GEORGIA: RE-ENGAGING WITH ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001669 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID OEXC RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RE-ENGAGING WITH ABKHAZIA REF: A. 08 TBILISI 2071 ¶B. 09 TBILISI 321 ¶C. 09 TBILISI 1517 ¶D. 08 TBILISI 2174 ¶E. 09 TBILISI 1131 ¶F. 08 TBILISI 2271 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. One year after the U.S. ceased nearly all aid to the breakaway regions in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war, the time is right to re-engage with Abkhazia. The Georgian government and the Abkhaz de facto authorities both support the idea, and U.S. long-term goals are better served with an active presence in Abkhazia. The devil really is in the details: choosing the right programs and getting them started without crossing political redlines on both sides will be at least as difficult as achieving the programs' objectives, and the de facto authorities make even travel to the region difficult. The Georgian government is drafting a strategy, due by December, for engaging the regions, and AID is providing technical assistance to that effort. Post recommends that the U.S. develop its own strategy in parallel with the Georgian process, and in coordination with European partners, with the short- and medium-term goals of providing needed aid to Abkhazia and establishing connections with Abkhaz leadership and society. The potential payoff in progress toward our strategic goals is worth the trouble of meeting the significant tactical challenges. Should the security situation eventually allow, post recommends that we pursue a similar strategy with regard to South Ossetia. End summary. BACKGROUND: WHY WE DISENGAGED ¶2. (C) After the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the U.S. Government implemented an immediate moratorium on the small USG aid programs in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For one thing, the war created security concerns, but Russia's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia also created a sensitive environment in which neither the U.S. nor Georgia wanted to lend any additional legitimacy to the de facto authorities. In fact, the U.S. and other western partners considered imposing additional costs on the de facto authorities, such as targeted sanctions; although no such steps were ultimately taken, reintroducing aid to regimes that were so blatantly flouting international law could have been perceived as rewarding them. The one program the U.S. has continued to support is the Halo Trust's demining efforts, which most sides agree should continue without becoming unnecessarily politicized. South Ossetian de facto authorities, however, have not allowed even Halo Trust to operate. ¶3. (C) On the practical level, the October 2008 Law on Occupied Territories made operating in the regions more complicated by imposing limitations on the activities of international entities in the regions (ref A); an implementing decree has still not been issued, and questions remain about the legality of various activities. The Law also signaled the government's policy preference to emphasize the regions' isolation in response to their newly energized claims to independence. On the Abkhaz side, the de facto authorities have imposed a virtual moratorium on travel by Tbilisi-accreditted diplomats to the region, arguing that allowing such trips by diplomats sent to Georgia undermines Abkhaz "sovereignty," even while they proclaim their interest QAbkhaz "sovereignty," even while they proclaim their interest in engagement (ref B). Although the seal is not hermetic, with diplomats traveling from capitals or bringing assistance dollars generally welcome, it has been difficult to conceive o any new assistance programs without being able to sit down and talk about it. ¶4. (C) The European Union and individual European states have taken a different approach, continuing their assistance programs in Abkhazia with very little interruption (ref B). (South Ossetian de facto authorities have allowed virtually no international assistance programs to proceed, except those provided by Russia.) They argue that keeping a presence in Abkhazia provides some ongoing insight into the situation in Abkhazia (especially important since the departure of UNOMIG); allows them to maintain trust with the local communities; and counterbalances somewhat the Russian presence, encouraging the de facto authorities to keep looking to the international community and avoid putting all their eggs in the Russian basket. TBILISI 00001669 002 OF 003 ¶5. (C) The danger of this approach is the extent to which it fosters a sense of legitimacy, authority, even entitlement among the de facto authorities, especially if donors are so committed to maintain engagement that they are unwilling to challenge the de facto authorities when appropriate. In one telling exchange, the French ambassador challenged his EU colleagues on this approach, noting that the de facto authorities are happy to accept EU assistance, but refuse to accept EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) monitors -- yet the assistance keeps flowing (ref C). SO WHY SHOULD WE RE-ENGAGE? ¶6. (C) The European arguments for engagement are sound, especially as more time goes by; the longer the U.S. remains out of Abkhazia, the harder it will be to re-establish trust and cooperative relationships, and the more dependent the region will be on Russia. The passage of time has lessened the danger that assistance programs will be perceived as rewarding Abkhazia for its renewed sense of independence. Abkhazia's relationship with Russia has also grown more complicated, with a significant proportion of the population, including among the leadership, having concerns about the extent of Russian influence (ref D). Although the approach of the December 2009 "presidential" elections has encouraged politicians to take a hard public line on sovereignty and status questions, it is quite likely that officials will have more space to be flexible once the election is over. ¶7. (C) The Georgian government has also encouraged the United States to get more actively involved in Abkhazia. Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili recently outlined his office's efforts to develop a strategy for re-engagement, to be completed by December 2009, and requested AID technical assistance in formulating the strategy. In a letter to the Ambassador, Yakobashvili explained, "our policy towards the population on the occupied territories will be proactive with the special emphasis to establish and to reinforce ties between returning and receiving communities." The chairman of the Tbilisi-backed Abkhaz government-in-exile, Giorgi Baramia, likewise expressed to poloff the importance of establishing programs that bring together elements of the Georgian and Abkhaz communities, such as the younger generations of both sides, or extended relatives of mixed families. Yakobashvili also stated that the Georgian government itself, at this point, would be wise to avoid running such programs and to leave their implementation to others, including the United States. ¶8. (C) Although he is quite critical of the government's conflict resolution strategies, prominent opposition member Irakli Alasania -- who served as the government's special representative on Abkhazia and as the Georgian permanent representative to the UN -- likewise advocates more active U.S. involvement in Abkhazia. During a recent conversation with the DCM, Alasania advocated programs very similar to those suggested by Baramia. Although he saw little opportunity for substantial progress toward reconciliation under the current administration, primarily because of the lack of trust between the sides, he said youth and cultural exchanges were critical to establishing and maintaining connections and laying the groundwork for reconciliation in Qconnections and laying the groundwork for reconciliation in the future. WHAT TO DO -- AND HOW TO DO IT? ¶9. (C) Making a decision to proceed with engagement raises questions of exactly which programs to choose, and how to implement them. The right program will offer genuine benefits to communities on both sides of the administrative boundary (and therefore be supported by both sides) and promote increased contact between the communities while remaining politically acceptable to the authorities on both sides, but without in any way undermining Georgia's territorial integrity. Many programs that appear reasonable on the surface risk doing the latter by increasing the de facto authorities' confidence in their own legitimacy and sovereignty. At the same time, being utterly inflexible about practical coordination with the de facto authorities on some level will prevent any project from proceeding. ¶10. (C) The Georgian government's efforts to develop a strategy will focus in particular on what types of activities to attempt. As some preliminary suggestions, Yakobashvili proposed activities in such broad areas as socio-economic, outreach/community, human rights, health care, cultural issues, and legal issues. Among his many specific ideas, TBILISI 00001669 003 OF 003 cross-community interaction, especially among the youth, is the kind of program advocated by both Baramia and Alasania as especially important right now. The United States has had considerable success with health care programs in the past, which many Abkhaz still remember and appreciate. Perhaps the easiest programs to re-introduce would be U.S. government exchange programs, such as FLEX, UGRAD, Muskie and other Educational and Cultural Affairs Bureau offerings. On the edgier side, something like law enforcemen assistance, while higher profile and likely more controversial to one or both of the sides, might at the same time provide real incentives to active participation, while also contributing to increased stability in the region. ¶11. (C) The trickiest issues are the logistical ones. For example, how would we pay local implementers? Carrying cash into Abkhazia is a serious security risk, especially since U.S. Embassy security personnel have difficulty assessing, much less improving, the security environment in Abkhazia. Direct bank transfers into Abkhazia, however (which EU countries use),support the Abkhaz de facto economy, therefore raising potential questions under the Law on Occupied Territories, and possibly enriching the de facto authorities. Yakobashvili has warned, for example, that Abkhaz banks are involved in money laundering, and European use of those banks serves to enable such activities. Or, if we were to propose a confidence-building program between communities, on what documents would Abkhaz residents travel? In the past they have traveled on Russian passports, but Georgian authorities have lately insisted they travel on Georgian ones. In the broad policy language included in past AID requests for applications, we typically included a statement reaffirming U.S. support for Georgian territorial integrity -- a statement that many local Abkhaz organizations find objectionable and that therefore discourages their participation. ¶12. (C) Since the 2008 war, the Georgian government's inclination has been to take a more rigid stance on any status-related details, such as money transfers and travel documents. They are still wary of compromising what they consider to be principled positions on their own sovereignty. As they develop a strategy for re-engagement, however, they will need to face these kinds of details and decide to what extent the success of the programs is worth additional flexibility. The United States will likewise need to distinguish between fundamental positions that cannot be compromised and less consequential areas that have room for maneuver. On travel documents, for example, allowing Abkhaz residents to travel, even to the United States, on Russian passports could be portrayed as reinforcing the unreality of Abkhaz "passports." The EU has continued to make direct bank transfers all along, while still maintaining a strong non-recognition policy; would it be possible for the United States to avoid delving into the details of a cooperating partner's financial arrangements? There likewise may be a way to finesse our policy statements in requests for applications that neither suggests any loss of support for Georgia's territorial integrity nor alienates potential Abkhaz partners. COMMENT: THE TIME IS NOW QCOMMENT: THE TIME IS NOW ¶13. (C) As post noted in December 2008 (ref E),engagement with the de facto authorities, and the population of Abkhazia overall, will ultimately serve to prevent Russia from assuming complete control of the region and to keep the door open to eventual reintegration with the rest of Georgia. Although both de facto and Georgian sensitivities have made it difficult to proceed with a program, the post-election environment in Abkhazia will be as auspicious a time as we can expect to get started. By working with the Georgian government to develop a realistic strategy, planning our own involvement with as much flexibility as possible, and maintaining some connection with the de factos, post recommends that the U.S. government strive to recommence direct involvement in Abkhazia in early 2010. TEFFT