GEORGIA: ADDITIONAL PROVOCATIONS HEIGHTEN TENSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001427 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ADDITIONAL PROVOCATIONS HEIGHTEN TENSION REF: TBILISI 1409 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. On August 2 Russian Border Guards set up poles in the village of Kveshi, 200 meters outside of the South Ossetian administrative boundary, as an apparent first step to establish a checkpoint; on August 3, the Russians and the poles were gone. On August 1 South Ossetian de facto officials accused Georgian forces of launching an attack on Eredvi, east of Tskhinvali, and the Russian Defense Ministry warned that additional "attacks" could provoke a Russian military response; the EUMM was unable to confirm that any incident occurred, and working-level Russian forces told Georgian counterparts the Ministry's statement was the result of a "miscommunication." Also on August 1, South Ossetian de facto "president" Kokoity repeated statements he made shortly after the war that ultimately South Ossetia could unite with Russia. Coming so soon before the war's anniersary on August 7, and following Russia's July 31 failure to appear as promised at a Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting, all three episodes are disturbingly provocative and chillingly echo the runup to the war in August 2008. End summary and comment. RUSSIAN FORCES ENTER VILLAGE IN GORI DISTRICT ¶2. (C) On August 2, EUMM monitors observed Russian border guards in Kveshi village in Gori district, 200 meters outside of the boundary with South Ossetia (based on the EUMM's GPS measurements),seemingly defining an area in which to set up a Russian checkpoint. The Russian border guards had set up poles, 80 centimeters high, in the middle of a street in the village. This spot, if established as a checkpoint, would not only have blocked traffic, but would have also prevented some elements of the local population from reaching their land plots. When EUMM monitors approached, armed Russian guards told the monitors in an aggressive manner (in the EUMM's opinion) that this was their spot. On August 3, Georgian news items appeared alleging that Russian forces had taken steps to redefine the boundary and take control of undisputed Georgian territory. That same morning, EUMM monitors returned to the village and discovered that both the Russians and the poles were gone. No reason has been given for their departure. Local Georgian press also reported that the Russians have opened a stationary checkpoint near the village of Artsevi, which is just across the administrative boundary line from Kveshi, but this cannot be confirmed. AUGUST 1 ATTACK? ¶3. (SBU) The morning of August 1, in a statement published on the Internet, South Ossetian de facto officials alleged that Georgian forces had launched a mortar attack in the vicinity of Eredvi, east of Tskhinvali. The Russian Ministry of Defense subsequently released a press release noting this "attack" and others from July 29 and warning that Russian military forces could answer any additional such attacks with all available means. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) dispatched monitors to the area, who were unable to verify the allegations because they were unable to cross the South Ossetian administrative boundary. They did confirm with local Georgian police officers that three explosions had occurred that morning, but the officers characterized them as grenade-like explosions akin to training activities, which have been carried out in the same area of South Ossetia in Qhave been carried out in the same area of South Ossetia in the past. The EUMM monitors also observed that the Georgian forces at local checkpoints were not in a heightened state of alert and did not seem overly concerned (some were not wearing their helmets, and some were even asleep). South Ossetian de facto officials eventually contacted the EUMM directly, through the recently established "hotline," or Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (JIPRM) contact list, and conveyed their concerns. They explained that they could not produce any physical evidence of the attack, because the shells had landed in a wooded area that was difficult to access. ¶4. (SBU) Director of the Analytical Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) Shota Utiashvili told EmbOff that local Russian counterparts told MoIA officials that the Russian Defense Ministry statement appeared before they themselves had reported on the events. Later that evening, they told their Georgian counterparts that the statement was in fact based on "miscommunication" among Russian parties. ¶5. (SBU) The evening of August 1, EUMM issued a statement indicating it could find no evidence to support the allegations of the attack, although it could not make a TBILISI 00001427 002 OF 002 complete assessment without access to South Ossetia. It also called on all sides "to exercise extreme restraint in words and actions at this particularly time" (i.e., in the approach to the anniversary of the war). "ONE DAY, WE WILL BE PART OF RUSSIA" ¶6. (SBU) In an interview with Reuters on August 1, Kokoity suggested that his ultimate goal may be to unite South Ossetia with Russia. Kokoity was quoted as saying, "We will build our own state, which will be in alliance with Russia...and I am not excluding that one day, we will be part of Russia. The people of South Ossetia want to be united with Russia." He went on to state that it was Russia which was not ready for unification, implying that it is not South Ossetia who is blocking such a move. Kokoity made a similar statement in Sochi just one month after the war. On September 11, 2008, he was quoted as telling a group of journalists and academics that "We are looking forward to joining North Ossetia and the Russian Federation." The Kremlin quickly denied this claim at the time, saying South Ossetia wanted to remain independent, and Kokoity quickly backtracked, saying his words had been misunderstood and that he was merely expressing the desire of many South Ossetians. COMMENT: BAD TIMING, AT THE VERY LEAST ¶7. (C) It is possible (although from our vantage point it strains credulity) to explain Russian actions not as a deliberate effort to raise the tension the weekend before the anniversary of the war, but as the result of poor coordination among Russian agencies and proxies. The Russian Border Guards' efforts to establish a new checkpoint, along a boundary which admittedly is not easy to determine in many places, may have been their effort to continue with their new mandate of protecting what they consider the "border." The surprisingly belligerent statement by the Defense Ministry may have been the result of an overly zealous defense establihment that did not consult with their colleagues in the MFA. Kokoity's latest allusion to the possibility of Russia's annexation of South Ossetia may simply exhibit a lack of self-control (as he seems to have shown back in September as well) -- it remains to be seen how Moscow will react to his latest confession. Finally, the Russians' no-show at the July 31 meeting of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meeting (reftel),which even the South Ossetians attended, could have been the result of local incompetence, rather than a deliberate rejection of the process. ¶8. (C) Nevertheless, in keeping with the spirit of the Defense Ministry's own statement, the timing of such a string of examples of poor judgment -- if that is what behind these actions -- could not be worse. As that statement notes, the runup to the war itself was eerily similar. In the first week of August 2008, the two sides made a series of heated allegations about attacks mounted by the other side. Also, despite efforts to get in contact with counterparts and defuse tensions, on several occasions Russian officials declined to show for scheduled meetings, with no explanation. This time around, the Georgians have showed remarkable restraint in response. Whether the Russian actions are simply a confluence of unfortunate circumstances or something more sinister, however, the possibility remains that one of these times, an event could spin out of control. TEFFT QTEFFT