Uzbekistan: Border Security Training Courses at Termez

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000941 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, EXBS FOR JEFF HARTSHORN AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/06/08 TAGS: PBTS PREL PGOV KNNP PHUM ASEC UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Border Security Training Courses at Termez REF: STATE CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, State, Pol-Econ; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: From April 5 through April 17, U.S. Customs and Border Protection trainers conducted border interdiction and rail interdiction training courses for Government of Uzbekistan officials at Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan. Uzbek participants actively participated in the training activities and shared information about conditions at the border. While Uzbek law enforcement officials who participated appeared highly knowledgeable, shortfalls in basic equipment may limit their effectiveness and low salaries suggest a potential for corruption. Uzbek participants were grateful for the training event, with some citing modules on concealment methods, trafficking-in-persons, detecting impostors, and behavioral analysis as especially valuable. In addition to enhancing the expertise of Uzbek officials, such courses expand awareness of human rights among Uzbekistan's law enforcement community and provide a platform for us to learn sensitive information about conditions at Uzbekistan's borders. End summary. ¶2. (C) A team of Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection (CBP) trainers, with support from State's Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS),taught two courses on International Border Interdiction Training (IBIT) and International Rail Interdiction Training (IRIT) for 11 Uzbek Customs and Border Guard officials at Termez from April 5 through April 17. (Note: Despite an invitation for over 24 Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) officials, only 11 could participate due to Uzbekistan's requirement to maintain a minimum number of personnel on the border during this timeframe. Nine of the participants worked at the border with Afghanistan, while two flew down from Tashkent. End note.) The Government of Uzbekistan provided its own facilities-the Surkhandarya Province Customs Headquarters-for this training. ¶3. (SBU) The International Border Interdiction Training course spanned a host of topics-including targeting, tools, and technology, containers and seals, behavioral analysis, examining commodities, vehicle examinations, document analysis, passenger selectivity, explosives, and trafficking in persons-and included classroom and practical exercises. During the second week, the International Rail Interdiction Training course examined some of the same topics in a rail context as well as rail examinations of freight, risks, safety, and passengers. The Uzbek participants were engaged in this training, actively participated in discussions, and frequently asked (and responded to) questions. Conditions at Border -------------- ¶4. (C) At the opening of the first training course, Uzbek Customs and Border Guard officials shared information about conditions at the border with Afghanistan and their respective roles. Customs officer Daniyar Maksumov stated that Uzbekistan detects radioactive materials crossing its borders about twice per year, and these incidents tend to take place on railway lines. A Customs officer named Norkobilov said that Uzbekistan has 44 officers at the border crossing point with Afghanistan, and revealed that 140-160 passengers, 80-100 vehicles, and 180-200 rail cars cross the border each day. All are subject to Customs inspections, he continued, and Uzbekistan inspects everything here very carefully due to Afghanistan's proximity. TASHKENT 00000941 002 OF 004 ¶5. (C) CBP trainers observed conditions at the border during practical exercises. The border crossing point is open from 0600 to 1800 each day. All photography at the border crossing point, including at tourist sites nearby, was prohibited. The Government of Uzbekistan maintains strict control of the border with Afghanistan, with a depth of approximately two miles between the entrance and exit of the border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The border has three lines of defense consisting of personnel from Uzbekistan's Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, and Customs, all of whom have radio communications with one another. Physical security is excellent, and Ministry of Internal Affairs units, equipped with fully automatic modified AK-47s, allow only two vehicles and one truck into the inspection site at any given time on the inbound and outbound lanes. GOU officials use vehicle racks and pits for all personal and commercial vehicles to drive over, enabling the officer conducting the inspection to safely look under the vehicle in question. There also is a fixed walk-over approximately 25 feet high and 80 feet long to enable the officer to walk the length of the vehicle rack and pit to see the tops of all commercial vehicles. Border Guards were armed with pistols (some Border Guards at the border fence also carried fully automatic modified AK-47s). Customs officers made up the tertiary line of defense, and CPB trainers observed no weapons at the inspection site. Customs indicated, however, that weaponry appropriate for any situation is available for officers if needed. ¶6. (C) The GOU is able to monitor the border from multiple watchtowers. The border perimeter fence has approximately twenty feet of open dirt that Uzbek officials track every day, laying an even surface to help determine whether anyone has attempted to cross it. The fence also is electrified each night when the gate is closed, and has barbs every two to three inches to deter unauthorized crossing. GOU officials at the border remarked that in the 1990s, there had been coordination between the GOU and Government of Afghanistan officials across the border, but this was no longer the case. In the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban had overrun Uzbekistan's lines, and so Uzbekistan had built the electric fence along the border. ¶7. (C) Pedestrians and vehicles must pass through radiation portal monitors (RPMs) that are under camera surveillance. CBP trainers observed that the radiation portal monitor console was up-to-date with current software and is user-friendly. The RPM console showed crisp pictures of all rail cars and identification numbers that had passed through the border, and displayed approximately 21,000 entries since its inception. Uzbek officers indicated that information about radiation alarms is instantly relayed to Tashkent and officers must also report such information to their supervisors. All officers appeared to have a good working knowledge of the RPM system. ¶8. (C) At the inspection site, Uzbek officers displayed a working knowledge of inspection of vehicles, trucks, and railcars. The CBP trainers drew attention to several areas of trucks that Uzbek officials should search more thoroughly, however. They also showed Uzbek officers how Customs' seals-which they had previously put much faith in-can be easily defeated. Assessment of Border Security Equipment -------------- -------------- TASHKENT 00000941 003 OF 004 ¶9. (C) CPB trainers observed that the buster at the border needed to be calibrated. (Note: This is a 7000 USD piece of equipment that measures cargo densities. End note.) The trainers attempted to do this themselves but failed, and advised that it be sent out to be serviced, but Uzbek officials have no plans to ship the unit back to the U.S. for repairs because of the shipping costs. The fiber optic scope at the border was fully functional. Trainers saw an MKC-A08 (a Russian radioisotope identification device),a bomb mirror with an extension pole, and other miscellaneous equipment including a drill and large flashlights at the site. Personnel Knowledgeable, but Poorly Paid and Equipped -------------- -------------- - ¶10. (C) The CPB trainers assessed Uzbek officials at the border as highly professional, dressed in impeccable uniforms, eager to learn, and quick to offer assistance to fellow officers. Nevertheless, they found that these officials lack some of the basic tools needed for their jobs, including brass hammers, probes, simple screwdrivers, vehicle disassembly equipment, and appropriate flashlights with batteries. While officials did have bulky flashlights, they were unable to use these effectively to look into small crevices. CBP trainers recommended providing Uzbek officials with small flashlights with battery-driven lights or hand-crank systems. Furthermore, Uzbek officials lacked basic first aid materials aside from a few band aids and performed potentially dangerous inspections with thin cloth gloves and without safety glasses. ¶11. (C) Customs officials make roughly 300 USD a month and are all paid through electronic funds transfers. Customs officials complained, however, that the state-owned banks in Uzbekistan "double-dip"-the Government of Uzbekistan charges a 20 percent commission on top of taxes when Customs officials withdraw their money. They also wondered how a former Customs officer who lives in the area had been able to purchase a huge house. ¶12. (C) The CBP trainers also suggested that providing Uzbekistan with a rail Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS),which would require relatively little maintenance, could assist border security efforts. Uzbek officials, however, expressed more interest in a mobile VACIS to give themselves more flexibility. CBP trainers recommended further U.S. Border Tactical Control Unit (BORTAC) training for Uzbek officials to improve their ability to handle diverse situations that could potentially arise at the border. (Note: BORTAC is a CBP special response team that has performed a wide variety of missions including international training, counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, interdiction and patrol operations, and more. End note.) HAZMAT Response Capabilities Questionable -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Termez lacks an onsite HAZMAT response capability. GOU TASHKENT 00000941 004 OF 004 officials here instead use an unspecified offsite company. Thus, the length of time before HAZMAT response personnel would arrive in the event of an incident is unclear. CBP trainers told Poloff that if funding is available, providing GOU officials with Russian-language copies of Hazardous Material Response Emergency Books would help address this gap. How Would Uzbekistan Respond to Threats to Transiting Cargo? -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶14. (C) When asked to address how Uzbekistan would respond to information suggesting a threat to cargo transiting Uzbekistan's borders, the Uzbek participants were silent for a long period. One noted the existence of a hotline that anyone can use 24 hours a day to report such information to Uzbekistan's authorities. Another alluded to a "special unit" that would work with such information. Others said they would simply report to appropriate officials if they became aware of such threats. Participants did not appear to be proactive in seeking information about potential threats to cargo shipments or observations of anything out of the ordinary from drivers who cross the border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. They noted that drivers always try to cross the border quickly and silently. Feedback from Students -------------- ¶15. (SBU) GOU participants wrote favorable comments about both the IBIT and IRIT courses in their feedback forms. On IBIT, four participants cited the module on methods of concealment in commercial and cargo vehicles as one the most valuable aspects of the course, with one officer adding that this had been very useful given the large volume of goods that transit the country by vehicles and the numerous attempts to hide illicit goods that the GOU has discovered. Students also highly praised the modules on trafficking in persons, detecting imposters, and behavioral analysis of persons crossing the border. Students only highlighted one module-on the entrance authorization process-as being not valuable, as it was geared toward new officers. Comment: -------------- ¶16. (C) These border security training courses not only improved the expertise of Government of Uzbekistan officials, but also provided a useful platform from which we were able to glean data about conditions and vulnerabilities at Uzbekistan's borders that would be difficult to obtain otherwise. Moreover, in addition to enhancing Uzbekistan's ability to secure its borders, this course-with its well-received module on trafficking-in-persons-illustrates how security cooperation also helps to raise the Uzbek law enforcement community's awareness of human rights. NORLAND