GEORGIA: SAAKASHVILI ACKNOWLEDGES HIS IMAGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001915 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: SAAKASHVILI ACKNOWLEDGES HIS IMAGE PROBLEM, BUT SEES CONTINUING RUSSIAN THREAT TO THE REGION Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BASS. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. During a lunch following the Ambassador's credentials ceremony, President Saakashvili acknowledged the international community's questions about the Georgian Government's reform program. However, he insisted that he was committed to using the remaining four years of his term in office to fulfill his legacy of creating a sovereign, independent and prosperous Georgia with democratic institutions that worked. Saakashvili portrayed Russia as intent on dominating both Georgia and the region; Georgia's determination to root out its soviet past threatened Russian PM Putin's plans. He said that others in the region were closely watching bilateral efforts to implement the U.S.-Georgian Strategic Partnership Charter and that the Charter as a guarantor of stability for Georgia. Belarus had already reached out to Georgia to ask for continued U.S. engagement with Minsk in order to counterbalance Russian pressure. On democratic reform, Saakashvili said that the opposition was hesitating to engage in dialogue and he asked the U.S. to continue to promote engagement. The Ambassador urged the Government to engage with the opposition and civil society as well, noting specifically that introduction of a draft electoral code could focus opposition-government discussions and make it harder for the opposition to eschew engagement. He also reiterated U.S. support for implementation of the Charter as a way to promote reform and development. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment. Saakashvili was relaxed during the October 16 lunch, but was particularly animated in recounting key parts of his vision for Georgia's future -- economic investment, democratic reform and engagement with the opposition, new cultural and educational exchange programs and a strong bilateral relationship with the U.S. (specifically through the implementation of the Charter), while stressing the Russian threat to the region. He specifically highlighted continuing Russian pressure not only on Georgia, but also Ukraine, Belarus and Central Asia. Although the President's emphasis on the Russian threat plays to his advantage politically, it also reflects a conviction shared across Georgian society. Saakashvili understood that many in the West now see Georgia mainly in terms of a disagreement between Russia and the U.S. and emphasized that he planned to change that image by redoubling his commitment to reform and democratic development. President Saakashvili was accompanied to lunch only by his Amcit advisor Daniel Kunin. DCM and USAID Mission Director also attended the lunch. End Comment. We Have an Image Problem -------------- ¶3. (C) President Saakashvili began lunch by discussing his recent trip to Kuwait and the UAE, as well as ongoing conversations with the Egyptians about trade development and potential investment. He noted that it was important to find new sources of foreign direct investment and that this had been the reason for this trip. Saakashvili then asked the Ambassadr about how the Tagliavini Report had been received in the U.S., noting his belief that it was a very good and factual report even though many of the conclusions were "wrong." Saakashvili said that he had observed a "strong anti-American bias" in much of the report. The Ambassador responded that we were still reviewing the report, but that much of the attention of Washington policymakers was on looking ahead rather than back. Qlooking ahead rather than back. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador noted the war had changed perceptions among many in the U.S. regarding Georgia's overall trajectory, especially the Georgian Government's commitment to continued reform and democratic development. Georgia could no longer take for granted international support for its efforts; many now saw Georgia primarily through the lens of an irritant in U.S.-Russian relations rather than a model for reform. Therefore, the Government needed to do a better job of explaining its vision and demonstrating progress on reform. Saakashvili acknowledged that Georgia now had an image problem, and reiterated that his commitment to realizing his vision had not changed. He insisted that his government would use the remaining four years of his term in office to fulfill his legacy of creating a Georgia that was sovereign, independent and prosperous -- and that had democratic institutions that worked. Georgia would regain its international reputation as a leader in reform by redoubling his commitment to reform and democratic development. ¶5. (C) According to Saakashvili, democratic reforms were continuing, but the opposition was "hesitating" to engage. He urged the U.S. and other international partners to continue to encourage opposition leaders to remain engaged in TBILISI 00001915 002 OF 002 dialogue. (Embassy note: This may refer to opposition leader Alasania's decision not to participate in the latest NSC meeting to which opposition leaders were invited. End note.) Saakashvili said that the constitutional commission was in the process of proposing changes that would make the government more representative and give parliament more powers, although he did not think that Georgia was ready for or could afford to move to a full parliamentary system. The Ambassador said that we would remain engaged on democratic reform and are committed to supporting dialogue between the government and opposition as well as wider civil society. However, he noted, it would also be useful for the Government to demonstrate its engagement by moving ahead with the introduction of a draft of the new electoral code, thereby giving a focus to ongoing government-opposition discussions. The Ambassador also suggested that clarity on the direct mayoral election in Tbilisi (this change has not yet been made in the law) would also give the opposition confidence that engagement was paying off. ¶6. (C) Saakashvili was enthusiastic about the upcoming meetings of the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission Working Groups, beginning with ASD Vershbow's chairing of the Security Working Group in Tbilisi on October 20. Other governments in the region were watching this effort closely, especially the fact that we were continuing to use the Charter as a framework for the development of relations. In Saakashvili's view, the Charter was acting as a guarantor of the U.S. commitment to Georgia and was bringing much-needed stability to Georgia. He looked forward to all the Commission working groups taking place this fall. But Russia Remains the Problem -------------- ¶7. (C) President Saakashvili noted that in many ways, "the worst was behind us," as the situation had stabilized on the ground along the administrative boundary lines and the economy was showing signs of recovery. However, the geopolitical problem with Russia remained. He said that Russia was not looking for a pretext or a provocation that would let them invade Georgia to "finish the job;" instead, Russia was looking for a situation in the world that would allow them to do this without international condemnation. In Saakashvili's opinion, this was the only factor holding Russia back -- an inability to know how exactly the international community would react if Russia used force against Georgia again. ¶8. (C) In fact, Russia's aggressive approach toward Georgia was threatening the entire CIS, in Saakashvili's view. He noted that no one had wanted to attend the most recent CIS Summit, but he had persuaded his Ukrainian counterpart and several others to attend in order to support Voronin in the face of Russian pressure to dictate next steps on Transdnistria. With the Georgians were absent, there was very little that the CIS had to offer. Saakashvili expressed concern about Ukraine's future, predicting that there could be trouble in Crimea after the election, and explicitly suggesting that Russia could use force to "secure Crimea," causing an immediate political crisis for whatever new President took office in Kyiv. ¶9. (C) Saakashvili said that Belarus was also under enormous pressure from Russia, especially to recognize the de facto "governments" in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He reported that recently Lukashenko had been in touch to ask for Georgian help in getting the U.S. to reengage with Minsk, Qfor Georgian help in getting the U.S. to reengage with Minsk, as a possible way to counterbalance some of Russia's pressure. Saakashvili suggested this might be a fruitful topic for discussions with senior USG officials. This showed that Russia was not only attempting to control Georgia, but was also trying to dominate the entire region. ¶10. (C) Indicating that he was doing his best to shore up European and international support for Georgia, Saakashvili ended the lunc by giving the Ambassador a sense of the large number of Georgian cultural figures and artists who would be performing in Europe and the West. In this way, he hoped to demonstrate to international (especially European) publics the country's existing cultural connections to Europe and the importance of continued international support for Georgia. BASS