GEORGIA: GOVT AGREES TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000171 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOVT AGREES TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY NEAR TERRITORIES REF: A. TBILISI 82 ¶B. STATE 5642 ¶C. USOSCE 13 ¶D. 08 TBILISI 2271 ¶E. 08 TBILISI 2495 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. In a briefing for diplomats, EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) staff provided information about the January 26 agreement between the EUMM and the Georgian Ministry of Defense (MOD). The EUMM military advisor judged that the limitations the Georgians voluntarily imposed upon themselves with this agreement significantly limited their ability to conduct offensive capabilities against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. EUMM Head Hansjorg Haber had hoped for more extensive limitations, but he saw this agreement as the beginning of a process; UK Ambassador Keefe noted the details were less important than the fact of the agreement. The EUMM signed a similar agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in October; Haber expressed some concerns about "creeping militarization" among MOIA forces, but the EUMM maintains an ongoing dialogue with the MOIA on these concerns. Haber said the next step was to encourage Russia to sign a similar agreement, but expressed little hope for success. French Ambassador Fournier noted the agreement provides a robust answer to criticism in Vienna of Georgia's refusal to permit a Russian military inspection under the OSCE Vienna Document process. Although the Georgians have room to improve, they have made a good effort to do their part to show their commitment to avoiding military escalation along the boundaries. End summary and comment. THE MOD MOU ¶2. (SBU) On January 26, Haber and Georgian Defense Minister Sikharulidze signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) called the "Provisional Arrangement for the Exchange of Information between the Ministry of Defence of Georgia and the European Union Monitoring Mission" (text emailed to EUR/CARC). The key elements remain the same as those reported in ref A, with the final compromises being Georgian willingness to sign one agreement covering both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and EUMM acceptance of a 15-km zone, versus 20-km, outside Abkhazia. The MOD had sought U.S. input on the agreement (ref A),which EmbOff and Deputy DATT provided to MOD Analytical Department Director David Nardaia on January 23 per ref B. According to the text, the agreement will be available in "the public domain"; Haber explained that it will probably not be posted on a website, but will be provided to anyone who asks for it, and has already been passed to Russia. ¶3. (C) At the EUMM's weekly briefing for the diplomatic community on January 29, the EUMM's military advisor, Clive Trout (from the UK),went through the key elements of the agreement and offered the overall assessment that its limitations made it difficult for Georgia to mount offensive operations against either Abkhazia or South Ossetia. He added that, because Georgia agreed to inform the EUMM of any major military movements, and the EUMM had the ability to inspect Georgian military installations within a day's notice, it would be very difficult for Georgia to take any steps to prepare for an offensive without the EUMM's knowledge. Head of Mission Haber said the EUMM had sought more extensive limitations on the Georgian military, such as Qmore extensive limitations on the Georgian military, such as a 20-km zone outside Abkhazia and a larger zone outside South Ossetia that would have included parts of the east-west highway, but decided that this initial agreement was worthwhile and would begin a process of cooperation between the EUMM and MOD. The agreement calls for fortnightly meetings between the EUMM and MOD. UK Ambassador Denis Keefe noted that in any case the fact of the agreement was more important than the details of the text. ¶4. (C) French Ambassador Eric Fournier expressed considerable indignation at the criticism levied against Georgia in Vienna in the context of Georgia's refusal to accede to Russia's request to conduct OSCE Vienna Document inspections (ref C). He pointed out that the MOU provided much more transparency on Georgia's military than OSCE commitments provided, because it allowed an international body present in Georgia virtually unrestricted access to installations and movements. THE MOIA MOU TBILISI 00000171 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) The MOU complements a similar agreement signed between the EUMM and the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA) on October 10, 2008. Haber reported that the EUMM is concerned by recent MOIA moves that have caused a "creeping militarization" of the adjacent areas. In one case, the EUMM undertook surprise inspections on January 27 of four MOIA posts near the boundaries, at Rukhi outside Abkhazia and Jria, Ergneti and Odzisi outside South Ossetia. The MOIA allowed immediate inspections in three of the posts, and the EUMM found the MOIA to be in full compliance with its MOU (e.g., no specialized or heavy weaponry). The MOIA did not allow an immediate inspection at Odzisi, however; after several phone calls, the EUMM was finally allowed in, but was not given access to one building. Minister of Internal Affairs Merabishvili later admitted to Haber that the refusal to allow an immediate and complete inspection was a violation of the MOU. He explained that the one restricted building was a highly sensitive surveillance station collecting signals intelligence from Russian and South Ossetian posts in Akhmaji and the Akhalgori Valley, adding that its cover had now been revealed to the Russians and the site would have to be relocated. ¶6. (C) The EUMM has also observed some equipment held by the MOIA that Haber described as showing a certain "lack of discipline" in its commitments to avoid militarizing the adjacent areas, which he will raise with the MOIA. EUMM monitors have observed rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), sniper rifles, and around January 18 at Koshka (just outside the South Ossetian administrative boundry, east of Tskhinvali),a tripod for an RPG launcher. The EUMM continues to question the MOIA's use of armored COBRA vehicles as well (refs D and E),although Haber admitted they did not violate the MOIA's agreement with the EUMM. (Embassy note. Minister Merabishvili has argued to the Ambassador that it is unfair of the EUMM to insist that their monitors needed armored vehicles to be safe along the administrative boundaries of the separatist territories, while objecting to the Georgian desire to ensure that their police personnel were equally safe. We and many of our European colleagues think that Merabishvili has a point. End note.) Haber noted that the EUMM has observed several flights by Russian helicopters over areas adjacent to South Ossetia in recent days (west of Perevi January 27; above Perevi and Jria January 24; above Sakorintlo January 24 and 21; and above Jria January 20) and speculated that the Russians were trying to keep their eye on Georgian movements, including those in particular by COBRAs and other vehicles. RUSSIA'S TURN ¶7. (C) Haber said the next step was to approach the Russians and seek a similar agreement, and in fact the EUMM has already begun this process by sharing the text of the MOU with Russia. Haber had been hoping for a "soft landing" with the Russians, and he was pleased that their initial response to the MOU was no response at all; he had feared some kind of negative statement. Haber reported that Russian Ambassador to the EU Chizhov in Brussels had remarked privately to him that the MOU does not go as far as the fourth point of the six-point cease-fire agreement (Haber commented to the Qsix-point cease-fire agreement (Haber commented to the assembled diplomats that the Russians still have some work to do on the fifth point). Haber said he had little expectation of immediate or substantive steps toward such an agreement with Russia, and he thought the international community might need to use other fora, such as bilateral engagement or the Geneva process, to make any progress. Nevertheless he thought approaching the Russians would still be useful in putting the diplomatic ball in their court. COMMENT: THE GEORGIANS ARE TRYING HARD ¶8. (C) Although the EUMM wanted to sign the MOU earlier, the Georgian government's caution in making these voluntary commitments is understandable. Its willingness to do so shows a sincere interest in being both cooperative and transparent with the international community. Even though the EUMM did not get as restrictive an agreement as it wanted, it is satisfied that Georgia's ability to mount offensive operations is significantly impaired. As the EUMM points out, the government's good will now deserves the reward of a serious expectation from the international community that Russia will reciprocate. Russia may counter that Georgia continues to militarize the adjacent areas -- TBILISI 00000171 003 OF 003 but such allegations must be kept in context. Although the MOIA's record of compliance with its MOU is apparently not 100%, it has maintained a regular dialogue with the EUMM. Merabishvili's admission of a violation, not to mention the rather remarkable revelation about sensitive intelligence operations, demonstrates an openness about internal operations that few sovereign nations would suffer on their own soil. The MOD MOU also establishes regular consultations, and we expect the MOD and EUMM will remain similar engaged. Furthermore, no international monitors have reported suspicions of active Georgian attacks against Russian, Abkhaz or South Ossetian forces. Instead monitors have continued to file regular reports about attacks against Georgian forces, as well as the installation of heavy equipment along the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides of the administrative boundaries. TEFFT