GEORGIA: 2ND INCIDENT MECHANISM BETTER, OR MAYBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001045 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2019 TAGS: PREL MOPS KPTS RS GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: 2ND INCIDENT MECHANISM BETTER, OR MAYBE NOT REF: A. TBILISI 0808 ¶B. GENEVA 0183 ¶C. GENEVA 0409 ¶D. GENEVA 0229 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. On May 29 the EUMM and OSCE co-facilitated the second session of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (JIPRM) at Dvani on the South Ossetian administrative boundary line. The participants engaged on such substantive issues as security for locals living near the boundary; gas for Akhalgori; electricity for Akhalgori and Tskhinvali; investigation of detentions; and joint visits. The South Ossetian de facto representative agreed to allow EUMM and OSCE to facilitate the meeting, but insisted that the EU and Russia should jointly chair the JIPRM in the long term. He also raised the case of three Ossetians missing since October 2008, stating that this case -- and the chairmanship issue -- must be resolved before South Ossetia can participate again. The Georgian representative proposed a visit into undisputed Georgian territory to investigate the disappearances, followed by reciprocal visits to South Ossetia -- but the South Ossetian refused. The next meeting of the JIPRM, tentatively scheduled for June 11 in Ditsi, seems unlikely to happen. Even though this session was closer to the original mechanism concept than the first, the South Ossetians clearly put issues of status above progress on concrete concerns -- including those of their own people. End summary and comment. MEETING ONE, PART TWO ¶2. (C) In a briefing for diplomatic colleagues on June 4, Head of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Hansjoerg Haber continued his practice of referring to the May 29 session as a continuation of the first meeting of the JIPRM, held April 23 (most of the following is based on his account. See ref A for the first meeting). His rationale is that the Russian and South Ossetian participants only provisionally tolerate the arrangement of joint EUMM-OSCE facilitation, and he did not want to give them a pretext to boycott the meeting. He also maintains that the discussion was a continuation of those points of the original agenda not covered on April 23. The meeting got off to a more promising start than the first. OSCE Chief Military Officer Steve Young told Emboff he was surprised when the South Ossetian participant, Merab Chigoev �00A;(deputy of the de facto "president"'s special representative),readily agreed to allow EUMM and OSCE to continue their role as joint facilitators. Haber proposed that the group start with substantive issues, rather than procedural ones, which had taken up the entire four hours of the first meeting, and everyone agreed. Haber detected a more cooperative attitude from the South Ossetians and told his diplomatic colleagues he thought the Russians had prevailed upon them to play nice. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ¶3. (C) Deputy Reintegration Minister David Rakviashvili, leader of the Georgian delegation (he did not participate in the first session),raised the issue of freedom of movement for local residents who live near the administrative boundary lines to access fields and pastures across the boundary. He said that such villagers, who before the August 2008 conflict were accustomed to crossing the boundary on a regular basis and grew dependent on that access for their livelihood, should be able to return home if they cross the boundary. Noting the presence of Russian "border guards" along the QNoting the presence of Russian "border guards" along the boundary, Rakviashvili directed part of his question to the Russian representatives, asking what they would do to ensure the safety of locals. Deputy Head of the OSCE's Conflict Prevention Center Pascal Heyman, leader of the OSCE delegation, also saw this as an important issue. Chigoev admitted the importance of guaranteeing the safety of local residents, but said that a "border is a border," so that regular movement back and forth would not be possible. Steve Young reported Chigoev also rejected the idea of cross-boundary trade. The Russians did not offer much of a response, saying only that they would uphold local residents' rights. (Note: Before the war, the boundary was poorly defined and control was often not enforced, so that many locals crossed over to use holdings on the other side on a regular, even daily basis. Even now, a great deal of confusion remains over the precise definition of the boundary in many places. Even if the South Ossetians or Russians seek to impose a hermetic seal, they will face considerable difficulty in doing so, and detentions, confrontations, and occasional violence will likely occur. Also, trade restrictions will likely harm South Ossetian villagers, who TBILISI 00001045 002 OF 003 have no other realistic partners, more than those south of the boundary. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) Haber raised another access issue -- the ability of locals to cross the boundary to visit cemeteries and religious sites. Neither the Georgian nor the South Ossetian side expressed any objections to such visits. The EUMM undertook to prepare a list of such sites and ultimately to facilitate such movements. ¶5. (C) In an emotional appeal, Chigoev raised the specific case of three Ossetians who disappeared in October 2008, who the de facto authorities suspect were detained by Georgian authorities. He went on to insist that the issue must be resolved before South Ossetia will participate in another session of the JIPRM. (Note: The South Ossetians have raised this case frequently in the past, including with the EUMM and at the Geneva talks. They did so at the most recent meeting on May 18-19, and EU Special Representative Pierre Morel suggested that this was exactly the kind of case that the JIPRM was designed to tackle. Haber told his diplomatic colleague the EUMM was willing to conduct investigations into the case, including with the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, but it had no executive authority to do much more than ask questions. End note.) In Steve Young's words, Rakviashvili then called Chigoev's bluff, saying that Georgia would be willing to allow a South Ossetian de facto delegation to visit the area where they believe the three were detained, if the South Ossetians would then be willing to allow a Georgian delegation into South Ossetia to investigate cases of concern on that side of the boundary. (Note: The Geneva-sourced document that establishes the JIPRM envisions, but does not mandate, just such joint visits -- see ref B. End note.) Chigoev refused the offer. ¶6. (C) Chigoev also raised the issue of gas deliveries to Akhalgori and electricity deliveries to Akhalgori and Tskhinvali, complaining that the Georgian side had not yet delivered on its commitments to ensure steady deliveries into South Ossetia. Although Rakviashvili suggested that the second Geneva working group was a more appropriate forum to discuss such issues (see refs C, D),Haber pushed back, saying that there was no reason for the JIPRM to limit itself to certain topics. Regarding the gas question, Heyman noted that the South Ossetians themselves had not yet fulfilled the recommendation of the OSCE expert to install a second pressure gauge on the South Ossetian side in order to help track the deliveries more precisely. PROCEDURAL ISSUES ¶7. (C) The sides did not reach agreement on the chairmanship of the JIPRM. The EUMM and OSCE's position is that they should serve as chairs, because they are the two Geneva co-chairs represented in the JIPRM, which itself derived from Geneva; Georgia supports this position. Chigoev repeated South Ossetia's refusal to accept the OSCE as a co-chair and proposed instead the EUMM and Russia, arguing that the Geneva process itself derives from the ceasefire agreement and its implementing measures, of which EU and Russia are the "parties" (sic). Furthermore, Chigoev stated that South Ossetia would not be able to participate in another JIPRM meeting until this issue is resolved. ¶8. (C) Rakviashvili repeated Georgia's interest in holding JIPRM meetings on both sides of the boundary. (Note: The Georgian position derives from their commitment to joint visits on both sides of the boundary; they believe that an Qvisits on both sides of the boundary; they believe that an inability to hold even JIPRM meetings on both sides undermines the principle of access, which is necessary for joint visits to incident locations. End note.) Chigoev, who did not object to the idea in principle on April 23 (ref A), expressed South Ossetia's objection to holding the meeting anywhere other than on the boundary. Haber told his diplomatic colleagues that, in a private conversation in Geneva, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin told him that Russia agreed that confidence-building measures should take place on both sides, but that he was not the "foreign minister" of South Ossetia. ¶9. (SBU) The parties agreed in principle to hold the next session on June 11 at Ditsi, on the administrative boundary. COMMENT: A STEP FORWARD -- OR MAYBE NOT ¶10. (C) Haber and his staff portrayed the second session of the JIPRM in a fairly rosy light, suggesting that finally the parties started to get down to the real issues the mechanism was designed to handle. Steve Young was also guardedly optimistic, calling the meeting "interesting" in the positive TBILISI 00001045 003 OF 003 sense of having elements that might hold promise for the future. The issues raised are important ones, and further discussion could possibly lead to mutually acceptable solutions -- so in that sense, May 29 was indeed a step forward. Based on South Ossetia's two preconditions for the next meeting, however -- a resolution of the three disappeared Ossetians and the chairmanship issue -- Post is less sanguine. Despite Chigoev's emotion over the fate of the three missing, he would not consider Georgia's reasonable proposal -- provided for in the Geneva document establishing the JIPRM -- to implement a joint visit to investigate the incident. It is clear that South Ossetia's attitude toward the JIPRM is colored first and foremost by status considerations and only secondarily by an interest in practical issues that directly affect the South Ossetian population. His objection to cross-boundary trade, which would benefit South Ossetians more than anyone, reflects this same hierarchy of values. The only conceivable venues for resolving either the disappearances or the chairmanship issues are the JIPRM itself and Geneva -- so unless South Ossetia backs away from its conditions, the JIPRM will not be meeting again anytime soon. TEFFT