UZBEKISTAN: THE WAY FORWARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 TASHKENT 000451 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND G/TIP AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06 TAGS: PHUM EAID ELAB ICRC KDEM KIRF KISL KTIP PGOV PREL SOCI, UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: THE WAY FORWARD ON HUMAN RIGHTS REF: TASHKENT 323; TASHKENT 395; TASHKENT 361; TASHKENT 226; TASHKENT 343; TASHKENT 271; TASHKENT 277; TASHKENT 194; TASHKENT 222 CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: While human rights abuses remain all too common in Uzbekistan, the government has taken some positive steps in certain areas over the past year. Uzbekistan is not posed to become a democracy anytime soon, but we continue to believe that the most effective strategy for curbing abuses and generating reform remains diplomatic engagement with officials on selected issues. Over the next year, we will seek to consolidate recent gains and prevent backsliding in key areas. This cable outlines a series of specific steps that we will urge the Uzbeks take on human rights over the next year on prison conditions, child labor, trafficking-in-persons (TIP),legal reform and implementation, religious freedom, and civil society. Consolidating progress in these areas will help us build trust with government officials, identify potential reformers, and lay the foundation for more systematic change over the long term. If we are serious about actually promoting human rights in Uzbekistan and not only cataloguing abuses, we need to take the long view. In contrast, adopting a more hard-line approach with the Uzbeks is likely to be counterproductive. End Summary. BUILDING TRUST IS THE KEY TO GREATER REFORM -------------- ¶2. (C) One of the major hurdles to more open dialogue with the Uzbeks on human rights remains a lack of trust and lingering fears over U.S. government intentions. As the fallout from the selection of independent human rights activist Mutabar Tojibayeva for the International Woman of Courage award demonstrated (ref A), President Karimov remains deeply suspicious of U.S. government motives and still fears that our human rights advocacy efforts are fundamentally aimed at regime change. President Karimov's paranoia is most likely fueled by distorted information fed to him by those in his government who do not favor improved relations with the West and foreign governments with similar objectives, such as Russia. At the same time, the Uzbeks are naturally reluctant to make any bold moves on human rights or any other issue in the bilateral relationship until the new Administration's policy on Central Asia comes more into focus. In order to bypass the Uzbek bureaucratic filter as the Administration develops its policy towards Central Asia, high-level official visitors need to deliver our message on human rights and other issues. KEY POINTS TO DELIVER TO THE UZBEKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) In our diplomatic engagement with the Uzbeks on human rights, we need to stress several key points. First, we must disabuse them of any notion that because they are providing increased cooperation on security issues, including assisting us with the transport of non-lethal military supplies to Afghanistan, we will cease discussing our human rights concerns with them. One benefit of Tojibayeva's selection for the Woman of Courage is that it sent this message loud and clear. Continuing to have high-level civilian and military visitors raise human rights issues will reinforce this message. Second, we continually need to stress to the Uzbeks, at the highest levels possible, that our efforts are TASHKENT 00000451 002 OF 008 not aimed at regime change, but at assisting the government fulfill its international human rights commitments. Third, we must emphasize the clear benefits Uzbekistan will reap from improving its human rights record, and with it, its international prestige. For example, Uzbek officials routinely complain to us about the lack of international investment in their country, but they still fail to understand that one of the reasons (among others) why international corporations are reluctant to invest in Uzbekistan is the government's poor human rights record. GOALS FOR 2009: CONSOLIDATE GAINS; PREVENT BACKTRACKING -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) For the first time since the violent Andijon events in 2005, Uzbek authorities over the past year have made progress in some areas, including allowing international observers back into prisons, adopting legal measures intended to curb child labor, increasing efforts to combat trafficking-in-persons (TIP), reforming legislation to strengthen defendants' rights, and releasing several political prisoners. Our goal for 2009 should be to consolidate the positive steps taken by the Uzbek government. At the same time, we need to prevent backtracking in other areas, including on religious freedom and civil society. The government has demonstrated a willingness to engage on many of these issues with the international community, including by publicly committing itself to improvements during Uzbekistan's recent Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the UN Human Rights Council (ref B). PRISON CONDITIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) As a majority of Uzbekistan's human rights abuses continue to occur behind prison walls (ref C),one of our main goals for 2009 is for the government to reach agreement with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to continue prison visits this year. Since ICRC restarted its prison monitoring program again on a trial basis in 2008, we have received reports of improvements in conditions at several prisons visited by ICRC. The main sticking point remains the intransigence of certain officials to allowing ICRC to visit pre-trial detention facilities operated by the National Security Service. In a recent conversation with the Ambassador, the ICRC director in Tashkent noted tension within the government between reformers, who favor international cooperation on improving prison conditions, and conservatives, who instinctively distrust international organizations and seek to maintain Uzbekistan's relative isolation. We will continue to urge authorities to expand the access of international monitors to detention facilities, which we believe is the most effective tool for promoting improvements in conditions. Meanwhile, we also will support the government's stated efforts to create several new ombudsmen to monitor prison conditions. For example, we are in the process of organizing an International Visitor's program for relevant officials to study prison administration in the United States. TASHKENT 00000451 003 OF 008 CHILD LABOR -------------- ¶6. (C) In 2009, we will urge the government to continue cooperation with UNICEF on combating the use of child labor during Uzbekistan's cotton harvest, a practice which has continued since the Soviet era and exists to various degrees throughout Central Asia. We also will ask the government to formally invite a new ILO representative to work in Uzbekistan. As the true extent of child labor in Uzbekistan is still unclear, one of our main goals for 2009 is to encourage the government to allow an independent assessment during the fall cotton harvest. Though some ILO officials have expressed skepticism about the practicality of conducting such an assessment, UNICEF continues to express an interest. Conducting an assessment is also clearly in the government's interest, as it is likely to show that some of the more exaggerated claims made by human rights activists, NGOs, and political opponents on child labor in Uzbekistan are off the mark. In addition, we believe that ILO and/or UNICEF could most effectively engage the Uzbeks in the context of a regional program involving neighboring countries with similar problems. This way, the Uzbeks are less likely to feel that they are being singled out for criticism. Any regional program should not aim at eradicating child labor overnight (an unrealistic goal),but rather should present a long-term strategy that addresses broader and related issues, such as rural poverty, unemployment, labor migration, and the perverse effects of cotton quotas. The U.S. Department of Labor can also play a role by providing funding for a regional ILO anti-child labor project involving Uzbekistan, as they have done in previous years. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS (TIP) -------------- ¶7. (C) We believe that the Uzbek government has demonstrated sufficient progress to warrant being upgraded again this year in the annual U.S. State Department's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report to Tier 2 from the Tier 2 Watch List. In 2009, we will urge the government to continue implementation of its anti-TIP National Action Plan, which was adopted in 2008. To demonstrate its commitment to working with international partners, we will encourage authorities to finally register the International Organization for Migration (IOM),which, despite operating as a local NGO, enjoys relatively good relations with officials in Tashkent and the provinces. In addition, the government is close to opening its own shelter for trafficking victims in Tashkent, the first clear example of it providing assistance to TIP victims (ref D). Furthermore, we will suggest that the government allow IOM, which already operates shelters for TIP victims in Tashkent and Bukhara, to provide training on best practices for the staff of the new government-controlled TIP shelter. Meanwhile, it will remain important for the United States to continue its support for the IOM shelters, as it will take some time for the state-controlled shelters to reach professional standards. Unfortunately, as long as economic opportunities remain limited for Uzbeks, especially those from rural regions, we will continue to see a significant number of Uzbeks migrants heading abroad for work, and with it, a corresponding number of TIP cases (ref E). TASHKENT 00000451 004 OF 008 LEGAL REFORM AND IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶8. (C) Over the past year, the government has adopted several new laws strengthening defendants' rights, including the habeas corpus law and a new law on defense attorneys. In 2009, we will continue to urge the government to fully implement these legal reforms and provide trainings to prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. Full implementation of these reforms is likely to require time and a change in attitudes, which continued training could further instill. We also will carefully monitor the implementation of the new defense attorneys' law, which requires all defense attorneys to pass new exams and receive certification from the government. While the new requirements will hopefully result in defendants receiving more competent legal counsel (one frequent complaint against defense attorneys in Uzbekistan is that they are poorly trained compared to prosecutors and judges),we will watch that the government does not use the new law to refuse to certify attorneys it does not like. PREVENTING BACKTRACKING ON CIVIL SOCIETY... -------------- ¶9. (C) Last year, for the first time since the Andijon events, the government granted registration to two U.S.-based NGOs: the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Institute for New Democracies (IND). This year, however, authorities are once again threatening to backtrack on civil society by denying accreditation to foreigners working at NGOs in Uzbekistan, including the new AmCit director of IND, a USAID grantee which had played a lead role in recent years in advocating legal reform and providing training for officials (ref F). Authorities also recently forced the departure from the country of the expatriate director of the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation and three expatriates at French humanitarian NGOs. Other international NGOs continue to complain about Uzbek bureaucracy hampering their activities. Some local NGOs, including the Ezgulik human rights group, also have come under renewed pressure recently. ...AND REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The first few months of 2009 have seen persistent pressure on Evangelical groups suspected of proselytism (which is illegal Uzbekistan) and a nationwide crackdown on suspected members of the conservative Turkish "Nur" Islamic group (ref G). This is a very sensitive issue in Uzbekistan, but we believe we have a chance to effect positive change by reaching an agreement with the government on a letter outlining specific steps it can take to improve religious freedom and to have itself removed from the U.S. State Department's Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) list. On March 30, MFA Americas' Section Chief Takhrir Mamajanov told the Ambassador that the government was still considering the letter, and, as he put it, "how to seize the current opportunity." At its TASHKENT 00000451 005 OF 008 recent UPR at the UN Human Rights Council, the Uzbek delegation also announced forthcoming amendments to the current religion law (Note: While we no information yet on what the amendments will be, we hope they will make the law less, not more, restrictive. End note.) POLITICAL PRISONERS -------------- ¶11. (C) Last year, the government released greater numbers of political prisoners than in previous years. Since we submitted a list of political prisoners to the government in early 2008, Uzbek authorities have released several individuals on the list, including Tojibayeva, who, at the time, was Uzbekistan's most high-profile political prisoner. At the same time, the government imprisoned a journalist and human rights activist in Karakalpakstan, creating two new political prisoners. Nevertheless, the total number of political prisoners decreased in ¶2008. Human Rights Watch currently lists a total of 11 political prisoners in Uzbekistan. While we will continue to urge the government to release more political prisoners this year, the total number of such prisoners here is less than in many other countries with whom Uzbekistan is frequently compared. Some independent activists claim there are thousands of "political prisoners" in Uzbekistan, but the vast majority of cases they cite involve individuals who were sentenced on religious extremism charges. While we are concerned that at least some of those individuals were imprisoned on the basis of coerced or fabricated evidence, they are not "political prisoners" in the same sense as imprisoned opposition members, human rights activists, or journalists. OTHER POSSIBLE AREAS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENGAGEMENT -------------- -- ¶12. (C) In addition to the key areas outlined above, we should seek to engage the Uzbeks on other human rights issues, including the rights of vulnerable groups such as the disabled and women. For example, the government recently has adopted the UN Convention on the Rights of the Disabled and announced a forthcoming law "On guarantees of equal rights and opportunities for women and men," both of which provide us with opportunities to increase dialogue with the Uzbeks on these issues and offer assistance. During Uzbekistan's UPR, Uzbek officials also did not reject out of hand a recommendation to adopt the UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. While this is a more sensitive issue for the government, it remains a serious area of concern (refs H and I). POLITICAL REFORM -------------- ¶13. (C) Unfortunately, political rights remain an area where the government has made little progress. December 2007 saw another flawed Presidential election, and the Parliamentary elections this TASHKENT 00000451 006 OF 008 December, despite featuring the trappings of democratic infrastructure, are unlikely to be free or fair. Uzbek citizens are consistently deprived of basic rights, including freedom of speech and assembly. Human rights and opposition activists are still routinely harassed, while media remains highly restricted. Promoting political reform is naturally much more difficult in a country like Uzbekistan than getting the government to address other human rights concerns. Nevertheless, through sustained engagement over time, we may be able to build enough trust with authorities through cooperation on other issues to eventually convince them to ease the clamp on political expression. We need to acknowledge that, as happened in neighboring Turkmenistan, the demise of the sitting president is not going to produce overnight change in this conservative, clannish society. ¶14. (C) At the same time, Uzbekistan is not North Korea or Turkmenistan, as is sometimes imagined by outside observers. Spontaneous demonstrations over socio-economic conditions occur in rural areas, especially during the winter, and such demonstrators are usually not dealt with harshly by authorities (political protests, however, are routinely disrupted). Articles criticizing socio-economic conditions also occasionally feature in local semi-independent media. While political and human rights activists face frequent harassment (and occasionally worse),authorities more or less tolerate the existence of a small independent civil society here. Print media is strictly controlled by the government, but the number of internet users, especially in urban areas, is on the rise. Many (but not all) independent websites are blocked, though most computer-savvy Uzbeks can still access them through proxy servers. However, most ordinary Uzbeks, especially in rural areas, are more focused on their daily struggle for economic survival than following politics or participating in civil society. THE GOU NEEDS TO BE OUR PARTNER ON HUMAN RIGHTS -------------- -- ¶15. (C) Independent civil society remains weak and fragmented, and the only entity in the country actually capable of affecting human rights reforms is ultimately the government. The current regime faces long-term challenges, but it is stable and there is no real threat of collapse on the horizon. The government's imprisonment of a large number of suspected religious extremists might be fueling the growth of religious extremism in prisons, but there is little evidence of religious extremism growing among the general populace. In fact, all indications point to extremist religious groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir being much weaker today than they were five or ten years ago. Uzbekistan under President Karimov is not Iran under the Shah. ¶16. (C) Rather than isolating government officials, we should be seeking to further engage and identify potential reformers. While opaque, the Uzbek government is not monolithic, and is composed of many different competing groups, some of them are more pro-Western than others. President Karimov is not going to be around forever, and we need to be in a position to have influence with whatever group comes to power after the dust settles. We also have the opportunity to strengthen the hand of potential pro-Western reformers through greater direct contact with them. TASHKENT 00000451 007 OF 008 ENGAGEMENT IS EFFECTIVE... -------------- ¶17. (C) It is notable that the organizations that have gone to the greatest lengths to engage the government on their respective issues - including ICRC, UNICEF, and IOM - have had the greatest relative success in the past year in promoting reform. In contrast, Human Rights Watch (HRW),which consistently has taken a rather hard line on the Uzbeks, had its country director thrown out of the country and its office effectively shut down for the second year in a row in 2008. While HRW's heart is in the right place, it has pursued a counterproductive strategy as far as promoting reform is concerned. However, there are signs that HRW has begun to recognize this. Its current researcher on Uzbekistan, Igor Vorontsov (who was denied accreditation in Uzbekistan and continues to cover the country from abroad),is leaving the organization, and it appears that HRW will move forward with nominating a new candidate to serve in Tashkent. ...WHILE A HARD LINE APPROACH IS UNLIKELY TO WORK -------------- -------------- ¶18. (C) Isolating the Karimov regime might please a small but vocal group of Uzbek exiles, but it will make things worse for activists remaining in the country and ordinary Uzbeks. We must remember these exiles have their own agendas and should not be relied upon to provide an objective analysis of human rights developments inside Uzbekistan. Safely residing in the West, these individuals have little to lose by calling for Western governments to break off relations with the Karimov regime. On the other hand, it is the human rights activists still in Uzbekistan who will pay the price later if relations between the United States and Uzbekistan go south. A majority of activists inside Uzbekistan consistently support warming relations with the West and further engagement. We have not seen any proof over the years that the Karimov regime responds well to outside pressure, a view shared by nearly all Western diplomats currently in Tashkent. GETTING BEYOND THE TIRED OLD NARRATIVE -------------- ¶19. (C) As cooperation between the United States and the Uzbek government continues on the Northern Distribution Network and other issues, we can expect more knee-jerk reactions from international rights groups like HRW and Uzbek exiles that Western governments are seeking to downplay human rights concerns to pursue closer cooperation on Afghanistan. We need to finally get beyond this tired old narrative that Western governments need to choose between pursuing either security interests or promoting human rights in Uzbekistan. In reality, we need simultaneous engagement on security and human rights. Our efforts to promote political reform are aimed at reinforcing Uzbekistan's long-term security. At the same time, as security cooperation improves, this will provide us TASHKENT 00000451 008 OF 008 with more of a forum (and leverage) to effectively engage in dialogue on human rights, to which we believe that the government is open. ¶20. (C) The value-added of the U.S. government with regard to human rights is not our ability to impose sanctions and isolate the Uzbeks, but the fact that we can engage officials through private diplomatic channels, where the Uzbeks are more open to dialogue. Uzbekistan is far from becoming a democracy, but we can work with reformers within the regime to curb abuses and lay the foundation for long-term progress. We are unlikely to change the views of international human rights groups like HRW, but we must be prepared to weather their criticisms in the short term in order to make substantive progress on human rights over the long term. NORLAND