Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT669
2009-05-07 08:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:
Uzbekistan: TRANSCOM Delegation Discusses Transit with GOU
VZCZCXRO8399 RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW DE RUEHNT #0669/01 1270829 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 070836Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0844 INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE CIS COLLECTIVE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0032 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TASHKENT 000669
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, OSD
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/07
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS PGOV PINS PINR PTER EINV ECON ETRD AF
UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: TRANSCOM Delegation Discusses Transit with GOU
Officials
CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, State, Pol-Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 TASHKENT 000669
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, OSD
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/07
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS PGOV PINS PINR PTER EINV ECON ETRD AF
UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: TRANSCOM Delegation Discusses Transit with GOU
Officials
CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, State, Pol-Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) Summary: On April 29, a delegation led by Transportation
Command Commander General Duncan McNabb met with First Deputy Prime
Minister Azimov and with railway officials in Termez to discuss
issues related to the transit of goods across Uzbekistan's borders
to Afghanistan. Azimov conveyed three major concerns: first,
Uzbekistan wants to see increased overland transit of goods out of
Navoi toward Afghanistan, and believes upgrades to Hayraton's
capacity as well as extension of the rail to Mazar-i-Sharif-with
Uzbekistan's willing assistance-can serve this goal. Second,
increased purchase of local goods is a key GOU priority. Third,
Uzbekistan wants to develop a Free Industrial Economic Zone in the
vicinity of Navoi to produce additional commodities that can be
used to support operations in Afghanistan. Measured and thoughtful
for most of the meeting and carefully deferential to President
Karimov, Azimov grew forceful when stressing the need for local job
creation associated with the Northern Distribution Network. The
delegation then met in Navoi with Korean Air and Hanjin Co. Ltd.
representatives who outlined Navoi Airport's value to the U.S.
Government as well as the airport's current and projected
capabilities. At Termez, GOU officials lamented the significant
delays in processing rail cars in Hayraton, Afghanistan and
recommended extension of the rail line to Mazar-i-Sharif as well as
greater mechanization at Hayraton. Uzbekistan can help in this
regard and has also discussed such plans with the Government of
Afghanistan-the only major hurdle to its realization is lack of
funding. On April 30, Foreign Minister Norov echoed Azimov's
sentiments on the importance of Northern Distribution Network
(NDN)-related economic benefits to Uzbekistan and called for
renewed political dialogue with the U.S., despite signs of what he
called "inertia" carrying over into the new Administration. These
meetings illustrate the significant additional responsibilities
that Uzbekistan can potentially take on-in providing materials,
experienced workers, and appropriate equipment-to facilitate our
operations in Afghanistan and underscore the importance of
establishing a structured political dialogue with Uzbekistan as
soon as possible. End summary.
Meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Azimov
-------------- --------------
2. (C) On April 29, a delegation led by Transportation Command
Commander General McNabb met with Uzbekistan's First Deputy Prime
Minister Rustam Azimov to discuss issues related to the transit of
goods across Uzbekistan's borders to Afghanistan. Azimov stated
his pleasure at this second meeting with General McNabb and his
delegation and his satisfaction that "civilian" cargo has started
to move across Uzbekistan's territory in support of Coalition
operations in Afghanistan. A theme he touched upon repeatedly
during the meeting was that this cooperation should remain
relatively silent, and that it has raised the profile of Uzbekistan
as a target for possible attacks. "We are not hiding it, but
neither is there any need to advertise it," he said.
3. (C) General McNabb indicated that the primary purpose of his
visit to Uzbekistan was to express appreciation for Uzbekistan's
support and the speed with which the arrangements have been
implemented since their November meeting. He praised the success
of the shipment of the first 200 containers to Afghanistan and
noted that the U.S. has 1500 additional containers ready to move
through Uzbekistan with the GOU's blessing. General McNabb thanked
the GOU for the hospitality it showed to the Defense Logistics
Agency team that recently visited Uzbekistan to investigate local
purchase. The U.S. already has purchased significant quantities of
bottled water from Uzbekistan, and there are further opportunities
for the purchase of food and construction materials. General
Petraeus had been complimentary of his visit and had signed a
TASHKENT 00000669 002 OF 006
letter instructing CENTCOM elements to maximize local purchase.
McNabb said he looked forward to the visit of GOU officials to
United States facilities including Scott Air Force Base to see
TRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency Logistics Center, and the
airfield and port in Charleston, South Carolina.
4. (C) Azimov thanked General McNabb for the kind words and, citing
President Karimov's decisive leadership, said that Karimov had
carefully weighed the benefits and risks associated with providing
large-scale support to the United States on transit before throwing
his support behind the United States in this endeavor. Switching
from Russian to English and strongly emphasizing his next point,
Azimov said he appreciates that the President of the United States
and Secretary of Defense recognize the price of Uzbekistan's
support. He expressed hope that the volume of cargo will increase
and benefit the United States as well as bring profit to
Uzbekistan. Leaning forward, Azimov noted that in the short-term
it is necessary to increase the capacity of Hayraton station in
Afghanistan. Switching again to English for a moment, he said that
Hayraton is overloaded and shipments have been postponed. Unless
steps are taken to increase Hayraton's capacity, "there will be
chaos because we're dealing with Afghanistan." Uzbekistan is
willing to help, however. Over the mid-term, the railway must be
extended some 78 kilometers from Hayraton to Mazar-i-Sharif, and
Mazar-i-Sharif should become the base for loading and unloading
cargo. Uzbekistan Railways can build this in six months, but
Uzbekistan needs funding for this. Azimov recommended that the
United States either push the Asian Development Bank (which is
working on this issue now) to allocate money for this quickly or
find alternative funding for the project. In the long-term, the
railway should be extended to Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and exit at
the borders with Iran and Pakistan, Azimov continued. "Afghanistan
is the only country in the world without railways--that's why it's
not developed," he opined.
5. (C) Azimov, growing more forceful, stressed that the U.S. needs
to create jobs in Uzbekistan to gain the support of the local
populace. "Local purchases must increase here so the local people
don't feel like they're merely being used." He asked that the
United States establish a working group on local acquisitions in
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan will not dictate what the U.S. should buy,
and the GOU will respect U.S. procedures and take steps to ensure
that there is no such interference. "If purchases don't increase,
we'll be concerned," he said, citing a "target figure" of 100
million USD. From time to time during the discussion he would
pointedly correct the interpreter and switch from Russian to
English when he felt that certain nuances in his remarks had not
been accurately conveyed.
Uzbekistan's Goals for Navoi
--------------
6. (C) Uzbekistan is building up Navoi and the Free Industrial
Economic Zone with strategic issues in mind, Azimov continued.
Uzbekistan wants to create a transcontinental commercial cargo hub.
Russia had asked Uzbekistan to use Navoi as an airfield for their
strategic bombers, but President Karimov had said "no." Azimov
warned that Russia is trying to compete with the U.S. and has
"great ambitions." Uzbekistan does not want to participate in such
games, however. "That's between you and Russia," he laughed.
Uzbekistan is making progress with Korean Airlines and in May will
launch daily cargo flights from Navoi to Bangkok, Moscow, and
Seoul. Work on additional flights to Bombay and Almaty is also in
progress.
TASHKENT 00000669 003 OF 006
7. (C) Azimov also made a pitch for the Free Industrial Economic
Zone in the vicinity of Navoi, stating that this would give the
U.S. the opportunity to create a "logistical base" to support
troops in Afghanistan and provide goods that it cannot find in
Uzbekistan. The zone would be tax-free for 35 years and would
become a significant market for Central Asia and the rest of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. In response to General
McNabb's question about whether Uzbekistan was considering a
regional air role for Navoi, Azimov replied that it was-but not for
flights to Afghanistan. He elaborated further on Uzbekistan's
vision for Navoi. It should not be considered a hub for either the
U.S. or Russia, as Uzbekistan might lose some of its partners if it
is perceived as a U.S. logistical base. Instead, Navoi should be
both a transcontinental hub for shipments between Europe and South
Korea as well as joining Moscow and Dubai as a third gateway to and
from the Commonwealth of Independent States. This will take
time-perhaps 15-20 years.
NDN to Focus on Commercial Transit
--------------
8. (C) General McNabb outlined objectives for the resupply of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, stating that as much commercial transit as
possible should pass through the Northern Distribution Network,
while military goods will be transported through Pakistan and
high-value and sensitive equipment will be delivered by air. The
U.S. is waiting for the GOU's blessing on the transit of 1,500
containers of cargo across Uzbekistan's territory, and has an
additional 12,000 containers in the pipeline. Azimov repeated his
three main concerns-on improving transit capabilities, increasing
local acquisitions in Uzbekistan, and producing commodities in
Uzbekistan that can be used in Afghanistan-and expressed hope that
both sides could discuss progress in these three areas during a
follow-on meeting this November.
Visit to Navoi Airport
--------------
9. (C) The delegation, accompanied by Ambassador, then travelled to
Navoi, where representatives from Korean Air, Hanjin Co. Ltd.
Global Logistics Service, and Central Asia Logistics briefed
General McNabb on the benefits that Navoi Airport can bring to the
U.S. Government as well as Navoi's current and projected
capabilities. They indicated that Navoi is valuable for its
accessibility, only 300 miles from the border with Afghanistan;
efficient performance thanks to support from Korean Air and Hanjin;
reduced risk because of its location near the theater of operations
but outside the conflict area; its ability to serve as a
multi-modal logistics hub; significant handling capacity; and
support from the Government of Uzbekistan including a presidential
decree on developing the airport and a Free Industrial Economic
Zone.
10. (C) Navoi Airport operates 24 hours a day and by September
2009, its Cargo Terminal Apron (420m by 180m) will be able to hold
five Boeing-747 freight aircraft. The airport's current temporary
warehouse, which is 900 square meters (sqm) and has a capacity of
30 tons per day, will be replaced in October with a Cargo Terminal
TASHKENT 00000669 004 OF 006
that is 11,500 sqm, can handle 300 tons per day, and will have
direct rail and truck connections.
11. (C) The Navoi Free Industrial Economic Zone will serve as an
industrial hub, they continued. It will occupy five million square
meters and will be involved with machinery, electronics, chemical
and pharmaceutical products, and food processing.
12. (C) The Navoi air network currently supports six
Inchon-Navoi-Milan flights per week via B747-400 freighters. The
company representatives indicated that this will be expanded by six
additional Inchon-Navoi-Brussels flights per week by B747-400
freighters and 11 Navoi-Delhi, Navoi-Bangkok, Navoi-Mumbai, and
Navoi-Moscow flights per week via A300-600 freighters. They stated
that if the Government of Uzbekistan lifts its current ban on
flights to Afghanistan, an A300-600 freighter will be ready to
handle this.
13. (C) Navoi Airport's fuel tank capacity will be rising in the
near future as well. The airport has a storage capacity of 370,000
gallons now, which can refuel seven B747-400 aircraft. By October
2009, the representatives anticipated a storage capacity of
1,420,000 gallons that can refuel 27 B747-400 aircraft. To promote
security and safety, airport guards are deployed at 14 observation
towers and two gates, several fire trucks and fire brigades as well
as 11 medical assistants are on-site, and three hospitals are
located within 20 minutes of the airport.
Rail Officials Discuss Transit to Afghanistan
-------------- --------------
14. (C) That evening, the delegation visited the border crossing
point at Termez on Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan to discuss
transit across the border with Deputy Railway Company Chairman
Shuhrat Sadikov and others including representatives of Customs,
the Ministry of Defense, and the International Automobile Transfer
Company. Uzbek officials acknowledged that there is a backlog of
cargo. Currently, a maximum of only 150-200 rail cars can be
offloaded per day in Hayraton, Afghanistan. Roughly 4,000
cars-including 2,000 loaded with fuel-are waiting to be processed
across Uzbekistan. In Afghanistan, an additional 700-800 cars are
waiting to be unloaded. The Uzbeks urged that the capabilities at
Hayraton be improved by having additional mechanized equipment take
the place of manual labor. Moreover, they lamented that while
Uzbeks work around the clock on processing these cars, Afghanistan
celebrates too many Islamic holidays and this contributes to the
backlog. Echoing Azimov, the officials advised extending the rail
line to Mazar-i-Sharif, but said laying this much track would take
approximately 12 months. Insufficient funding is the primary
obstacle to this, however.
15. (C) Uzbek Customs officials also requested again that the
United States provide large-scale Rapiscan scanning equipment to
better process the large volume of cargo that will cross the border
in the future. (Note: In November, State Customs Committee Deputy
Chairman Mansurov wrote to Post asking for the provision of 12
RAPISCAN 524 control systems, three RAPISCAN EAGLE M4500 mobile
control systems for shipments and vehicles, and one RAPISCAN EAGLE
F6000 Base control system for shipments and vehicles to avoid
delays in processing cars. The total cost of this equipment would
TASHKENT 00000669 005 OF 006
probably be several million dollars. End note.) GOU officials
stated that Termez is able to handle 40-50 trucks per day now.
Customs Chief Inspector Rustam Kabulov later told Poloff that with
the requested scanning equipment, Termez could process about 250
trucks per day. Local officials concluded the day with an
extraordinary display of traditional Uzbek hospitality by hosting a
dinner with musical and dance performances in the General's honor.
Foreign Minister Norov on Relations with the West
-------------- --------------
16. (C) On April 30, General McNabb met jointly with Minister of
Foreign Affairs Norov and Minister of Defense Berdiyev. Norov
noted the intensification in U.S.-Uzbek dialogue and their shared
view on Afghanistan and stressed the importance of the commercial
dimension of NDN-particularly the development of Navoi-to
Uzbekistan. He said the GOU has been following the development and
implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy very closely.
17. (C) Norov indicated that there is room for bilateral
cooperation to grow further. The U.S. and Uzbekistan have
long-term common interests if both sides wish to cooperate, but
such cooperation should be constructive. Noting that McNabb is the
second senior U.S. military official to visit Tashkent since the
new administration took office, he remarked that Washington still
has not provided clear political signals. He feared "inertia from
the previous administration continuing in the assessment of
Uzbekistan." Norov said he was optimistic that relations can
improve, but there is "still no confirmation that this optimism can
be realized and implemented."
18. (C) Uzbekistan is also continuing to watch relations with its
Central Asian neighbors, especially Kazakhstan, Norov continued.
Uzbekistan accepted Kazakhstan as the Chairman-in-Office of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe because
Kazakhstan is Uzbekistan's neighbor, not because Kazakhstan is
democratic. "How can Kazakhstan serve as an example of democracy
and human rights in the OSCE?" he asked.
19. (C) Norov said it is important for the U.S. and Uzbekistan to
have open and honest relations based on mutual interests and that
there should be a fair assessment of the situation here.
"Uzbekistan cannot be put on a hook," i.e. pressured, he said.
"This is counterproductive." Norov also recommended that the U.S.
and Uzbekistan enter into a structured political dialogue and
harked back to the 2002 Strategic Partnership and Cooperation
Framework. (Comment: Norov often cites this in discussions with
U.S. officials. It is interesting that over the course of this
meeting, Norov did all the talking from the GOU side. When he
offered the silent Berdiyev the chance to weigh in at the end,
Berdiyev declined. End comment.)
Uzbekistan's Relations with CSTO, SCO
-------------- --
20. (C) Russia has been trying to establish a Rapid Reaction Force
under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that
TASHKENT 00000669 006 OF 006
President Medvedev told CSTO heads of state on February 4 would be
"as well armed as NATO," Norov continued. He asserted that
Uzbekistan will not join this. Russia is trying to develop the
CSTO into a political-military bloc as well as enhance the
military-technical dimension of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Uzbekistan has opposed both of these plans, he
emphasized. He added that Uzbekistan is the only SCO member
actively resisting Russian efforts to create a military dimension
within the SCO and complained that Uzbekistan should not be seen as
part of a "privileged area" for the Russians. Uzbekistan is not
"drifting toward the West" by pursuing these policies-it is simply
acting on behalf of its national interests. Alluding to Russia,
Norov said, "some expect the U.S. to fail in Afghanistan, although
they are aware of the threats as well."
More on Local Purchases, Economic Benefits to Uzbekistan
-------------- --------------
---
21. (C) Echoing the sentiments of First Deputy Prime Minister
Azimov the previous day, Norov stressed the importance of local
purchases and economic benefits to Uzbekistan from NDN. General
McNabb replied that the U.S. understands very well and is working
on maximizing local purchase wherever possible. He noted that he
would bring up the construction of the Hayraton-Mazar-i-Sharif rail
line during his upcoming visit to Afghanistan as well. Norov
reiterated that Uzbekistan is ready and able to build this rail
line-only financing is needed. McNabb said that transportation
links with Afghanistan are important not only for supplying current
operations there, but for the future development and stability of
the entire Central Asian region, and Uzbekistan is at the center of
this.
Comment:
--------------
22. (C) The consistent theme from the Uzbeks on NDN is "don't take
us for granted, and show us some appreciation." In fact, NDN can
not only benefit Uzbekistan, but its focus on key rail
infrastructure into Afghanistan can serve as a stimulus for
projects, such as extending the line from Hayraton to
Mazar-i-Sharif, that hold transformational potential in terms of
regional economic integration. As the U.S. military works to
develop and consolidate these ties, the U.S.-Uzbek political
relationship needs to ramp up fast if the difficult human rights
and democratic reform issues that remain are not to knock things
off track.
NORLAND
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, OSD
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/05/07
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS PGOV PINS PINR PTER EINV ECON ETRD AF
UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: TRANSCOM Delegation Discusses Transit with GOU
Officials
CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, State, Pol-Econ;
REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) Summary: On April 29, a delegation led by Transportation
Command Commander General Duncan McNabb met with First Deputy Prime
Minister Azimov and with railway officials in Termez to discuss
issues related to the transit of goods across Uzbekistan's borders
to Afghanistan. Azimov conveyed three major concerns: first,
Uzbekistan wants to see increased overland transit of goods out of
Navoi toward Afghanistan, and believes upgrades to Hayraton's
capacity as well as extension of the rail to Mazar-i-Sharif-with
Uzbekistan's willing assistance-can serve this goal. Second,
increased purchase of local goods is a key GOU priority. Third,
Uzbekistan wants to develop a Free Industrial Economic Zone in the
vicinity of Navoi to produce additional commodities that can be
used to support operations in Afghanistan. Measured and thoughtful
for most of the meeting and carefully deferential to President
Karimov, Azimov grew forceful when stressing the need for local job
creation associated with the Northern Distribution Network. The
delegation then met in Navoi with Korean Air and Hanjin Co. Ltd.
representatives who outlined Navoi Airport's value to the U.S.
Government as well as the airport's current and projected
capabilities. At Termez, GOU officials lamented the significant
delays in processing rail cars in Hayraton, Afghanistan and
recommended extension of the rail line to Mazar-i-Sharif as well as
greater mechanization at Hayraton. Uzbekistan can help in this
regard and has also discussed such plans with the Government of
Afghanistan-the only major hurdle to its realization is lack of
funding. On April 30, Foreign Minister Norov echoed Azimov's
sentiments on the importance of Northern Distribution Network
(NDN)-related economic benefits to Uzbekistan and called for
renewed political dialogue with the U.S., despite signs of what he
called "inertia" carrying over into the new Administration. These
meetings illustrate the significant additional responsibilities
that Uzbekistan can potentially take on-in providing materials,
experienced workers, and appropriate equipment-to facilitate our
operations in Afghanistan and underscore the importance of
establishing a structured political dialogue with Uzbekistan as
soon as possible. End summary.
Meeting with First Deputy Prime Minister Azimov
-------------- --------------
2. (C) On April 29, a delegation led by Transportation Command
Commander General McNabb met with Uzbekistan's First Deputy Prime
Minister Rustam Azimov to discuss issues related to the transit of
goods across Uzbekistan's borders to Afghanistan. Azimov stated
his pleasure at this second meeting with General McNabb and his
delegation and his satisfaction that "civilian" cargo has started
to move across Uzbekistan's territory in support of Coalition
operations in Afghanistan. A theme he touched upon repeatedly
during the meeting was that this cooperation should remain
relatively silent, and that it has raised the profile of Uzbekistan
as a target for possible attacks. "We are not hiding it, but
neither is there any need to advertise it," he said.
3. (C) General McNabb indicated that the primary purpose of his
visit to Uzbekistan was to express appreciation for Uzbekistan's
support and the speed with which the arrangements have been
implemented since their November meeting. He praised the success
of the shipment of the first 200 containers to Afghanistan and
noted that the U.S. has 1500 additional containers ready to move
through Uzbekistan with the GOU's blessing. General McNabb thanked
the GOU for the hospitality it showed to the Defense Logistics
Agency team that recently visited Uzbekistan to investigate local
purchase. The U.S. already has purchased significant quantities of
bottled water from Uzbekistan, and there are further opportunities
for the purchase of food and construction materials. General
Petraeus had been complimentary of his visit and had signed a
TASHKENT 00000669 002 OF 006
letter instructing CENTCOM elements to maximize local purchase.
McNabb said he looked forward to the visit of GOU officials to
United States facilities including Scott Air Force Base to see
TRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency Logistics Center, and the
airfield and port in Charleston, South Carolina.
4. (C) Azimov thanked General McNabb for the kind words and, citing
President Karimov's decisive leadership, said that Karimov had
carefully weighed the benefits and risks associated with providing
large-scale support to the United States on transit before throwing
his support behind the United States in this endeavor. Switching
from Russian to English and strongly emphasizing his next point,
Azimov said he appreciates that the President of the United States
and Secretary of Defense recognize the price of Uzbekistan's
support. He expressed hope that the volume of cargo will increase
and benefit the United States as well as bring profit to
Uzbekistan. Leaning forward, Azimov noted that in the short-term
it is necessary to increase the capacity of Hayraton station in
Afghanistan. Switching again to English for a moment, he said that
Hayraton is overloaded and shipments have been postponed. Unless
steps are taken to increase Hayraton's capacity, "there will be
chaos because we're dealing with Afghanistan." Uzbekistan is
willing to help, however. Over the mid-term, the railway must be
extended some 78 kilometers from Hayraton to Mazar-i-Sharif, and
Mazar-i-Sharif should become the base for loading and unloading
cargo. Uzbekistan Railways can build this in six months, but
Uzbekistan needs funding for this. Azimov recommended that the
United States either push the Asian Development Bank (which is
working on this issue now) to allocate money for this quickly or
find alternative funding for the project. In the long-term, the
railway should be extended to Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and exit at
the borders with Iran and Pakistan, Azimov continued. "Afghanistan
is the only country in the world without railways--that's why it's
not developed," he opined.
5. (C) Azimov, growing more forceful, stressed that the U.S. needs
to create jobs in Uzbekistan to gain the support of the local
populace. "Local purchases must increase here so the local people
don't feel like they're merely being used." He asked that the
United States establish a working group on local acquisitions in
Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan will not dictate what the U.S. should buy,
and the GOU will respect U.S. procedures and take steps to ensure
that there is no such interference. "If purchases don't increase,
we'll be concerned," he said, citing a "target figure" of 100
million USD. From time to time during the discussion he would
pointedly correct the interpreter and switch from Russian to
English when he felt that certain nuances in his remarks had not
been accurately conveyed.
Uzbekistan's Goals for Navoi
--------------
6. (C) Uzbekistan is building up Navoi and the Free Industrial
Economic Zone with strategic issues in mind, Azimov continued.
Uzbekistan wants to create a transcontinental commercial cargo hub.
Russia had asked Uzbekistan to use Navoi as an airfield for their
strategic bombers, but President Karimov had said "no." Azimov
warned that Russia is trying to compete with the U.S. and has
"great ambitions." Uzbekistan does not want to participate in such
games, however. "That's between you and Russia," he laughed.
Uzbekistan is making progress with Korean Airlines and in May will
launch daily cargo flights from Navoi to Bangkok, Moscow, and
Seoul. Work on additional flights to Bombay and Almaty is also in
progress.
TASHKENT 00000669 003 OF 006
7. (C) Azimov also made a pitch for the Free Industrial Economic
Zone in the vicinity of Navoi, stating that this would give the
U.S. the opportunity to create a "logistical base" to support
troops in Afghanistan and provide goods that it cannot find in
Uzbekistan. The zone would be tax-free for 35 years and would
become a significant market for Central Asia and the rest of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. In response to General
McNabb's question about whether Uzbekistan was considering a
regional air role for Navoi, Azimov replied that it was-but not for
flights to Afghanistan. He elaborated further on Uzbekistan's
vision for Navoi. It should not be considered a hub for either the
U.S. or Russia, as Uzbekistan might lose some of its partners if it
is perceived as a U.S. logistical base. Instead, Navoi should be
both a transcontinental hub for shipments between Europe and South
Korea as well as joining Moscow and Dubai as a third gateway to and
from the Commonwealth of Independent States. This will take
time-perhaps 15-20 years.
NDN to Focus on Commercial Transit
--------------
8. (C) General McNabb outlined objectives for the resupply of U.S.
forces in Afghanistan, stating that as much commercial transit as
possible should pass through the Northern Distribution Network,
while military goods will be transported through Pakistan and
high-value and sensitive equipment will be delivered by air. The
U.S. is waiting for the GOU's blessing on the transit of 1,500
containers of cargo across Uzbekistan's territory, and has an
additional 12,000 containers in the pipeline. Azimov repeated his
three main concerns-on improving transit capabilities, increasing
local acquisitions in Uzbekistan, and producing commodities in
Uzbekistan that can be used in Afghanistan-and expressed hope that
both sides could discuss progress in these three areas during a
follow-on meeting this November.
Visit to Navoi Airport
--------------
9. (C) The delegation, accompanied by Ambassador, then travelled to
Navoi, where representatives from Korean Air, Hanjin Co. Ltd.
Global Logistics Service, and Central Asia Logistics briefed
General McNabb on the benefits that Navoi Airport can bring to the
U.S. Government as well as Navoi's current and projected
capabilities. They indicated that Navoi is valuable for its
accessibility, only 300 miles from the border with Afghanistan;
efficient performance thanks to support from Korean Air and Hanjin;
reduced risk because of its location near the theater of operations
but outside the conflict area; its ability to serve as a
multi-modal logistics hub; significant handling capacity; and
support from the Government of Uzbekistan including a presidential
decree on developing the airport and a Free Industrial Economic
Zone.
10. (C) Navoi Airport operates 24 hours a day and by September
2009, its Cargo Terminal Apron (420m by 180m) will be able to hold
five Boeing-747 freight aircraft. The airport's current temporary
warehouse, which is 900 square meters (sqm) and has a capacity of
30 tons per day, will be replaced in October with a Cargo Terminal
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that is 11,500 sqm, can handle 300 tons per day, and will have
direct rail and truck connections.
11. (C) The Navoi Free Industrial Economic Zone will serve as an
industrial hub, they continued. It will occupy five million square
meters and will be involved with machinery, electronics, chemical
and pharmaceutical products, and food processing.
12. (C) The Navoi air network currently supports six
Inchon-Navoi-Milan flights per week via B747-400 freighters. The
company representatives indicated that this will be expanded by six
additional Inchon-Navoi-Brussels flights per week by B747-400
freighters and 11 Navoi-Delhi, Navoi-Bangkok, Navoi-Mumbai, and
Navoi-Moscow flights per week via A300-600 freighters. They stated
that if the Government of Uzbekistan lifts its current ban on
flights to Afghanistan, an A300-600 freighter will be ready to
handle this.
13. (C) Navoi Airport's fuel tank capacity will be rising in the
near future as well. The airport has a storage capacity of 370,000
gallons now, which can refuel seven B747-400 aircraft. By October
2009, the representatives anticipated a storage capacity of
1,420,000 gallons that can refuel 27 B747-400 aircraft. To promote
security and safety, airport guards are deployed at 14 observation
towers and two gates, several fire trucks and fire brigades as well
as 11 medical assistants are on-site, and three hospitals are
located within 20 minutes of the airport.
Rail Officials Discuss Transit to Afghanistan
-------------- --------------
14. (C) That evening, the delegation visited the border crossing
point at Termez on Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan to discuss
transit across the border with Deputy Railway Company Chairman
Shuhrat Sadikov and others including representatives of Customs,
the Ministry of Defense, and the International Automobile Transfer
Company. Uzbek officials acknowledged that there is a backlog of
cargo. Currently, a maximum of only 150-200 rail cars can be
offloaded per day in Hayraton, Afghanistan. Roughly 4,000
cars-including 2,000 loaded with fuel-are waiting to be processed
across Uzbekistan. In Afghanistan, an additional 700-800 cars are
waiting to be unloaded. The Uzbeks urged that the capabilities at
Hayraton be improved by having additional mechanized equipment take
the place of manual labor. Moreover, they lamented that while
Uzbeks work around the clock on processing these cars, Afghanistan
celebrates too many Islamic holidays and this contributes to the
backlog. Echoing Azimov, the officials advised extending the rail
line to Mazar-i-Sharif, but said laying this much track would take
approximately 12 months. Insufficient funding is the primary
obstacle to this, however.
15. (C) Uzbek Customs officials also requested again that the
United States provide large-scale Rapiscan scanning equipment to
better process the large volume of cargo that will cross the border
in the future. (Note: In November, State Customs Committee Deputy
Chairman Mansurov wrote to Post asking for the provision of 12
RAPISCAN 524 control systems, three RAPISCAN EAGLE M4500 mobile
control systems for shipments and vehicles, and one RAPISCAN EAGLE
F6000 Base control system for shipments and vehicles to avoid
delays in processing cars. The total cost of this equipment would
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probably be several million dollars. End note.) GOU officials
stated that Termez is able to handle 40-50 trucks per day now.
Customs Chief Inspector Rustam Kabulov later told Poloff that with
the requested scanning equipment, Termez could process about 250
trucks per day. Local officials concluded the day with an
extraordinary display of traditional Uzbek hospitality by hosting a
dinner with musical and dance performances in the General's honor.
Foreign Minister Norov on Relations with the West
-------------- --------------
16. (C) On April 30, General McNabb met jointly with Minister of
Foreign Affairs Norov and Minister of Defense Berdiyev. Norov
noted the intensification in U.S.-Uzbek dialogue and their shared
view on Afghanistan and stressed the importance of the commercial
dimension of NDN-particularly the development of Navoi-to
Uzbekistan. He said the GOU has been following the development and
implementation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy very closely.
17. (C) Norov indicated that there is room for bilateral
cooperation to grow further. The U.S. and Uzbekistan have
long-term common interests if both sides wish to cooperate, but
such cooperation should be constructive. Noting that McNabb is the
second senior U.S. military official to visit Tashkent since the
new administration took office, he remarked that Washington still
has not provided clear political signals. He feared "inertia from
the previous administration continuing in the assessment of
Uzbekistan." Norov said he was optimistic that relations can
improve, but there is "still no confirmation that this optimism can
be realized and implemented."
18. (C) Uzbekistan is also continuing to watch relations with its
Central Asian neighbors, especially Kazakhstan, Norov continued.
Uzbekistan accepted Kazakhstan as the Chairman-in-Office of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) in Europe because
Kazakhstan is Uzbekistan's neighbor, not because Kazakhstan is
democratic. "How can Kazakhstan serve as an example of democracy
and human rights in the OSCE?" he asked.
19. (C) Norov said it is important for the U.S. and Uzbekistan to
have open and honest relations based on mutual interests and that
there should be a fair assessment of the situation here.
"Uzbekistan cannot be put on a hook," i.e. pressured, he said.
"This is counterproductive." Norov also recommended that the U.S.
and Uzbekistan enter into a structured political dialogue and
harked back to the 2002 Strategic Partnership and Cooperation
Framework. (Comment: Norov often cites this in discussions with
U.S. officials. It is interesting that over the course of this
meeting, Norov did all the talking from the GOU side. When he
offered the silent Berdiyev the chance to weigh in at the end,
Berdiyev declined. End comment.)
Uzbekistan's Relations with CSTO, SCO
-------------- --
20. (C) Russia has been trying to establish a Rapid Reaction Force
under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that
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President Medvedev told CSTO heads of state on February 4 would be
"as well armed as NATO," Norov continued. He asserted that
Uzbekistan will not join this. Russia is trying to develop the
CSTO into a political-military bloc as well as enhance the
military-technical dimension of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Uzbekistan has opposed both of these plans, he
emphasized. He added that Uzbekistan is the only SCO member
actively resisting Russian efforts to create a military dimension
within the SCO and complained that Uzbekistan should not be seen as
part of a "privileged area" for the Russians. Uzbekistan is not
"drifting toward the West" by pursuing these policies-it is simply
acting on behalf of its national interests. Alluding to Russia,
Norov said, "some expect the U.S. to fail in Afghanistan, although
they are aware of the threats as well."
More on Local Purchases, Economic Benefits to Uzbekistan
-------------- --------------
---
21. (C) Echoing the sentiments of First Deputy Prime Minister
Azimov the previous day, Norov stressed the importance of local
purchases and economic benefits to Uzbekistan from NDN. General
McNabb replied that the U.S. understands very well and is working
on maximizing local purchase wherever possible. He noted that he
would bring up the construction of the Hayraton-Mazar-i-Sharif rail
line during his upcoming visit to Afghanistan as well. Norov
reiterated that Uzbekistan is ready and able to build this rail
line-only financing is needed. McNabb said that transportation
links with Afghanistan are important not only for supplying current
operations there, but for the future development and stability of
the entire Central Asian region, and Uzbekistan is at the center of
this.
Comment:
--------------
22. (C) The consistent theme from the Uzbeks on NDN is "don't take
us for granted, and show us some appreciation." In fact, NDN can
not only benefit Uzbekistan, but its focus on key rail
infrastructure into Afghanistan can serve as a stimulus for
projects, such as extending the line from Hayraton to
Mazar-i-Sharif, that hold transformational potential in terms of
regional economic integration. As the U.S. military works to
develop and consolidate these ties, the U.S.-Uzbek political
relationship needs to ramp up fast if the difficult human rights
and democratic reform issues that remain are not to knock things
off track.
NORLAND