Financial Crisis: Uzbekistan in the Tail of the Storm

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 000067 SIPDIS SIPDIS 08 STATE 134459 AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-01-15 TAGS: ECON EFIN SOCI UZ SUBJECT: Financial Crisis: Uzbekistan in the Tail of the Storm REF: a) DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, b) EEB/IFD/OMA, c) EEB/EPPD CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Although spared from the initial fall out of the global financial crisis by its isolation, Uzbekistan could face growing economic difficulties in the second half of 2009. Uzbekistan is vulnerable on three fronts: 1) reduced remittances and increased unemployment among the ranks of an estimated 2 million labor migrants working in Russia and Kazakhstan; 2) declining commodity prices, particularly for cotton; 3) reduced demand for industrial exports and deferral of capital investment. Although the higher export price paid by Russia for Uzbek gas could help offset some of these effects, particularly for Uzbekistan's current account, the fate of the country's labor migrants is a major concern for the Government that could even lead to eventual social unrest in the country. End Summary. Isolated bliss? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Uzbekistan is largely cut off from the world of international finance and there has been little foreign investment in the domestic banking sector. This is as much the result of policies that have sought to maintain state control over the "commanding heights" of the economy and effect a gradual transition towards a more market-oriented system as it is a result of Uzbekistan's political isolation and unpredictable business environment. The GOU has also actively pursued a policy of import substitution that has kept consumer selection limited and prices high, but has also ensured that the bulk of commodity and resource export earnings have remained in the Central Bank's coffers as a stabilization fund that is the equivalent of 5 to 8 percent of GDP (approximately $1.8 billion). Likewise, the equity and securities markets are virtually non-existent here. Consequently, the market declines that have buffeted other economies have been felt only by the Uzbek oligarchs and apparatchiks who have managed to squirrel away investments abroad. For the vast majority of the Uzbek population, market trends have little immediate relevance. Cut off from reality, but not from the world economy -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Some in the GOU see the crisis as the ultimate vindication of their "go slow" economic policies that have favored gradualism and maintenance of state control over true economic reform or liberalization. Foreign Minister Norov has made this point to us on several different occasions. However, isolation from financial markets does not mean that Uzbekistan is isolated from the world economy. The GOU is likely to face serious challenges as the crisis moves from the financial sector to the real economy, resulting in reduced remittances from Uzbek migrants abroad, higher unemployment, lower demand for cotton, and falling industrial exports and investment. Reduced remittances and unemployment -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Although nobody is certain of the figures, there is consensus that upwards of 2 million Uzbeks are working abroad in various capacities. The majority of these are men who are employed in the construction and energy sectors in Russia and Kazakhstan. Their remittances account for up to 10 percent of Uzbekistan's GDP, approximately $2.2 billion. More importantly, they are the sole source of income for numerous families, particularly in Uzbekistan's provinces where some towns are now virtually devoid of working age males. Anecdotal evidence already suggests that more and more of these migrants have been returning to Uzbekistan this winter. As many work in construction, the winter return is not unusual as projects in Russia and Kazakhstan come to halt because of cold temperatures. However, word here is that many of these TASHKENT 00000067 002 OF 003 workers will not find jobs waiting for them in the spring as the confluence of the financial crisis and lower energy prices buffet the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan. ¶5. (C) There are few reliable figures regarding unemployment rates in Uzbekistan and wages for the vast majority of workers hover at subsistence levels. Uzbekistan's economy has little capacity to absorb additional job seekers. This presents a major challenge for the GOU, as swelling ranks of young, unemployed males could lead to unrest, rising crime rates, and even provide recruits for extremists. One embassy contact posited to us that Uzbek workers in Russia, living together in relative isolation as a consequence of xenophobia there, have actually been more sensitized to their Muslim identity by this experience and, if not already radicalized, could prove more receptive to radical ideologies upon their return. Whether this is the case or not, the newly returned unemployed are one of the most troubling potential consequences of this crisis for Uzbekistan. Cotton -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The world's second largest cotton exporter, this crop alone accounts for another 10 percent of Uzbekistan's GDP. Declining prices, coupled with boycotts initiated by major retailers due to the use of child labor in the cotton harvest in Uzbekistan, already appear to have had an impact. With prices in 2008 ten percent lower than in 2007, a significant portion of Uzbekistan's 2008 crop remains unsold and market prices are currently below the cost of production. A degree of this reflects the usual fluctuation in prices, but lower demand in Uzbekistan's primary export markets - China and Bangladesh - is having an impact. Market conditions at the time of this year's fall harvest could have a particularly negative impact on Uzbek farmer, as the state would likely lower the price it offers them in order to secure its margin on export sales. Falling exports -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Uzbekistan exports finished and semi-finished goods, including automobiles, aircraft, textiles and chemicals, primarily to the Russian and Kazakh markets. Falling demand for these products has already been felt with the return from Russia of thousands of unsold Nexia automobiles produced by the Uzbek-GM joint venture in Asaka in Andijon Province. The fallout from this contraction affects not only the exporting companies themselves, but also their suppliers and other dependent industries. ¶8. (SBU) Adding to the difficulties of the manufacturing sector will be the increasing scarcity of credit. Many industries in Uzbekistan that survived the Soviet collapse operate on the margins of profitability (or below) and are in desperate need of capital investment to expand output and efficiency. A prolonged tightening of international credit markets could mean that many of the investments Uzbekistan needs to enable its economy to grow will be deferred, thus further eroding growth and employment. Energy export growth a cushion -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Despite falling energy prices globally, the price Uzbekistan agreed with Russia's Gazprom for gas exports for the first quarter of 2009 is substantially higher than the 2008 price: $340 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) vs. $165/tcm last year. This price has led to a surge in gas exports as the government tries to capture this windfall (at the expense of cutting off large numbers TASHKENT 00000067 003 OF 003 of domestic consumers). Also softening the blow to Uzbekistan's current account are lower oil prices. As a net importer of oil, the fall in prices since the summer of 2008 has relieved pressure and helps to lower the cost of production for many industries and agriculture. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Uzbekistan no doubt faces serious challenges in the year ahead, depending on the course of the world economy. Large swathes of the population already survive on the margins, highly dependent on remittances from their relatives abroad. A deep and sustained worldwide downturn could ultimately have very severe consequences for the Uzbek economy. Although the GOU and its security apparatus maintain a tight grip on this society, no regime can suppress popular discontent indefinitely. The situation here is still a long way from that point, but with largely exogenous factors determining the economy's course, the situation could look quite different later in the year. The relative social peace that the GOU has achieved over the last decade stems largely from its capacity to deliver security (the late 1980s and early 1990s were marked by rampant crime in Tashkent and elsewhere) and modest but steady economic growth. If the population begins to struggle economically as a result of the crisis, authorities here could have reason to be concerned. BUTCHER To view the entire SMART message, go to URL http://repository.state.sgov.gov/_layouts/OSS SearchResults.aspx?k=messageid:367b0c30-4659- 4b39-91e3-5899bf800563