GEORGIA: MISSTEPS ON NEW OSCE PRESENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001810 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MISSTEPS ON NEW OSCE PRESENCE REF: A. GENEVA 822 ¶B. ATHENS 1365 ¶C. TBILISI 1786 ¶D. MOSCOW 2518 ¶E. 10/5/09 OSCE DAILY DIGEST (10/5/09 CHRISTENSEN EMAIL) TBILISI 00001810 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. OSCE Chairman-in-Office Special Representative Christopoulos visited Tbilisi and Tskhinvali September 30 - October 2, hoping to reach agreement on modalities for a new roving OSCE presence. Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria protested some process fouls, but also expressed concerns about potentially harmful status-related elements of the proposal, and he initially asked Christopoulos not to travel to Tskhinvali. After the Charge's intervention, Bokeria relented on the trip, and Christopoulos achieved some minor successes with the de facto authorities -- notably a commitment to accept OSCE participation in the IPRM. He did not succeed in his main objective, however, and based on his readout to USOSCE, it now seems the Greeks will settle for a lesser alternative -- periodic trips to Georgia, rather than a permanent (if roving) presence. Although the Georgians could have been more flexible, the Greeks did not do their homework and ran into deep-rooted Georgian fears. The lesson is that, when it comes to any potentially status-related idea, the Georgians need time and the ability to review proposals in a written form to satisfy themselves they are not taking a step they will later regret. End summary and comment. THE CHRISTOPOULOS PLAN ¶2. (C) Following previous Greek failures to reach consensus on a new format for an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) presence in Georgia, Special Representative for Protracted Conflicts Charalampos Christopoulos floated the idea in Geneva of following a model the UN is using (ref A). The basic idea is to base a small number of staff members in Vienna and have them maintain a roving, rotational presence in Georgia, including both Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. (The UN has instituted a similar arrangement, with three staff members based in Geneva maintaining a rotating presence in both Tbilisi and Sukhumi.) The roving presence would provide information and logistical support for the OSCE's involvement in both the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) for South Ossetia and the Geneva discussions on Georgia. Post will provide an outline of the plan to EUR/CARC via classified email (please protect this unclassified but sensitive internal OSCE document). GEORGIAN CONCERNS ¶3. (C) Following initial consultations with Georgian representatives in Vienna, Christopoulos and OSCE Conflict Prevention Center Deputy Director Pascal Heyman traveled to Tbilisi to consult with Georgian and South Ossetian de facto representatives to finalize a plan. Apparently believing they already had Georgian support, Christopoulos and Heyman called the Charge in a panic prior to their first meeting with DFM Bokeria October 1 to sk for help in gaining Georgian agreement to listen to the proposal. In spite of a call from the Charge prior to the meeting, they received a cool reception. Both Bokeria and Christopoulos told the Charge the meeting did not go well. According to Bokeria, the Georgians were still waiting for a response from the OSCE Qthe Georgians were still waiting for a response from the OSCE to their inquiry on the status of the previous proposal for an OSCE presence in Georgia (which was blocked by Russia, reportedly at the South Ossetian de factos' behest; see ref B for an outline of that earlier proposal). They were hesitant to consider a new proposal until they received a formal response on the previous one. They were also unwilling to offer a formal response to the plan without seeing a written proposal, which Christopoulos did not provide. (Note: A written version of the plan did exist -- post received a copy October 1 -- so Christopoulos's unwillingness to share a copy with Bokeria is hard to explain. End note.) Finally, Bokeria protested the pressure from Christopoulos to accept the plan on the spot, without seeing it in writing or having any time to discuss it within his own government. As a result, he asked Christopoulos not to travel to Tskhinvali to discuss the plan with the de factos, because the Georgian government was not ready to accept it, and the South Ossetians should only be consulted after the Georgian TBILISI 00001810 002 OF 003 government gave its approval. ¶4. (C) Beyond his complaints about the process, Bokeria had substantive concerns about the plan as well. He told the Charge that the proposal provided for a very insignificant OSCE presence, but could give the Russians a political victory, enabling them to argue that the OSCE's presence has been re-established while they still blocked a robust mission. He suggested that allowing the roving team members to spend an equal amount of time in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali would suggest political equivalence of the two cities. He also had questions about transportation arrangements. Christopoulos and Heyman traveled into South Ossetia in a UNHCR vehicle that entered South Ossetia from the Russian border to the north, and the plan envisaged similar transportation arrangements for the team members. Although the Georgians tolerate access from the north on a limited basis for the likes of the International Committee of the Red Cross and UNHCR, they are unlikely to agree to any formalization of such movements, because they implicitly acknowledge Russia and the South Ossetian de facto authorities' control of the Russia-Georgia border. In more general terms, Bokeria explained that the Greeks in the past have shown themselves to be too willing to compromise too much on status questions for the sake of reaching a deal with the Russians, and the Georgians are therefore wary of agreeing to any Greek proposal without thoroughly understanding it first. TEAM USA TO THE RESCUE ¶5. (C) During the afternoon of October 1, the Charge received a frantic call from Christopoulos, asking for help in convincing the Georgians to be more flexible. Charge placed a call to Bokeria, suggesting that blocking the trip could reflect poorly on Georgia -- and that the OSCE representatives could have a general meeting with the de facto authorities and avoid discussing the roving team proposal. Bokeria complained that Christopoulos had enlisted the United States as an intermediary, but agreed to discuss the trip to Tskhinvali with Christopoulos once again, after he consulted with his minister. The Charge met later that same evening with Bokeria on the margins of the German National Day reception and told the Charge that he would be willing to agree to the trip, but only with Christopoulos's commitment to avoid discussing the proposal. The Charge conveyed the conditions to Christopoulos (also attending the same reception) and he agreed to Bokeria's terms. PROGRESS IN TSKHINVALI ¶6. (C) Christopoulos reported to the Charge that his October 2 trip to Tskhinvali was a success, even though he honored Bokeria's request to avoid discussing the roving team proposal. The most significant achievement, according to Christopoulos, was the South Ossetian de facto authorities' agreement to accept the OSCE's involvement in the IPRM, and their invitation to visit Tskhinvali before and after the next meeting on October 19. He told the Charge he would accept that invitation. The de facto authorities also agreed to convene the new group on missing persons, proposed in Geneva (ref A),but requested to be allowed to send two representatives, including one from the police; Christopoulos agreed, but noted that the Georgians would then also be able to send two representatives. The de factos also offered Qto send two representatives. The de factos also offered their reaction to the recently released Tagliavini report (ref C),which was the same as Russia's (ref D). ¶7. (C) On the water issue, Christopoulos reported that the conversation echoed previous discussions, in which the de factos linked the question of water access to the question of payment. They said they were ready to provide water for free to undisputed Georgia if international donors agreed to finance water works in South Ossetia. The basic problem, according to Christopoulos, remains that the South Ossetians do not want to give Georgians access into South Ossetia, nor do they want to travel into undisputed Georgia. He said the de factos showed some interest in linking the water questions to the issue of supplying gas to the Akhalgori Valley. He said he would try in Vienna to develop a plan for a joint study, perhaps with the Georgians working in undisputed Georgia and the South Ossetians in South Ossetia, to be linked together by the OSCE. Christopoulos also thought the South Ossetian idea of involving international donors, who could presumably gain access to both sides of the boundary, held promise. TBILISI 00001810 003 OF 003 NEXT STEPS ¶8. (C) The Charge suggested to Christopoulos that providing a written proposal to the Georgians might help alleviate their concerns over the roving team proposal. Although initially resistant, Christopoulos finally conceded that some kind of document might be possible -- but it would have to be confidential and not shared with the South Ossetians. Since his return to Vienna, however, post understands that Christopoulos has now backed off the roving team concept, intending instead to make periodic trips himself around the IPRM meetings and at other times as needed to prepare for the Geneva talks (ref E). These trips could conceivably represent a foot in the door that could be expanded to trips by other OSCE representatives for reasons other than IPRM meetings. COMMENT: BEWARE THOSE TOES ¶9. (C) Bokeria's sensitivity may appear overwrought, but Christopoulos's ham-handedness -- in particular his unwillingness to share a written draft of the plan -- left little room for maneuver. One theme that has remained constant in the government's approach to the post-war environment is to avoid any steps in the international arena, especially relating to the status of the regions, that Georgia might later come to regret. Rightly or wrongly, the government has long been suspicious of the OSCE's full commitment to Georgia's territorial integrity, so it wants to evaluate any OSCE-originated proposal very carefully. The timing of this misadventure is unfortunate, because with less than three months left as CiO, the Greeks are unlikely to pursue any more creative ideas to re-establish a meaningful presence in Georgia. The good news, perhaps, is that the door is still open for new ideas on a robust OSCE presence in Georgia. LOGSDON