GEORGIA: ASD VERSHBOW LEADS SECURITY WORKING GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 001949 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ASD VERSHBOW LEADS SECURITY WORKING GROUP Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Under the umbrella of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow, Ambassador Bass, and an extended USG team jump-started the U.S.-Georgia Charter Working Groups. The meeting on October 20 with Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Vashakidze, Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria, and other Georgian interagency counterparts was the inaugural meeting of the Security Working Group. ASD Vershbow said the U.S. viewed the Charter as a vehicle for strengthening the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership and deepening defense cooperation. Vershbow expressed appreciation for Georgia's ISAF contribution; he also noted continued U.S. commitment to Georgia's security and defense reform, with an initial focus on doctrine, education, training and building the intellectual capacity of the Georgian Armed Forces. Vashakidze and Bokeria both emphasized the continued Georgian commitment to reform, and Bokeria reaffirmed Georgia's commitment to strategic patience and a peaceful resolution of the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Bokeria also observed that Georgia still faces real and immediate threats that pose an existential threat to Georgia and can complicate reform efforts. An international presence was required to prevent destabilizing actions by Russia. Regarding NATO, ASD Vershbow said the U.S. supported Georgia's membership aspirations and encouraged continued efforts to implement the Annual National Program (ANP); Bokeria sought language in the next NATO Ministerial declaration that would reflect some progress since the Bucharest Summit, but said Georgia did not oppose MAP for Montenegro. The sides also discussed maritime incidents on the Black Sea; U.S. missile defense plans; a new agreement on the Central Reference Laboratory; efforts to combat nuclear smuggling; and exchange of classified information. End summary. -------------- GENERAL OVERVIEW -------------- ¶2. (C) ASD Vershbow began by echoing a central theme of the U.S.-Georgia Charter: that a strong, independent, sovereign and democratic Georgia, capable of responsible self-defense, contributes to the security and prosperity not only of all Georgians, but of a Europe whole, free and at peace. He expressed continued U.S. commitment to Georgia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic prosperity. At the same time, he noted the importance of continued progress on democratic reform and of avoiding provocative actions that could escalate into renewed violence. He expressed support for Georgia's NATO membership aspirations, for which he pledged U.S. support through the Georgia-NATO Commission. He also expressed appreciation for Georgia's planned contribution to ISAF. ¶3. (C) Vashakidze responded with an expression of Georgian gratitude for the various military assistance programs the United States has provided since 2004, which he described as crucial to Georgian military development. Noting Georgia's previous contribution to the effort in Iraq, he expressed Georgia's continued commitment to sending a series of battalions to Afghanistan. He also expressed interest in continued U.S. support for deepened defense assistance programs, in terms of both military education and equipment. Qprograms, in terms of both military education and equipment. He also proposed organizing U.S. support for Georgia's military reform efforts under a U.S.-Georgia Defense Cooperation Plan. -------------- FOCUS ON REFORM -------------- ¶4. (C) Calling for 2010 to be the "year of reform," Vershbow congratulated Georgia's progress thus far, but noted that continuing to make significant progress was a prerequisite for Georgia's NATO aspirations. The U.S. stood ready to assist, and is focusing the first phase of assistance efforts on building the intellectual component of the Georgian Armed Forces -- the so-called "brains before brawn" approach. Noting that, in the whole of Eurasia, the U.S. has its busiest schedule of bilateral cooperation in Georgia, ASD Vershbow said that those programs have come under close scrutiny, and that their continuation depended on Georgia's continued progress in reform overall, including on the political and economic side, as well as responsible behavior in the region. If Georgia made real progress and met established milestones, bilateral defense cooperation could deepen; on the other hand, lagging reforms would hamper TBILISI 00001949 002 OF 004 deepened cooperation. ASD Vershbow stressed the benchmarks of NATO's Annual National Program (ANP),such as reform of the acquisition and procurement process, as necessary first steps, emphasizing that the U.S. and other NATO allies were watching for a clear delineation of responsibility between the Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs. ¶5. (C) Deputy Defense Minister Nodar Kharshiladze offered an update on Georgia's efforts at military reform. In terms of broad planning, he said the government is in the process of updating its threats assessment and completing both a Strategic Defense Review (SDR) and a National Strategic Review (NSR),all with a view to determine what the Georgian Armed Forces should look like in 2015. He said a top priority was to develop an efficient use of resources, in order to be in a position to respond to threats while reflecting budget realities. The military is working on doctrine development, with a view in particular toward a doctrine that reflects Georgia's unique needs. Military education is a primary focus, with three specific objectives described: the establishment of a four-year officer academy; a Command General Staff College (CGSC); and training for NCOs. Other areas of focus include human resources reform and cooperation with NGOs on strategic planning. -------------- REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶6. (C) Head of the Georgian Joint Staff's Strategic Planning and Military Policy Department, Col. Nikoloz Janjghava, listed a number of areas in which Georgia requires additional U.S. assistance. Janjghava reiterated Georgia's capability gaps as a result of the August 2008 war, in particular, anti-air, anti-tank and radar capabilities. Not only did Georgia lose equipment, but the lack of spare parts has further decreased the level of operational capacity. Janjghava also requested additional U.S. assistance in educational programs, as Georgia continued to strive to develop its military education system on western models. Finally, Georgia needed additional U.S. assistance in developing the General National Defense Plan (NDP). This was particularly important request, as it would affect Georgia's force structure, training plan and procurement requirements. The U.S. DATT and ODC Chief noted U.S. cooperation efforts, including the CGSC, initial consultations on the NDP, doctrine development, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) slots. ¶7. (C) Deputy Minister Bokeria indicated that there was wide acceptance within the Georgian government of the approach of "strategic patience" on the conflicts, and that they could not be resolved militarily. Acknowledging current geopolitical considerations, Bokeria reiterated Georgia "got the message" on the brains before brawn approach. Nevertheless, he pointed out that such development of intellectual capacity without some kind of accompanying development of actual physical capacity could not continue forever. U.S. assistance with Georgia's NDP is particularly vital at the current time. ASD Vershbow acknowledged the perilous situation facing Georgia, including the damage done during the war, but made clear that the preliminary stages of reform had to be done right first, so that, when the time came, it would be possible to incorporate new equipment into Qcame, it would be possible to incorporate new equipment into the military more effectively. -------------- AFGHANISTAN UPDATE -------------- ¶8. (C) Janjghava reflected on the ISAF deployment, noting preparation was well underway to send a Georgian battalion to ISAF. He also noted that Georgia had plans to send personnel to serve with French, Turkish and Lithuanian units as well. Bokeria added that Georgia was ready to increase its contribution to the transit of military supplies to Afghanistan, so that Coalition partners would have a number of different alternatives. Vershbow agreed that a variety of routes was desirable and welcomed Georgia's proposals. -------------- NATO -------------- ¶9. (C) Bokeria reaffirmed that Georgia has not changed its goal of NATO membership, which he described as crucial to Georgia's existence as a state. He asked for additional clarity on a possible path for Georgia to membership. TBILISI 00001949 003 OF 004 Expressing an understanding that a breakthrough at this time may not be possible, Georgia needed to have some indication that it has moved further down the road since the Bucharest Summit -- otherwise, the perception that Russia has an effective veto over Georgia's (and Ukraine's) membership will be strengthened, with resulting effect externally and internally in Georgia. Expressing his support for NATO's overall expansion, and for the possible extension of Membership Action Plans to additional countries at the upcoming summit, Bokeria nevertheless suggested that, if Georgia would not be receiving a MAP, then it needed at least a change in language from the NATO ministers indicating some progress. One possibility would be a statement that MAP is not the only path to membership. Finally, Bokeria said that, in the context of the discussions in Geneva about a non-use of force (NUF) agreement, Georgia might be willing to go forward with such an agreement if it received a clear message from NATO on its path forward. ¶10. (C) ASD Vershbow encouraged Georgia to stay engaged with NATO, in particular by responding to the areas for improvement expressed in the ANP. By continuing to demonstrate its seriousness, Georgia would be in a good position when the situation for a political decision matured, although it was not clear when that would be. ASD Vershbow confirmed that the U.S. believes there are multiple paths to NATO membership, and the Bucharest Summit, by declaring that Georgia and Ukraine would gain membership, had established these two countries as unique cases, with ANPs and Commissions that could serve as functional equivalents to MAP. ASD Vershbow affirmed the U.S. will work with the Alliance toward adopting such a position. Regarding a NUF agreement, ASD Vershbow said that Georgia should not have to meet additional standards to gain membership, but suggested that Georgia might want to hold on to that idea in case it became useful. -------------- SECURITY ENVIRONMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Eka Zguladze offered an overview of the current security situation. Pointing to the presence not only of some 8,000 Russian forces in the occupied territories but also large amounts of heavy armaments, Zguladze said that Russia was in a position to take further action in Georgia at any time. The Russian presence in South Ossetia is close to sensitive targets, including the main East-West highway, and Georgia was therefore vulnerable to terrorist attacks coordinated from within the occupied territories. Zguladze reflected on the recent attack on electrical power lines in Georgia as a case in point. Georgia's main concern at the moment, however, was the ethnic Georgian population of Gali; Russian Border Guards were making it increasingly difficult to cross the administrative boundary, and that population was therefore increasingly vulnerable. Although the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) had been effective within the limits imposed on it (primarily its inability to enter the occupied territories), and the frequency of security incidents had gone down, Georgia was worried by recent Russian statements that Georgia was fomenting terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus. ¶12. (C) Bokeria acknowledged that the Georgian government considered the threat of a large-scale invasion by Russia Qconsidered the threat of a large-scale invasion by Russia unlikely (due largely to political support from the United States); he pointed out, however, that a Russian policy of small-scale provocations would nevertheless greatly complicate Georgia's reform efforts. Accepting the logic of focusing on the further reform and development of undisputed Georgia for the time being, he suggested this logic was flawed if Georgia did not have a stable environment in which to pursue reforms and development. Georgia would itself refrain from provocative actions, because any headlines of destabilizing events in Georgia -- no matter who provoked them -- were damaging to the international perception of Georgia. Bokeria suggested that some kind of international presence to guarantee stability was crucial to Georgia's security and progress (although not at the price of degrading Georgia's territorial integrity),and that even discussion of a possible departure of the EUMM was harmful to Georgia's security. Bokeria encouraged the United States to be open to any invitation by the EU to participate in the EUMM; ASD Vershbow said the United States had not received any such invitation, but would consider one if asked. ¶13. (C) On the Geneva talks, Bokeria described a positive process which was a good deterrent. While expressing TBILISI 00001949 004 OF 004 skepticism that it would lead to anything substantive in the near future, with neither the Russians, Abkhaz nor South Ossetians ready to discuss serious issues at the moment, Bokeria said the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) was positive. Russia's recent unwillingness to respond to an urgent call on the hotline indicated continued problems. Bokeria explained that a clear redline for Georgia was full implementation of Point 5 of the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement (which calls for the withdrawal of Russian forces to previously held positions). Not only did the Russians need to fully comply, but the Georgians could not accept any additional agreements or arrangements that undercut that commitment, made by the Russian president, or otherwise legitimized the current Russian presence. ¶14. (C) The Director of State's Office of Caucasus Affairs and Regional Conflicts, Ethan Goldrich, expressed U.S. support for the Geneva process and looked forward to coordinating with the Georgians on how best to proceed. The United States supported an international presence, although not at the expense of Georgia's territorial integrity. The Ambassador noted that, in the past, the OSCE's Border Monitoring Mission had helped alleviate concerns about movements into the North Caucasus, suggesting that perhaps a preliminary discussion about a similar arrangement to help prevent pretexts would be useful. -------------- OTHER TOPICS -------------- ¶15. (C) Regarding maritime incidents on the Black Sea, Bokeria explained that Georgia was currently in discussions with Turkey to find a way to enable vessels to travel to Abkhazia within the scope of Georgian law. He also explained that Coast Guard personnel now have orders not to engage in hot pursuit and not to take any actions in Georgia's economic zone, (i.e., beyond the 24 nautical miles of Georgia's territorial waters),so that there was little likelihood of provocative incidents. Nevertheless, he pointed out that Georgia still had concerns about smuggling. A ship on the way to undisputed Georgia was recently detained by Abkhaz de facto naval forces for 30 minutes (then fortunately released with no further consequences); thus it was not only Georgia that needed to avoid provocative actions. Ultimately it was Russia that was occupying Georgian territory, and public condemnations of Georgia for questionable actions in defense of its territorial integrity were in danger of distracting the world's attention from Russia's fundamentally illegal actions. ¶16. (C) ASD Vershbow offered an overview of the new U.S. approach to missile defense, noting the United States had not yet begun consultations on the placement of land-based SM-3 missile sites or other elements, with the exception of Poland and the Czech Republic, but that in any case the United States was not discussing the placement of elements of the new system with any non-NATO members. ¶17. (C) Vashakidze noted the recent conclusion of the Umbrella Agreement between the United States and Georgia for the Central Reference Laboratory, agreeing to continue to hold bilateral consultations to work on the details of implementation. Deputy Director of the Georgian Foreign Ministry's International Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration Office Giorgi Dolidze expressed his appreciation QIntegration Office Giorgi Dolidze expressed his appreciation for U.S. support of efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and noted that President Saakashvili planned to participate in the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010. Finally, Deputy Minister Kharshiladze proposed an agreement on the exchange of classified information, which he described as a practical step to legalize the exchange of information necessary for deepened cooperation. ¶18. (U) This message was cleared by Assistant Secretary of Defense Vershbow. BASS