for the government. When
asked about current security service activity in the Pankisi
area, he noted that all Georgian special forces and other
MOIA counterterrorism units had departed the area, and only
minimal MOIA liaison from these units with the local MOIA
police was necessary. The most troubling current issues of
importance to the local police is marijuana usage by local
male youths; certainly not the hard drugs or weapons
smuggling that were so prevalent when he served in the area.
--------------
PUBLIC RELATIONS
TBILISI 00001962 003 OF 003
--------------
9. (C) Ending the fact-finding mission approximately eight
kilometers from the border on an empty river basin,
Targamadze led a dinner in which he continued to stress the
importance of democracy and openness in Georgia, replete with
toasts expressing appreciation to the villagers for their
hospitality, and the diplomats for their interest.
Targamadze worked the crowds of villagers as a seasoned
politician, and the Georgians with whom he interacted all
seemed to appreciate it. Targamadze's ability to build
support among the villagers, and his clear comfort in doing
so, was noted by most diplomats as impressive, and a method
of politicking usually only attributed to Saakashvili among
the leading political figures. Additionally, the fact that
CDM organized this trip, with every Georgian press outlet
stressing it as such, also demonstrated the party's efforts
to build a base of support among the international community,
and to be looked upon by Georgians as a serious player on one
issue that generally unifies the populace: Russia.
BASS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA:COUNTERING RUSSIAN CLAIMS OF TERRORISTS IN
THE PANKISI GORGE
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: A visit to Pankisi revealed no evidence of
Russian claims of increased terrorist activity in the region.
Stopping in each village after reaching the gorge, CDM
leader Giorgi Targamadze facilitated discussion among locals,
police officials, and community leaders on the situation in
the Pankisi, and the lack of an Islamic extremist presence.
During a tour of the single Wahhabi mosque, residents in the
gorge unanimously commented that the gorge was thoroughly
devoid of militants, the border was virtually impossible to
cross, and the only important issue in the area was
unemployment. Georgian law enforcement stated that in
comparison to 2001-2003, the calm security situation had
allowed for a reduction of forces in the area, and their
primary focus was on petty crime. The assembled diplomatic
corps, along with an at least equal number of press, left
with the impression that the Russian accusations were
meritless. End Summary.
2. (C) Comment: With nearly every embassy in Tbilisi
sending a representative, and large numbers of press from
both inside and outside of Georgia, the mission was clearly a
success for the CDM party, while also providing an important
opportunity to publicly demonstrate Georgia's interest in
transparency in a region supposedly a haven for terrorists.
The impromptu nature of the travel, and the ability of
diplomats and press to talk privately with resdents in the
area, further contributed to the positive nature of the
visit. By the end, the Swedish representative openly toasted
Targamadze for the trip, saying it was clear that the next
time he came, he would be sure to bring his family given how
secure it was. While it is certainly not the last word on
the issue, and Georgian government officials expect continued
statements from Moscow, this initial attempt to push back on
the issue, employing the international community and media as
its outlet, will likely be looked upon as a successful
strategy in the future. End Comment.
--------------
GEORGIAN CONCERN
--------------
3. (SBU) Seeking to counter Russian claims of a terrorist
safehaven in the Pankisi Gorge of northern Georgia, the
Christian-Democratic Party (CDM) organized a tour of the
gorge on 29 October. Recent items in Russian press in
October regarding the possibility of terrorist activity in
the Pankisi Gorge, and the Russian belief that Chechen
terrorists were using the gorge as a safehaven have drawn
significant attention in Georgian media, government and
academic circles. In particular, FSB Chief Alexander
Bortnikov's reported statements received wide attention when
he accused Georgian security services with assisting
"Al-Qa'ida emissaries." In response, comments ranging from
denouncements of the statements as Russian propaganda to
concern about so-called "Wahhabism" in the Pankisi have
flourished in local media. Of note, opposition leadership,
including CDM party leader and MP Giorgi Targamadze and
Alliance for Georgia leader Irakli Alasania, appear to have
taken the lead in countering the Russian claims, with
Alasania calling on the government to organize a trip of
diplomats and journalists to the Pankisi, and Targamadze
doing just that.
4. (C) With Georgian admissions in 2002 that the Pankisi
was a safehaven for militants, the idea to counter claims
now, with Georgia/Russian relations near their nadir,
Qnow, with Georgia/Russian relations near their nadir,
achieved wide support across the political spectrum. While
Georgian government officials publicly state their lack of
concern about the "groundless accusations," privately they
note significant worries that these types of statements could
be used as pretexts for additional anti-Georgian diplomatic
efforts at the UN. Alasania told us of his concerns that the
Russian government could use old recordings or documents,
possibly fraudulent or forged, as new "evidence" of Georgian
complicity with Chechen militants. These concerns resulted
directly in the apparently unanimous support for a fact
finding trip to the Pankisi gorge with diplomats and
journalists.
--------------
OBSERVATIONS AND SECURITY
--------------
5. (C) Attended by over 20 foreign diplomats, including the
Ambassadors of Iran and China, as well as at least 30 members
of the press, Targamadze led a convoy of approximately 15
vehicles and one large tour bus into the Pankisi gorge.
TBILISI 00001962 002 OF 003
Prior to departure he made sure to conduct multiple media
interviews and appeared quite pleased with the turnout.
Stopping at the first large Pankisi village of Duisi,
Targamadze immediately gathered a crowd of villagers and
began asking questions about the security situation in the
Pankisi, and the villagers' thoughts on Russian comments
about Al-Qa'ida support. Of particular note was that while
it was clear, at least in the first village, that locals knew
the delegation was coming, Targamadze generally picked random
people from the street to ask questions, and encouraged the
diplomatic corps to talk with villagers on their own as well.
6. (C) In discussions with PolOff, locals made it clear
that they had significant concerns regarding the Russian
comments, worrying about everything from Russian provocations
at the border to a Russian military excursion in the area.
In a common trend, each villager noted the near impossibility
of crossing the border (some noted this with a hint of
disappointment, as it had obviously hurt the illicit economy
in the area),with Georgian border guards being exceedingly
strict, and Russian border troops not preventing the crossing
of any would-be travelers from the Pankisi area.
Additionally, they stressed that from November to March, the
small road, inaccessible to vehicles even during the summer,
was also nearly impossible to cross via horse or on foot.
Villagers also made it clear that the situation had greatly
changed from 2002, when shopping for grenades and
Kalashnikovs was as easy as going to the market. They tended
to credit the Saakashvili government for these changes, but
also stressed that unemployment was a primary concern of
residents, with some estimating that unemployment bordered on
90 percent. Residents in each village also made clear to the
assembled diplomats that, of the approximately 800 Chechen
refugees in the Pankisi, most had assimilated completely into
the Georgian and Kist communities, with intermarriage, joint
schooling (in Georgian),and joint worship at churches or
mosques.
7. (C) As the road show continued, Targamadze's decisions
on when to make random stops at different points appeared to
be solely based on when he saw villagers lingering on the
streets. Beyond the first village, it clearly was a surprise
for locals to see such a massive convoy. However, statements
and criticisms remained the same: the peace in the area was
better than it had been in at least ten years, and no
fighters had passed through in recent memory, nor would they
likely be able to without notice. Villagers seemed genuinely
surprised that there were reports of such travel, as most
Chechen refugees had given up even attempting tocontact
relatives in Russia due to the extreme difficulty in actually
traversing the border, by legal or illegal means. The
convoy stopped and toured the one Wahhabi mosque in the
gorge, a clearly well-built structure from 2001 (reportedly
from Saudi funds) that dominated the village. The Imam
provided answers to questions, stating that there were
approximately 7,000 Muslims in the gorge; 90 percent
Georgian, five percent Kist, and the remainder refugees from
Russia. Of these, approximately 150 Muslims prayed at his
mosque, with the majority being young men. There were three
other mosques in the Pankisi gorge; however, these followed a
less stringent version of Islam, and were clearly more
Qless stringent version of Islam, and were clearly more
popular and traditional among the locals. The Imam, in
response to a diplomat's question, stressed that the local
government had submitted a special order to not hinder any
activities of the mosque, which was much appreciated.
8. (C) In a private discussion, CDM MP Nika Laliashvili, a
former Ministry of State Security Colonel who worked
extensively in the Pankisi gorge in 2001-2002, emphasized the
changes since his time in MSS. He said that while he travels
frequently to the area, it still shocked him to view
firsthand the changes from the days of Al-Qa'ida influence.
Of particular interest to him was the lack of visible
weaponry (PolOff never saw any during this trip),whereas in
2002 one could buy heroin, grenades and RPGs as simply as
fruit at the local market. Stressing that he certainly was
not a strong supporter of Saakashvili, he said the changes in
this area clearly were a victory for the government. When
asked about current security service activity in the Pankisi
area, he noted that all Georgian special forces and other
MOIA counterterrorism units had departed the area, and only
minimal MOIA liaison from these units with the local MOIA
police was necessary. The most troubling current issues of
importance to the local police is marijuana usage by local
male youths; certainly not the hard drugs or weapons
smuggling that were so prevalent when he served in the area.
--------------
PUBLIC RELATIONS
TBILISI 00001962 003 OF 003
--------------
9. (C) Ending the fact-finding mission approximately eight
kilometers from the border on an empty river basin,
Targamadze led a dinner in which he continued to stress the
importance of democracy and openness in Georgia, replete with
toasts expressing appreciation to the villagers for their
hospitality, and the diplomats for their interest.
Targamadze worked the crowds of villagers as a seasoned
politician, and the Georgians with whom he interacted all
seemed to appreciate it. Targamadze's ability to build
support among the villagers, and his clear comfort in doing
so, was noted by most diplomats as impressive, and a method
of politicking usually only attributed to Saakashvili among
the leading political figures. Additionally, the fact that
CDM organized this trip, with every Georgian press outlet
stressing it as such, also demonstrated the party's efforts
to build a base of support among the international community,
and to be looked upon by Georgians as a serious player on one
issue that generally unifies the populace: Russia.
BASS