Uzbekistan: DTRA and Uzbek Officials Review Biological

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000469 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01 TAGS: TBIO TSPL PTER PINS PGOV PBTS PREL ASEC SENV UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: DTRA and Uzbek Officials Review Biological Threat Reduction Cooperation CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: A Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) delegation met with officials from the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) in mid-March to discuss cooperation under the framework of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP). The GOU showed up in force and at a high level--with many Deputy Ministers present--during the Executive Review/Implementing Program Review of the BTRP on March 16, and office calls that DTRA conducted at various ministries were productive and positive. The DTRA delegation also visited several Regional Diagnostic Laboratories built in Uzbekistan's provinces with BTRP support. The delegation met both of its primary objectives: highlighting for the Government of Uzbekistan the importance of an improved alignment of Uzbek laws and regulations with Threat Agent Detection and Response processes as well as establishing a roadmap toward official acceptance of the Electronic Infectious Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) developed collaboratively with the GOU and funded by DTRA. Also notable were comments that GOU officials made about Uzbek threat perceptions, including the MOD's view that water shortages could lead to war down the road and its concern that terrorists could employ bioterrorism against Uzbekistan's armed forces. End summary. Executive Review/Implementing Program Review -------------- -------------- - ¶2. (SBU) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Director Rear Admiral John Byrd (ret.) and CTR Policy Director Jim Reid led a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) delegation that met with officials from the Government of Uzbekistan on March 13-18 to discuss cooperation under the framework of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP). Ambassador Norland accompanied the DTRA delegation to the Executive Review and Implementing Program Review for the BTRP at the International Business Center in Tashkent on March 16. The Government of Uzbekistan displayed its seriousness of purpose with a presence of some 30 officials drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), Ministry of Defense (MOD),Ministry of Health (MOH),and Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR). GOU officials present included Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations Lt. Col. Khakimjon Abdulazizov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Khamidulla Karamatov, Deputy Minister of Defense Maj.-Gen. Rustam Niyazov, Deputy Minister of Health Bakhtiyar Niyazmatov, and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources Shermat Nurmatov. ¶3. (SBU) Admiral Byrd expressed his appreciation for the great cooperation that the U.S. and Uzbekistan have enjoyed over the years in combating the threat of bioterrorism. Ambassador Norland indicated that both the U.S. Government and U.S. Embassy are strong supporters of collaboration on the BTRP, the value of which to date has exceeded $130 million. He cited this as an example of pragmatic cooperation, and that it serves our mutual interests to move forward on this initiative. ¶4. (C) Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations Abdulazizov responded that the U.S. and Uzbekistan are fighting a threat that can appear at any time, and cited the appearance of an unknown powder at the U.S. Embassy on December 30. "Terrorism has no boundaries. We must fight it together," he asserted. He called the development of Uzbekistan's capabilities to detect and respond to especially dangerous pathogens an "urgent issue." Recent BTRP Accomplishments -------------- - ¶5. (SBU) The DTRA delegation highlighted a number of recent accomplishments in Uzbekistan that have taken place under the BTRP. Some of these accomplishments fall under BTRP's Biological Safety and Security/Threat Agent Detection and Response (BSS/TADR) Project. (Note: TADR seeks to reduce the risk of theft, diversion, or accidental release of pathogens by strengthening safety and security measures. It also establishes an integrated, secure, and sustainable network to detect and respond to deliberate or TASHKENT 00000469 002 OF 005 accidental release of Especially Dangerous Pathogens (EDPs). End note.) Recent TADR-related accomplishments include: the installation of the Electronic Integrated Disease Surveillance System (EIDSS) into all six constructed Regional Diagnostic Laboratory (RDL) facilities in Uzbekistan (Note: Regional Diagnostic Laboratories are intended to provide real-time detection of Especially Dangerous Pathogens (EDPs) using modern technology. The GOU also can use such labs for other research and diagnostic purposes consistent with promoting biosafety and security. End note.); installation of, training on, and acceptance of the Pathogen Asset Control System for inventory of strains at two RDLs with strain repository capabilities; the completion of an analysis related to giving the GOU the capability to produce its own bacteriological media; the creation of working groups to facilitate BTRP implementation; and preparation for training exercises in Samarkand and Karshi this spring. Recent accomplishments in promoting biosafety and biosecurity include: continued support of the creation and implementation of biosecurity and biosafety procedures at all of Uzbekistan's BTRP-related facilities; additional security upgrades at the Center for Prophylaxis of Quarantine of Most Hazardous Infections (CPQMHI) in Tashkent; upgraded training rooms at the Chief Veterinary Directorate for Especially Dangerous Pathogens (CVD-ESP) in Tashkent, which oversees animal disease surveillance systems in Uzbekistan; and additional security improvements at the Uzbek Scientific Research Institute of Veterinary Science (UzSRIV). BTRP has recently trained over 1,300 lab staff, epidemiologists, and clinicians in the country. BTRP also has completed assessments of plague, anthrax, tularemia, and arbovirus infections across Uzbekistan through Collaborative Biological Research (CBR) projects that fund research for the GOU and sometimes result in publications. BTRP Plans for the Coming Year -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The DTRA delegation also discussed a series of activities projected through March 2010 for BTRP. BTRP plans to commence construction of additional labs in the Ferghana Valley; continue to provide maintenance, sustainment, and training to seven Regional Diagnostic Laboratories; continue long-range sustainment planning for the transition of the Threat Agent and Detection Response (TADR) network to the GOU; and conduct additional studies on pathogens in Uzbekistan, among other activities. DTRA noted that Policy has agreed to the construction of one limited capacity BioSafety Level Three (BSL-3) Laboratory in Tashkent. Given this decision, the GOU should prioritize the construction of Regional Diagnostic Laboratories, Epidemiological Support Units (ESUs) and the BSL-3. In conjunction with the training, supplies, and equipment provided over the next four years, Uzbekistan can achieve implementation of the Threat Agent Detection and Response Network. BTRP Long-Term Vision -------------- ¶7. (SBU) BTRP's long-term vision for Uzbekistan revolves around five central goals: first, strengthening the surveillance, reporting, and response system for especially dangerous pathogens. Second, consolidating Uzbekistan's especially dangerous pathogens in a safe, secure repository. Third, developing strategic research partnerships between Uzbek scientists conducting internationally-funded research and high-priority domestic research. Fourth, bringing Uzbekistan into compliance with International Health Regulations under the World Health Organization and World Organization for Animal Health reporting guidelines; and fifth, continuing peaceful scientific pursuits. ¶8. (SBU) Abdulazizov thanked the DTRA delegation for the comprehensive review as well as the training that BTRP had provided for Uzbek personnel in 2008. In response to policy issues the delegation had raised, such as the issue of the GOU transferring strains to the USG in accordance with a previous agreement, the GOU TASHKENT 00000469 003 OF 005 encouraged the U.S. side to communicate its views on such issues via diplomatic note so that GOU officials could coordinate their responses. Meeting with Officials in Kashkadarya Province -------------- -------------- - ¶9. (SBU) Ambassador Norland traveled with the DTRA delegation to Karshi in Kashkadarya Province on March 17, where they examined the first DTRA-funded Karshi Joint Regional Diagnostic Laboratory (Human and Veterinary). (Note: Karshi Joint RDL construction began in August 2007 and the lab will service Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya Provinces. End note.) RDL officials were grateful for DTRA's efforts here, and one RDL official told them that the lab tests several hundred samples from 14 districts for cholera and anthrax daily. ¶10. (C) Ambassador Norland and the delegation then met with First Deputy Hokim of Kashkadarya Province E. Mamadiyorov. Mamadiyorov gave them a warm welcome and spoke at length about the history of the province, also noting that President Karimov himself had served as Hokim of the province in the late 1980s. Admiral Byrd described DTRA's work in the province on the joint lab, noting that this will be operational soon after the delivery of some additional equipment. The state-of-the-art lab will have the ability to rapidly detect especially dangerous pathogens that occur naturally or have resulted from a terrorist attack. Byrd noted that the lab personnel the delegation had met with are excited about the facilities they'll be able to work in, and DTRA's efforts support the health of the region. The lab is part of a large program being implemented throughout the former Soviet Union intended to counter bioterrorism. ¶11. (C) Byrd added that it is important to be able to rapidly detect and diagnose a disease outbreak so that emergency services can respond appropriately, reducing the risk of an endemic or pandemic outbreak. Thanks to techniques DTRA has provided in Karshi, an outbreak that stemmed from natural causes or a terrorist attack can be detected in hours. This is a significant improvement over the several days that would have been necessary using earlier lab techniques. CTR Policy Director Reid noted that controlling a disease outbreak is a national security imperative and newly emerging diseases can arise anywhere--in fact, a unique strain was discovered in Karshi in 2002 and named the "Karshi virus." ¶12. (C) Surprised, First Deputy Hokim Mamadiyorov said that this virus was news to the staff of the Hokimiyat. He had visited the Karshi lab several times, and was pleased and impressed with the facilities there. Mamadiyorov praised DTRA's collaboration on early detection of diseases as timely and useful. MOD Wants a Bigger Piece of the Pie... -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) On March 18, Director Byrd and Policy Director Reid met with Deputy Defense Minister Maj-Gen. Niyazov at the Ministry of Defense. Niyazov expressed his gratitude for DTRA's efforts in Uzbekistan, but noted that while DTRA has spent some 130 million USD on the BTRP, the MOD has received only 1.5 million USD from this total. He suggested that as the "Executive Agent" of the program in Uzbekistan, MOD has been receiving too small a share of these resources. (Note: The Executive Agent acts as the liaison between the Government of Uzbekistan and the United States Government. Responsibilities include coordinating on all site access, arranging meetings with the appropriate ministries involved in the BTRP, and overseeing operations related to overall implementation of the BTRP. End note.) Niyazov claimed that MOD is easier to work with than other GOU agencies, is accurate, and precise. (Comment: This was a perfect example of the interagency tug-of-war over resources that takes place in the GOU. End comment.) Niyazov repeatedly asked for more U.S. funding for MOD TASHKENT 00000469 004 OF 005 projects including the construction of additional facilities on the military side. ¶14. (C) Director Byrd and Policy Director Reid responded that it is important to be mindful of the program's key objectives--BTRP is aiming to consolidate pathogens already in Uzbekistan's possession; establish comprehensive surveillance networks to diagnose and respond to potential disease outbreaks; enhance safety for those who will come into contact with pathogens; and increase the engagement of scientists with the international community. It is important for MOD to explain in writing its role and participation in this program and to help them understand how further assistance for MOD would assist them in achieving their program objectives. If the MOD has needs outside of the program, they may be able to help identify other donors or agencies that can help. Niyazov appeared disappointed, but thanked them for the clarification, stating that he would discuss the issue with the Minister. He noted that time and time again, when there is an emergency, people turn to the army for assistance. He cited Hurricane Katrina and a recent earthquake in China. Mr. Reid pointed out that if the MOD is unhappy being the "Executive Agent" and did not want the responsibility anymore, Policy would consider moving this responsibility to another Ministry, possibly the Ministry of Emergency Situations. ... and Shows Concern Over Water, Terrorism -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) At one point, an innocuous comment from Director Byrd about the rainy weather prompted a speech from Niyazov about what a critical issue water is for Central Asia. He lamented that while the Amu River used to flow into the Aral Sea and the Caspian, the river cannot even reach the Aral now. Niyazov predicted that there could be wars over water down the road. He also noted that many terrorists remain in Afghanistan and are planning strikes against Central Asia. Bioterrorism could be one of the weapons that they will use. Uzbekistan has "reliable evidence" that terrorists are targeting the armed forces of Uzbekistan, and so Uzbekistan must appear powerful in order to deter potential attacks. "If I live in a house, my neighbor may be combative--but if he knows I'm strong, he won't try to mess up my garden!" he said. He warned that terrorists are getting stronger. "Maybe I sound pessimistic, but I served in Afghanistan for a while," he continued, and warned ominously, "I assure you that more problems will be coming." He also took a jab at bureaucracy, stating that terrorists are successful because they don't have to fill out as much paperwork as governments. Meeting with Ministry of Emergency Situations -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Director Byrd and Policy Director Reid also met with Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations Abdulazizov and other representatives of MES on March 18. Byrd and Reid noted that they had raised the possibility of elevating the Ministry of Emergency Situations over the Ministry of Defense as Executive Agent for BTRP. While there have not been problems in interacting with MOD, it has seemed that MES has been doing the work of the Executive Agent and coordinated with MOH and MAWR concerning outbreaks of infectious diseases. The Department of Defense is ready to make this change if the MES and GOU would find this useful. ¶17. (C) Byrd and Reid stressed the importance of Uzbek personnel being able to demonstrate that equipment provided and training received under the auspices of BTRP has been effective, and this can be confirmed during upcoming exercises. During their visits to multiple laboratories in the provinces of Uzbekistan, they had observed a few problems that need to be addressed, however. First, the Uzbek Scientific Research Institute of Veterinary Sciences (UzSRIV) Regional Diagnostic Laboratory/Brucellosis Laboratory in Samarkand is supposed to be part of the TADR network to allow the flow of EDP samples. Byrd and Reid had no objection to local TASHKENT 00000469 005 OF 005 authorities using the lab for research, to the extent that research does not interfere with the processing of samples to diagnose potential outbreaks of disease. The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources has indicated that it will integrate UzSRIV with the larger TADR network so that suspected pathogens can be analyzed at UzSRIV rather than Tashkent. ¶18. (C) Second, some laboratories--particularly UzSRIV--showed problems with their facilities. At UzSRIV, lights blinked in the corridor. Serious voltage control issues at the lab need to be resolved. The temperature was very hot, which risks damaging sensitive equipment. The air conditioning had been unplugged, apparently to save electricity, despite the fact that the U.S. is paying for this electricity. Other problems were apparent at the Republican Center for Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance (RSES) of the Ministry of Health. They had observed many boxes and fridges with wax seals. (Note: According to Uzbek law, seals must be applied to storage equipment three days prior to accepting visitors at RDLs. End note.) The director had not identified the contents. This raises biosecurity and biosafety concerns. (Note: RSES is responsible for detecting, verifying, and responding to epidemics and outbreaks of infectious diseases as they occur and is the main laboratory within the larger Sanitary and Epidemiological Surveillance (SES) system. End note.) Byrd and Reid expressed hope that Uzbekistan's Ministries would take ownership for such labs in the future, and asked for the GOU's assistance in identifying ways to make this transition. ¶19. (C) Abdulazizov expressed his gratitude for the work done on the Biological Threat Reduction Program and noted that it is important for the U.S. and Uzbekistan to jointly identify shortcomings and priorities of the program. This can verify that funds spent are serving BTRP objectives. Abdulazizov said that there should be experts and professionals at all levels as well as properly maintained equipment to ensure a rapid response to a potential disease outbreak. He offered up several proposals. First, that MES coordinate with the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and the Ministry of Health to draft rules and requirements for personnel at Regional Diagnostic Laboratories to properly use and maintain equipment. Second, that MES experts be integrated into Regional Diagnostic Laboratories. Third, emergency response teams could be created. He suggested that the U.S. and Uzbekistan jointly develop technical requirements for such teams that address personnel issues, training and equipment, and rules and regulations. Abdulazizov asserted that without emergency response teams, Uzbekistan would be unable to respond to an outbreak. He pledged that Uzbekistan would address the shortcomings Byrd and Reid mentioned with regard to the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources and Ministry of Health facilities and make them work properly. Finally, Abdulazizov said that his leadership will examine the issues raised during the meeting and asserted that Uzbekistan wishes to sustain the network the U.S. has provided. Comment: -------------- ¶20. (C) DTRA's Biological Threat Reduction Program, which is currently the largest U.S. program in Uzbekistan, has clearly made substantial progress in training and equipping Uzbekistan to deal with potential disease outbreaks. The DTRA delegation accomplished both of its primary goals: emphasizing the importance of revising Uzbek regulations in accordance with Threat Agent Detection and Response processes and establishing a roadmap toward official acceptance of a disease surveillance reporting system. Nevertheless, inspections of some labs in Uzbekistan's provinces indicate that not all facilities are being well-maintained by the directors. Hopefully, further engagement with Uzbekistan will result in improved rules and regulations that more effectively safeguard dangerous pathogens in support of our mutual interests in countering the threats of bioterrorism and bio-agent proliferation. NORLAND