GEORGIA: MINISTER SHASHKIN - GOG TO MOVE FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001165 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2019 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: MINISTER SHASHKIN - GOG TO MOVE FORWARD REF: A. TBILISI 1069 ¶B. TBILISI 0979 ¶C. TBILISI 0968 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of Corrections and Legal Aid, Dmitri Shashkin gave Poloff a wide-ranging assessment of the current political situation and the GoG's plans to move forward with its reform agenda without non-parliamentary opposition participation. Shashkin said that the GoG no longer harbored hopes that any in the non-parliamentary opposition would engage in dialogue with the government so it no longer made sense to continue negotiations and draw out the process. Shashkin predicted a new round of protests in the fall after the non-parliamentary opposition leaders took their August vacations; however, he felt they would be small and ineffective. Shashkin said that the new chairman of the Constitutional Commission presents an organizational challenge but is not an obstacle to reform. Shashkin provided more behind the scenes insights into how the protests and negotiations unfolded. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: Usually an optimist, Shashkin's frustration with the non-parliamentary opposition's unwillingness or inability to engage was obvious, and he repeatedly expressed his doubt that any among the group were truly interested in doing the nuts and bolts work of reforming and improving Georgia's democracy. The GoG clearly believes incorporating the non-parliamentary opposition into the political process is to their advantage but has come to the conclusion that moving forward on democratic reform alone is currently the best of a number of imperfect options. End Comment. History on the GoG's Frustration ¶3. (C) Shashkin, who headed the Tbilisi office for the International Republican Institute before becoming minister, said that the difference between the public and private faces of the non-parliamentary opposition was striking. Shashkin, who was in the non-parliamentary meeting with President Saakashvili on May 11 said that not oncedid any of the non-parliamentary leaders ask Saakashvili directly for his resignation. Shashkin confirmed that Saakashvili was direct and stated that he would not resign. According to Shashkin, Saakashvili said he was open to listening to their suggestions, which they had trouble formulating. Shashkin said that Alasania talked about amnesty for opposition supporters and Saakashvili quickly agreed an arrangement could be worked out. Shashkin characterized the meeting as Saakashvili continually asking the non-parliamentary opposition what else they wanted. Vague responses such as judicial freedom, opposition oversight of key ministries, a stronger parliament and other such ideas were offered to which Saakashvili responded that all were acceptable and asked the non-parliamentary opposition for their specific proposals. According to Shashkin, they received nothing from the other side but were still willing to entertain any proposals the non-parliamentary opposition offered. Shashkin said that in private meetings the non-parliamentary leaders were unsure of themselves and understood that they had little bargaining power, albeit without any idea of what they wanted or could accept as a face-saving compromise. ¶4. (C) Shashkin said he had hoped that Alasania and his team would be reasonable and that perhaps David Usupashvili (Alliance - Republicans) would come around but, like the other non-parliamentary opposition, they lived in their own Qother non-parliamentary opposition, they lived in their own tone-deaf political reality. Shashkin told Poloff that Bakradze was extremely irked with Alasania who had a number of private meetings with Bakradze. Shashkin repeated the familiar complaint that Alasania would agree to something and be constructive with Bakradze behind closed doors, then attend a rally the next day and call for Saakashvili's resignation. Shashkin assessed Alasania as a weak, uncertain politician with little sense of what he wanted to accomplish. Shashkin said that he believed Alasania had an opportunity to capture a large, broad, moderate swath of the electorate by breaking from the non-parliamentary opposition and negotiating with the GoG but that chance had passed. Shashkin said that Usupashvili, though often personally reasonable, was still trapped by his personal animosity toward Saakashvili as well as by the more radical members of his party. As for the others, Shashkin said he had little hope from the outset they would negotiate. Countering the claim that the protests were a struggle for democratic values, Shashkin said that the only real issue discussed at the Saakashvili-Gachechiladze meeting was a payoff and amnesty. (Embassy Comment: Shashkin acknowledged that an offer was made but Gachechiladze thought it was too low. End TBILISI 00001165 002 OF 003 Comment.) Shashkin then said marginal figures such as Gia Maisashvili (Party of the Future) and Kakha Gamsakhurdia (Freedom Party) had said that they would accept USD 300,000 a piece to quit protesting which garnered quite a chuckle among Saakashvili and his inner circle. These Guys Had a Chance - What Happened with The Patriarch ¶5. (C) Shashkin then said that if the non-parliamentary opposition were smart, they could have pocketed substantial concessions and taken credit for them. Shashkin said that until recently, Saakashvili was ready to negotiate and supported Bakradze and others using back channels to work a deal, but now he has determined that back channel negotiations are pointless. Shashkin said that after May 26, a number of people in the GoG were surprised that the non-parliamentary opposition could gather some 60,000 protesters. (Embassy Note: Shashkin called this a good thing to remind the GoG that regardless of their personal assessments of the non-parliamentary opposition leaders themselves, a significant number of Georgians are unhappy with their current situation. End Note.) He said that he was watching the rally with Bakradze, Minister of Interior, Vano Merabishvili, Minister of Justice Zurab Adeishvili and a few others when they received a phone call from a source in the Patriarchate telling them that the Patriarch was planning to attend the rally. Shashkin said everybody immediately understood the significance of such a gesture but also knew they had "no leverage whatsoever over the Patriarch" to convince him not to go. Shashkin said that when Giorgi Gachechiladze (Utsnobi) entered the stadium as a messiah figure carrying an icon, the Patriarch became enraged and subsequently gave a statement in his sermon widely viewed as condemning the non-parliamentary opposition and supporting Saakashvili (ref B). ¶6. (C) Shashkin said that anti-GoG forces inside the Patriarchate who he identified as the church secretary and press attache convinced the Patriarch to backtrack two days later and issue a more neutral statement (ref C). Shashkin said the Patriarch is constantly balancing pro-Western and modernizing voices versus arch-conservative voices. He guessed that the Patriarch was going to attend the rally to try to push for some reconciliation, but decided against attending because he believed that the non-parliamentary opposition would politicize his appearance and claim the church's support. In any event, Shashkin said that the non-parliamentary opposition miscalculated and instead of parlaying the rally into leverage in negotiations to provide deliverables to their supporters; they again demanded Saakashvili's resignation and subsequently lost their bargaining power. Shashkin said that the Patriarch was not currently playing any particular role but remained a wild card over which the GoG had little to no influence. What's Next ¶7. (C) Shashkin said the GoG would move forwrd with both the Electoral Law Working Group and Constitutional Commission. When asked his assessment of the Chairman Avtandil Demetriashvili, Shashkin rolled his eyes and called him his "biggest headache"(ref A). Shashkin said Demetriashvili had focused more on logistics of the commission rather than the substantive challenges. Nevertheless, Shashkin said that Demetriashvili was acceptable to virtually everybody (even the non-parliamentary opposition has not criticized him) and had no personal agenda Qopposition has not criticized him) and had no personal agenda so his "headache" was tolerable. Shashkin said working group leaders would drive the process, and he was confident of the caliber of the participants to produce solid recommendations. Shashkin said the commission was a work in process but the GoG's goal was to strengthen Parliament and the Judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive. He said that Saakashvili completely agreed in principle on these changes. Shashkin said that Saakashvili supported giving Parliament the ability to choose some or all of the Cabinet of Ministers depending on the mechanism. Shashkin said that the non-parliamentary opposition would and has been trying to discredit the process, but he indicated that he was not overly concerned that their complaints would resonate beyond their hard-core supporters. ¶8. (C) Shashkin predicted more protests in late August or September after the non-parliamentary leaders returned from vacation but did not believe they would be large scale or ongoing. Shashkin said the non-parliamentary opposition had largely discredited itself but that further protests would be another "headache". Shashkin said that the perfect solution would have been to involve the non-parliamentary opposition in the process and produce some sort of win-win face saving compromise. Shashkin said a tremendous amount of thought and TBILISI 00001165 003 OF 003 effort was put into trying to formulate a way to allow the non-parliamentary opposition to save face but was rejected every time by non-parliamentary leaders. Shashkin said the GoG had no choice but to initiate reforms on its own as the best among possible choices but said that nobody in the GoG viewed this scenario as a victory. TEFFT