Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT449
2009-04-06 06:26:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN: SECURITY SERVICES SEEKING TO ENTRAP HUMAN RIGHTS

Tags:  PHUM KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ 
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DE RUEHNT #0449/01 0960620
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 060626Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0694
INFO CIS COLLECTIVE
NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0157
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0215
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0175
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 0172
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 0175
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0208
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0167
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000449 

SIPDIS
NOFORN SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06
TAGS: PHUM KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: SECURITY SERVICES SEEKING TO ENTRAP HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICER

REF: TASHKENT 277

CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000449 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-06 TAGS: PHUM KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: SECURITY SERVICES SEEKING TO ENTRAP HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICER REF: TASHKENT 277 CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Fitzmaurice, Poloff; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The National Security Service (NSS) appears to be attempting to entrap the Embassy's Human Rights Officer by arranging meetings for him outside the Embassy on sensitive topics that could then be taped. On at least three separate occasions over the past month, we have strong reasons to believe that NSS officials have attempted to facilitate meetings between poloff and individuals with links to suspected religious extremists and independent (and illegal) Islamic communities. Most likely, these efforts are aimed at discrediting soon-to-be-departing poloff - who publicly reports on abuses in Uzbekistan (including those committed by NSS officers) through the annual U.S. State Department human rights reports - in the eyes of the country's leadership. It is also possible that such efforts are organized by elements within the security services that seek to disrupt further improvement in relations between Uzbekistan and the United States. End summary. POLOFF CONTACTED BY FORMER DAO FSN -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Poloff was recently contacted by a former Defense Attache Office (DAO) FSN, who was ostensibly laid off in 2007 due to budgetary reasons, but who actually was let go because he was widely suspected by Emboffs and other FSNs of reporting to Uzbekistan's National Security Service (NSS). The FSN also was suspected of playing some role in the arrest and beating of another former Embassy FSN in 2007. While poloff briefly overlapped at the Embassy with the former DAO FSN prior to his firing, he never had any direct contact with him before. ¶3. (S/NF) Poloff met with the former DAO FSN at the Embassy on March 30 to talk about his current research on Islam in Uzbekistan, which he explained "would be of great interest" to poloff (the Embassy's principal Human Rights Officer, whose portfolio includes Islam and religious freedom issues). The former FSN began the �
0A;meeting by explaining that since he left the Embassy in 2007, he has been working on his PhD dissertation at the Uzbek Academy of Science's Institute of History, focusing on the Soviet government's policy towards Islamic communities in Central Asia. The former FSN noted that he was currently working on translating the works of American historians on Uzbekistan, referring several times to the work of a particular AmCit scholar at Indiana University (with whom poloff once took a class, a fact that he previously mentioned to other Uzbek scholars.) FORMER FSN STRONGLY CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT'S RELIGION POLICY -------------- -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Unprompted, the former FSN quickly switched gears from talking about his own research to his views on the current regime's policy towards Islam, which he claimed (unconvincingly) was just as repressive as that of the Soviets. For example, he argued that all imams at state-sanctioned mosques were chosen by the NSS and that their Friday sermons were pre-screened by censors (the latter is a TASHKENT 00000449 002 OF 005 well-known fact we have long reported in our annual human rights reports). ¶5. (S/NF) More surprisingly, the former FSN claimed that since the ascension of a new Mufti last year, the government has been promoting a more conservative strain of Sunni Islam and was encouraging intolerance of "minority Islamic sects," including "Sufis" and Shiites (Note: If true, this is all news to us. Rather than promoting a more conservative brand of Islam, we continue to see imams quoted in the state-controlled press speaking out against the import of "alien customs," including the wearing of the hijab. We also have not heard of growing intolerance for Shiites or Sufis. End note.) In particular, he claimed that authorities were especially worried about "independent Sufi leaders," which he referred to as "black imams" (as opposed to state-approved "white imams"),who allegedly had hundreds of followers each. He also accused the new Mufti of being "poorly educated," claiming he was only chosen because he came from Samarkand, President Karimov's hometown. ...CLAIMS HE WAS INTERROGATED BY NSS AFTER LEAVING EMBASSY -------------- -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Next, the former FSN reported that approximately three months after he left the Embassy, he was interrogated by the NSS as a potential witness in a case against 20 Uzbek military officers accused of religious extremism. The officers reportedly included an individual who participated in the U.S. Defense Department-supported "Aviation Leaders Program" exchange program and had studied in the United States from 1999 - 2001. The former FSN said he last saw the officer in 1999 and could not remember his name. ¶7. (S/NF) The former FSN reported that he was interrogated by the NSS on three separate occasions at a pre-trial detention facility in Tashkent. He described the interrogations as "less than a pleasant experience," noting that a NSS officer threatened him with arrest if he lied about anything. In the last two meetings, he claimed that the NSS spent most of the interrogation asking questions about the Embassy, which he speculated might have been the real reason he was contacted by the NSS in the first place. The former FSN said he "played dumb" and told the NSS as little as possible. Since those interrogations, he said he was not contacted by the NSS again. The former FSN observed that he might also have raised NSS suspicions since he traveled to Andijon on official Embassy business shortly after the violent events there in 2005. ...OFFERS TO INTRODUCE POLOFF TO "UNOFFICIAL" IMAMS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) Towards the end of the meeting, the former FSN asked whether poloff would be interested in meeting with him periodically outside of the Embassy to continue their discussions. He also offered to introduce poloff to Islamic leaders, including "black TASHKENT 00000449 003 OF 005 imams." In return, he asked for poloff's assistance in making contact with professors and research institutions in the West. He added that he had no interest in remaining in Uzbekistan and wished to complete his PhD somewhere abroad. Poloff thanked the former FSN for sharing his work and insight, but made no commitments to meet with him again. ¶9. (S/NF) Comment: As with the other cases outlined below, we believe it is possible that the former FSN was attempting to arrange meetings for poloff outside the Embassy with members of independent (and illegal) Muslim communities, which then would be taped and shown to higher-level officials as proof of U.S. government "meddling in Uzbekistan's internal affairs." We have no intention to meet with the former FSN again. After the poloff previously refused to meet with the individuals described below, it is possible that the NSS then attempted to use the former FSN to lure poloff into such meetings. End comment. NSS ALLEGEDLY TOLD NUR MEMBER'S WIFE TO CONTACT POLOFF -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Over the past few months, Uzbek authorities have pursued a widespread crackdown on suspected members of "Nur," a banned conservative (but not extremist) religious organization associated with Turkish scholar Fethullah Gullen. One of the men imprisoned as part of the crackdown - Abudaliziz Dadahanov, a U.S. government exchange program alumnus who studied in Connecticut - was the subject of a March 10 article on the CNN.com website which included shocked reactions from his American friends (reftel). ¶11. (S/NF) On March 11, a Public Affairs Section (PAS) FSN who previously studied with Dadahanov, reported to Emboffs hearing from a mutual acquaintance that Dadahanov's wife Aziza had been frequently called into the NSS since her husband's arrest in August ¶2008. After a meeting with the NSS in early March, Aziza reportedly told the mutual acquaintance that the NSS had instructed her to contact the PAS FSN to set up a meeting with poloff at a public location outside of the Embassy. The NSS allegedly told Aziza that the meeting would be taped, a transcription of which would then form the basis of a letter that would be delivered to the MFA, possibly accusing the United States of meddling in internal Uzbek affairs. The NSS reportedly told her that if she cooperates with them, they would ensure that her husband would be amnestied or at least would be transferred to a prison with better conditions. They also allegedly warned her that if she did not cooperate, they would ensure that her husband would be sent to the Jaslyk prison in Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan's most notorious prison). After talking with Aziza, the mutual acquaintance then warned the PAS FSN, who subsequently informed Emboffs. The PAS FSN, the mutual acquaintance, and Dadahanov had all attended the same Turkish-Uzbek high school in the 1990s (reftel). ¶12. (S/NF) On March 11, Aziza attempted but failed several times to get in contact with the PAS FSN. On March 12, she directly called poloff to request a meeting outside of the Embassy to discuss her husband's case. When poloff suggested that they meet inside the Embassy and that the Ambassador would also be interested TASHKENT 00000449 004 OF 005 in meeting with her at the Embassy, Aziza explained she was afraid to come to the Embassy. Aziza said she would "think it over" and call poloff back (Comment: We suspect that Aziza felt she needed to clear any meeting at the Embassy with the NSS first. End comment.) After trading a few more phone calls, Aziza eventually stopped calling poloff. WITNESS IN NUR CASE ALSO TRIES TO MEET WITH POLOFF -------------- -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) On March 24, a different PAS FSN reported being contacted by Khamza Jumaev, a well-known television journalist who served as a witness in the trial against Dadahanov and other suspected Nur members. Jumaev requested that the PAS FSN set up a meeting with poloff. While he has not been charged with any crime so far, Jumaev told the FSN that he was worried that he could still be charged with Nur membership. He allegedly wanted to ask poloff's advice about whom to hire as a defense attorney, as he reported having difficulty finding an attorney who was willing to represent him on his own. On March 25, Jumaev directly contacted poloff and asked to meet with him outside of the Embassy. When poloff asked Jumaev to come to the Embassy for a meeting, Jumaev reported he was afraid to come to the Embassy. Like Aziza, Jumaev said he would "think about it" and call poloff back. So far, Jumaev has not contacted poloff again (Comment: Given the similarities in the cases, we believe the NSS likely attempted to have Jumaev arrange a meeting with poloff after he did not meet with Aziza. End comment.) PAS FSN CALLED IN BY NSS -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) The PAS FSN who was contacted by Jumaev was also called in for questioning by the NSS on March 20, who told her that they were investigating whether the FSN and her husband had completed their government service obligation for the former "Umid" Scholarship Program. Under the program, which was ended in the 1990s, the Uzbek government paid for Uzbek students to study abroad, who were then obligated to work for the government for five years upon completion of the program. Over the past several years, authorities have harassed several FSN who are alumni of the program by accusing them of not completing their service obligation and threatening them with having to pay back the full cost of their education abroad. The PAS FSN also had previously been visited at home by a NSS official after meeting with Jumaev earlier this year (reftel). COMMENT -------------- ¶15. (S/NF) It is impossible for us to confirm that these incidents are related and that any of the individuals were instructed by the NSS to seek meetings with poloff. However, the timing of events TASHKENT 00000449 005 OF 005 suggests repeated attempts by the NSS to arrange meetings for poloff outside of the Embassy with "enemies of the people," which could then be taped. Poloff will be departing post in May, so the NSS could be looking to discredit him without resorting to PNG tactics, thereby complicating things for his successors. The ultimate motive of the NSS is unclear, though such efforts are likely aimed at discrediting poloff, who publicly reports on abuses in Uzbekistan (including those committed by NSS officers) through the annual U.S. State Department human rights reports, in the eyes of higher-level Uzbek government officials. We also cannot dismiss the possibility that such efforts are organized by elements within the security services that seek to disrupt further improvement in relations between Uzbekistan and the United States. In addition, it is also possible that the NSS is deliberately seeking to feed poloff damaging information regarding Uzbekistan's human rights record, knowing that such information could then be reported publicly, further disrupting relations. Such efforts are nothing new: poloff and his predecessors long have been singled out for criticisms by Uzbek officials, including by President Karimov, with periodic hints of expulsion, suggesting that previous meetings Emboffs have held outside the Embassy with human rights and religious contacts also have been taped. ¶16. (S/NF) The incidents also highlight the difficulty of conducting human rights reporting and advocacy in environments like Uzbekistan. Ironically, the more aggressive Emboffs are in investigating alleged human rights abuses, the more opportunity we provide to the security services to twist the intent of our work in the eyes of the country's leadership. ¶17. (S/NF) Our first priority remains the protection of the Embassy's local employees. RSO has been alerted about these incidents, and we have instructed all FSNs to keep us informed if they are approached by the NSS again. NORLAND

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