GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA-RUSSIA -- THE HONEYMOON IS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000112 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KBTS RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA-RUSSIA -- THE HONEYMOON IS DEFINITELY OVER REF: A. 08 TBILISI 1861 ¶B. 09 TBILISI 97 ¶C. 08 TBILISI 2071 ¶D. 08 TBILISI 2458 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. Recent stories from inside Abkhazia suggest that the initial euphoria following Russia's recognition of Abkhazia's independence has faded, with the reality of Russia's all encompassing influence sinking in. Russia already wields tremendous influence on the political, economic, and military situation in Abkhazia -- and the de facto authorities are finding that Russia's goals in those areas do not always coincide with their own. Abkhazia seems to want engagement with additional partners, although it is so far unwilling to sacrifice either its own perceived "sovereignty" or the security it believes it receives from Russia. Nevertheless, the cracks in the Abkhazia-Russia partnership are real and are likely to widen into the future. End summary and comment. WASN'T INDEPENDENCE GRAND? ¶2. (C) According to the outgoing Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Georgia, Ivo Petrov, the standard joke in Abkhazia these days runs along the lines of "Wasn't independence grand?" -- i.e., back before Russia recognized independence. Of course there is still a strong sense of pride in having their long years of self-proclaimed sovereignty acknowledged, if only by two countries. A recent Muskie Fellowship candidate from Abkhazia, who is ethnically Armenian, ultimately refused to accept the condition of traveling on a Georgian passport, citing her pride in her "country" of Abkhazia. Nevertheless, there lurks an undercurrent of wariness that the current arrangement is far from ideal. A British diplomat who recently traveled to Abkhazia with British Ambassador Denis Keefe described how everyone they met with, from "president" Bagapsh on down, took pains to make clear that Abkhaz and Russian interests are not identical; Keefe himself noted that "foreign minister" Shamba indicated Abkhaz interest in pursuing a "multi-vector" foreign policy. POLITICAL IMPACT ¶3. (C) Despite its small size, Abkhaz politics is surprisingly complex, and different players have reacted to Russia's recognition in different ways. These differences will only amplify as we approach Abkhazia's "presidential" elections toward the end of 2009. According to Petrov and Keefe, Shamba -- whom some consider a rival to Bagapsh for "president" -- has advocated for a continued UN presence, seeing it as an important counterbalance to Russia's influence. Bagapsh seems close to Shamba on the UN question, but perhaps not quite as enthusiastic. Both seemed to Keefe to be sincerely interested in engagement with the west -- as another counterbalance. During his meeting with Keefe, Bagapsh asked, "Where's (Ambassador) Tefft?" Secretary of the Abkhaz "National Security Council" Lakoba, however, described by Petrov as the quintessential Abkhaz hardline nationalist, is opposed to becoming too close to Russia or the west. Acording to Petrov, he and other hardliners opposed meeting Ambassador Keefe, on the grounds that the UK Ambassador to Georgia has no business visiting Abkhazia. Both Bagapsh and Shamba made a show of explaining that they agreed to meet Keefe only because the UNOMIG mandate is still in force, and the Group of Friends of the Secretary General Qin force, and the Group of Friends of the Secretary General were therefore still welcome. Bagapsh told Keefe, however, that no ambassador accredited only to Georgia would be able to visit after the February 15 expiry of the mandate. Petrov thought that Bagapsh was being overly optimistic; he described the internal debate over the Keefe meeting as quite intense, and suggested permission to enter Abkhazia might not be forthcoming for any more Tbilisi-based ambassadors. German Ambassador Flor is currently seeking permission to make the trip; her attempt will be an interesting test case of the struggle between the westernizers and the hardliners. ¶4. (C) As Petrov has observed before (ref A),Shamba continues to insist that a small ethnic group like the Abkhaz has a better chance to survive in the context of a large country like Russia, where numerous ethnic groups have the space to coexist, than in a small country like Georgia. Whatever the truth of this logic, it suggests that Shamba, for one, implicitly recognizes that Abkhazia's "independence" TBILISI 00000112 002 OF 003 is only a relative concept -- that it really reflects a move toward the Russian orbit. ¶5. (C) Petrov said that, until the war, Bagapsh was weak politically and destined to lose the next election -- but that now he has become stronger, and at this point there is no one in a position to challenge him. Petrov discounted assertions that businessman Beslan Butba was a viable candidate, saying he did have control over newspapers and television, but was an inexperienced politician unused to being in the limelight. He thought Khajimba, whose name has also been heard as a possible candidate, did not have the necessary charisma. Although Russia did not back Bagapsh in the last election, Petrov thought that to some extent Russian President Putin may simply have received bad advice. By the same token, he noted that Russia wants to assert increased control over the finances of Abkhazia, and that it may yet seek an alternate Abkhaz whom it can control more easily. One scenario Petrov raised as a possibility was that Russia would offer Bagapsh some alternate position in order to remove him from the scene. Bagapsh's recent criticism of the proposed Enguri Hydropower Plant management deal between RAO-UES and the Georgian government (ref B) might reflect growing cracks between the "president" and his northern neighbor. ¶6. (C) Other issues could become points of political contention between Abkhazia and Russia. On the external side, Petrov said that Abkhazia and South Ossetia could be encouraged to enter a union treaty with Russia and Belarus -- whether they perceive it to be in their self-interest or not. Internally, he said that demographic trends indicate that the Armenians will likely assume a greater role within Abkhaz society. Considering their business acumen and existing wealth, Petrov thought the Armenians -- who might perceive their own interests as closer to those of Russia than the Abkhaz -- represented a potential threat to the Abkhaz. More generally, identity issues loom large in Abkhazia, especially when it comes to passports. The de facto authorities apparently encourage ethnic Georgians to accept Abkhaz "passports," but Abkhazia and Russia have taken initial steps toward providing for dual citizenship -- and Petrov suggested Russia does not necessarily want to enable ethnic Georgians to move to Russia. Furthermore, the acceptance by Georgians of the Abkhaz documents enables them to participate in elections -- which in the past election helped Bagapsh win. ECONOMIC IMPACT ¶7. (C) Issues of ethnic influence could also become contentious in the economic sphere. Petrov noted that workers from Central Asia currently provide a considerable portion of the workforce in Abkhazia, but that they generally come on a temporary basis. He said, however, that the Abkhaz are concerned that a dual citizenship arrangement with Russia would encourage people from the North Caucasus to come and settle more permanently, further marginalizing the eponymous Abkhaz. In general, Petrov indicated there is great concern that Russia will overwhelm Abkhazia with its economic influence. Right now Abkhaz law forbids land ownership, but there is concern that Russian investors will buy up property, driving up prices and keeping locals out of the market. He noted that stories continue to circulate about Russian plans Qnoted that stories continue to circulate about Russian plans to build a city in the north of Abkhazia to support preparations for the 2014 Sochi Olympics. ¶8. (C) Russian economic involvement could of course benefit Abkhazia in some ways. Petrov noted that Russian candy companies are looking at Abkhazia as a source for hazel nuts, and their demand would far exceed what Abkhazia currently produces. This connection would potentially benefit the ethnic Georgian population in Gali, where most Abkhaz hazel nuts are produced. Such investments will likely raise the ire of the Georgian government, however, which has passed a law theoretically governing economic activities in the regions (ref C). The Russians have already shown themselves willing to put practical considerations above political principles, much to the ire of the Abkhaz; Georgian Ministery of Energy Khetaguri commented that the Enguri Hydropower Plant deal will very possibly cause difficulties between the Russians and the Abkhaz (ref B). MILITARY OPERATIONS ¶9. (C) Information is difficult to come by on the day-to-day situation in Abkhazia, especially in those areas occupied by TBILISI 00000112 003 OF 003 Russian and Abkhaz forces. UNOMIG is constrained in the areas it is able to patrol (ref D),and even Petrov was hesitant to weigh in. Our British colleagues heard clearly that the Abkhaz very much appreciate the security it perceives Russia as providing, and even Georgian government officials acknowledge that it will be difficult for any potential partner of Abkhazia's to convince the de facto authorities to turn their back on this support. Anecdotal reports suggest, however, that Russia is finding that maintaining a major military presence in Abkhazia (as well as South Ossetia) to be more difficult than it perhaps expected. Recent press reports suggest friction between Russian and Abkhaz forces to be on the rise, with some reports suggesting the friction rising even to the level of violence and shooting. More consistent are reports that Russian troops in Abkhazia are poorly supplied, leading to incidents of looting and robbery. These attacks have apparently been directed at both ethnic Georgians and ethnic Abkhaz; MP Paata Davitaia, an ethnic Abkhaz from Abkhazia, has noted publicly increasing tension in Ochamchire between Russian forces and ethnic Abkhaz. COMMENT: UNEQUAL PARTNERS ¶10. (C) One of the most interesting tidbits the British diplomats heard from the Abkhaz is that Russia's recognition of Abkhazia on August 26 came as a complete surprise to the Abkhaz themselves. Bagapsh was on his way to a meeting with Russian counterparts when he heard the news, about 20 minutes before Russian President Medvedev made his public statement; other high-level de facto officials first heard of the decision on TV. Of course the Abkhaz were overjoyed when they finally did hear the news, but this rather cavalier communication of a major, even existential policy decision to a partner suggests to us that Russia sees Abkhazia not as an equal member of the international community, but a useful tool. We have been consistently hearing from many interlocutors that Abkhazia wants to engage with the outside world, and there seem to be good reasons why. Although Abkhazia is unlikely to give up the security and legitimacy it believes it receives from Russia in the short term, that calculation of Abkhaz interests -- especially among the various Abkhaz political groupings -- could change in the future. TEFFT