GEORGIA: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ISSUES CLUSTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001149 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2019 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PHUM PREF SOCI GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ISSUES CLUSTER MUNITIONS REPORT ON AUGUST CONFLICT Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. On April 14, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report entitled "A Dying Practice" on the use of cluster munitions by Russia and Georgia in the August 2008 conflict. NGOs involved in explosive remnants of war (ERW) clearance in Georgia generally agree with the report's technical characterization of the use of cluster munitions during the conflict. However, at least one disagrees with some of the report's recommendations to Georgia and Russia. In addition, all NGOs praised the Government of Georgia for cooperating closely with them in the effort to remove ERW threats, an important point which the report does not highlight. Although it seems that both sides used cluster munitions in the conflict, only Georgia has admitted it; despite evidence to the contrary, Russia continues to deny usage. The Georgian Ministry of Defense claims that they did not use cluster munitions against civilians, civilian targets or civilian populated areas. While questions remain regarding Georgia's intention in using the cluster munitions, the government has since committed to dealing with the consequences of the use of cluster munitions by both sides and cooperated extensively with the international demining organizations on clearance activities, mine risk education, victims assistance and the establishment of a national authority. End summary and comment. METHODOLOGY OF HRW ¶2. (U) HRW's research was accomplished through on-the-ground missions in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor in August 2008 during and immediately after the conflict. They also conducted a mission in October 2008 to Georgia to investigate humanitarian damage caused by the cluster munitions. HRW researchers spoke with all international demining NGOs working in Georgia, The HALO Trust, Norwegian People's Aid and iMMAP, as well as the Georgian Ministry of Defense. HRW exchanged letters with the Russian Ministry of Defense, but received no cooperation from them. RUSSIAN USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS ¶3. (C) The HRW investigation found that Russia used two types of submunitions during the August 2008 conflict, the AO-2.5 RTM and the 9N210. HRW researchers concluded that Russian cluster munitions landed in Akhaldaba, Dzlevijvari, Gori, Pkhvenisi, Ruisi, Variani and Varianis Meurneoba. NPA further noted Russian cluster munitions in Kvemo Khviti and Zemo Nikozi, while The HALO Trust found Russian munitions in Karaleti, Karbi and Kvemo Nikozi. The HRW report concluded that Russia cluster munition strikes killed at least 12 civilians and injured another 46. Russia has repeatedly denied using cluster munitions during the conflict, but HRW, The HALO Trust, NPA, and iMMAP definitively refute Russia's claim. The HALO Trust told Poloff that in one of their denials, the Government of Russia listed all the types of cluster munitions that they did not use during the conflict, conveniently leaving off the AO-2.5 RTM and the 9N210. (Note: Post has not seen this document and only has this report via The HALO Trust. End note.) GEORGIAN USE OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS ¶4. (C) Georgia used the M85 submunition during the conflict, fired from GRADLAR rockets, which were purchased from Israel. The report concluded that Georgia cluster munitions strikes killed at least four civilians and led to eight injuries. After first denying using cluster munitions in the conflict QAfter first denying using cluster munitions in the conflict and condemning the weapon in August 2008, in September 2008 the Georgian Ministry of Defense acknowledged use of cluster munitions during the conflict. They said they aimed the strikes only at Russian targets between the Roki Tunnel and Tskhinvali between August 8 and 11 and denied launching them towards Shindisi, where cluster munitions were discovered. HRW researchers determined that Georgian cluster munitions landed in Brotsleti, Ditsi, Kvemo Khviti, Meghvreskisi, Pkhvenisi, Shindisi, Tirdznisi, Zemo Khviti and Zemo Nikozi. The HALO Trust also reported to Poloff that they found Georgian cluster munitions in Ergneti, Kvemo Nikozi, and Variani. According to the HRW report, the MOD told HRW researchers that they could not explain the presence of Georigan fired cluster munitions south of the administrative boundary with South Ossetia and said that the Ministry had opened an investigation to determine why this happened. The MOD has not yet replied to PolOff's inquiry regarding the status of this investigation. ¶5. (C) One possible explanation, according to both the MOD and HRW, is that a massive failure of the weapons systems occurred. HRW did find that the majority of M85 submunitions TBILISI 00001149 002 OF 002 in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor had failed to function. The MOD was especially surprised by this, as they said their contract for the submunitions was only for the self-destruct model. The HALO Trust told Poloff confidentially that while a massive failure was a possibility, it was also likely that the Georgians felt so overwhelmed by the Russian attack, they merely fired off everything they had with little thought to strike distance or consequences on the civilian population. HRW RECOMMENDATIONS TO RUSSIA AND GEORGIA ¶6. (C) The HRW report makes several recommendations to the governments of Russia and Georgia for mitigation of the humanitarian threat caused by the cluster munitions, including a call for assistance with remedial measures such as clearance and an independent investigation into each country's use of cluster munitions during the conflict. The report specifically recommends that Georgia coordinate with international demining organizations by providing details on the clearance already accomplished by the government. However, the report does not acknowledge the cooperation of the Government of Georgia in precisely that. All the demining organizations working in Georgia have acknowledged both the MOD's and MOIA's efforts in providing this kind of data to them, and as an example, one NGO said the MOIA provided them nine binders of information on their clearance activities since 2004. While the MOD's and MOIA's reporting on their clearance activities does not meet international standards, they have at least been reporting generally what they destroy and where. In regards to another HRW recommendation, that both countries provide details regarding their strike data, a demining NGO representative in Georgia told us that such information was actually of little real use, since these are imprecise weapons by their design. TEFFT