Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT423
2009-04-01 09:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues

Tags:  PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ 
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RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNT #0423/01 0910911
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 010911Z APR 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0673
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0005
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000423 

SIPDIS SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEES)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues

REF: TASHKENT 200

TASHKENT 00000423 001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON:
1.4(B),(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TASHKENT 000423 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDRESSEES) E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-04-01 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC ENRG PTER PINS ECON SENV KTIA UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: MFA Discusses Regional Security, Economic Issues REF: TASHKENT 200 TASHKENT 00000423 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Steven Prohaska, Second Secretary, P/E Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Uzbekistan's Acting Americas Department Chief at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared his views of a wide range of regional security and economic issues in a recent meeting with us. His remarks tracked closely with comments we have recently heard from GOU officials--Uzbekistan remains concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and skeptical of its government, while supportive of U.S. and NATO efforts to promote regional security. Uzbekistan also has no plans to participate in the CSTO's Rapid Reaction Forces. On energy, Uzbekistan welcomes proposals for pipelines that bypass Russia in order to promote Uzbekistan's national interests and sovereignty. Mamadjanov expressed hope that continued dialogue with the United States could spur trade and deeper economc ties, citing General Motors' operations in Uzbekistan as a model for others to follow. He also expressed concern about the potential for "double standards" to be applied to Uzbekistan on human rights and democracy, but stated his interest in U.S. support on democratization and civil society. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a meeting with Poloffs on March 23, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Acting Americas Department Chief Takhir Mamadjanov echoed a number of familiar GOU positions in a wide-ranging discussion of regional security and economic issues. Mamadjanov described the relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan as improving and asserted that it would continue to improve in the future. He noted Uzbekistan's particular interest in cooperation on promoting regional security and stability, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and combating organized crime and narcotrafficking. Uzbekistan is optimistic about the new administration in the United States and was pleased by recent positive statements (he did not specify which) from the U.S. Still Concerned About Afghanistan, Supportive of
NATO-US Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Mamadjanov noted that Afghanistan is Uzbekistan's greatest security concern, and he expressed disappointment with the current situation there. He lamented that the positive results achieved during the past eight years of the Coalition's presence have been insufficient. The Government of Afghanistan lacks the support of the local population and is corrupt, while ordinary Afghans see little of the significant material assistance the international community provides to Afghanistan. Moreover, Coalition forces undertake certain measures without taking into account local traditions and have not made socioeconomic issues a high enough priority, he claimed. Mamadjanov acknowledged that the United States and Uzbekistan do not see eye-to-eye on the "6 plus 3" proposal that President Karimov had espoused at the NATO Summit in Bucharest last April. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan will continue to support NATO's efforts in the region and welcomes the transit of non-lethal NATO and U.S. shipments across Uzbekistan's territory. Uzbekistan also welcomes new ideas and approaches from the United States on Afghanistan. Uzbekistan's "Special Opinion" on CSTO -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Though Uzbekistan signed an agreement related to the Collective Security Treaty Organization's Rapid Reaction Forces (CSTO RRF),Uzbekistan had attached a "special opinion" to the agreement, Mamadjanov continued. He emphasized that Uzbekistan's view on the RRF differs from that of other CSTO members. Mamadjanov indicated that Uzbekistan has no plans to participate in the Rapid Reaction Forces, but did not close the door to this entirely, suggesting that "if there is an urgent need, we'll be ready to participate." Interest in a Mutually Acceptable Solution on Water Usage -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Mamadjanov asserted that all decisions on the use of transboundary water from Amu Darya and Syra Darya be based on the consent of all affected countries and should be consistent with TASHKENT 00000423 002.2 OF 004 United Nations principles on the use of water. Furthermore, ecological effects should be taken into account. Uzbekistan continues to oppose attempts to build large-scale hydropower stations upstream, and Mamadjanov expressed concern about there being insufficient water to support Uzbekistan's agricultural needs. Citing UN-affiliated experts, Mamadjanov asserted that these projects can damage the environment of the region. "If independent experts conclude that there is no threat to the environment, we'll be ready to support such projects," he said. Energy Policy and Foreign Economic Relations -------------- -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Uzbekistan does not export oil, but exports about 40 percent of its natural gas. (Comment: If Mamadjanov's figure correctly reflects current GOU gas export policy, this marks yet another uptick in the proportion of natural gas that Uzbekistan exports, reftel. End comment.) Mamadjanov said that the GOU is ready to consider any alternate routes for exporting natural gas, with an eye toward a proposed route's economic benefits. (Comment: He launched into a clearly well-prepared statement in response to a broader question about global energy demand trends that had not mentioned pipelines, suggesting that he was looking for an opportunity to deliver pre-cleared talking points emphasizing Uzbekistan's willingness to consider pipeline routes that bypass Russia. End comment.) For the time being there is only one (major) export route in place--the northern route through Russia--but additional routes are in Uzbekistan's interest because they increase the country's independence. Uzbekistan is interested in having relations with many partners to avoid dependence on one country, he continued. He stated repeatedly that Uzbekistan is open to all pipeline proposals and is willing to study each of them. Uzbekistan would pay particular attention to proposals' economic benefits to the country, but would also look for ways to make projects generate acceptable returns for investors. Furthermore, the GOU prefers to use "civilized" means to make agreements and aims to establish mutually beneficial terms. Mamadjanov asserted that Uzbekistan's location at the heart of Central Asia makes the development of any other route through the region impossible without Uzbekistan's support. ¶7. (C) He expressed satisfaction with the prices Uzbekistan receives for its natural gas exports to Russia, which he described as based on market prices. Mamadjanov declined to comment further on the recent gas price negotiations or prospects for future negotiations beyond stating simply that Uzbekistan's prices would reflect world prices. ¶8. (C) On specific projects, he noted that Uzbekistan had agreed to increase the capacity of the Central Asia-Centre pipeline. Uzbekistan had also agreed to allow Turkmenistan to ship gas destined for China through Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan will derive benefits simply for allowing the use of its territory for the transit of Turkmenistan's gas, but Uzbekistan will consider exporting some of its own gas via that route if the project proves successful. Mamadjanov called Nabucco "just an idea," and said that no one had pursued steps to make it a concrete project--questions about who will build it and who will finance it remain unanswered. ¶9. (C) Russia is Uzbekistan's primary economic partner, with trade turnover exceeding four billion USD per year, Mamadjanov noted. Uzbekistan and Russia cooperate on over 800 joint ventures, and some 300 Uzbek enterprises are operating in Russia. Russia is continuing to invest in Uzbekistan, and the GOU has not observed any interruptions in its trade or economic relations with Russia. He said that both countries are observing and implementing their long-term economic agreements. Domestic Effects of the Global Financial Crisis -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Mamadjanov stated that Uzbekistan's economy does not depend TASHKENT 00000423 003.2 OF 004 on energy exports alone, in contrast to some other energy-producing countries. Uzbekistan has been working toward a balanced, diversified economy by developing several sectors simultaneously. He said that such efforts had helped to insulate Uzbekistan from the worst effects of the global financial crisis because Uzbekistan had invested money in diversification while other countries had invested too much money in "speculative investments and short-term projects." He acknowledged that Uzbekistan is not entirely insulated against the effects of the global crisis because it is part of the world, and anything that affects the country's partners will have an indirect effect on Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan is thus taking "concrete steps" to protect itself from the effects of the financial crisis. He also asserted that Uzbekistan being closed to speculative capital is not such a bad thing for the country. (Comment: Though Mamadjanov did not seem troubled by the effect of the global financial crisis on Uzbekistan, other sources suggest that this is an issue of growing concern for Uzbekistan. MFA recently delivered a copy of President Karimov's most recent book--which addresses the crisis and steps Uzbekistan must take to deal with it--to us. We also have obtained a copy of the agenda for the recent Eighteenth Plenary Session of the Senate of the Oliy Majlis--it lists "On the roles of local authorities for unconditional fulfillment of the anticrisis program 2009-2012" as its lead item. End note.) Hoping to Rejuvenate the Bilateral Relationship -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Mamadjanov said that he hoped Uzbekistan's relationship with the United States will be restored to its previous level of closeness. (Comment: Though he stated, in traditional GOU parlance, that this should happen "step-by-step" to restore trust and openness. End comment.) He also hoped to spur trade and economic ties. He praised the operations of General Motors (GM) in Uzbekistan in particular, citing this as an example for other investment projects and business operators to emulate. Mamadjanov also said that the bilateral relationship should not be subjected to "double standards" as far as human rights and democracy are concerned, and he hoped that these issues would not create obstacles to the bilateral relationship. He hoped that the U.S. would take a pragmatic and objective stance on these issues, taking into account local "realities" in the region. Mamadjanov also expressed interest in U.S. support for further work on democratization and civil society in the country, including U.S. assistance on drafting legislation. He described direct contact as key to reestablishing the relationship, noting that all too often, relationships could sour because of misunderstandings or due to "information from other sources." Comment: -------------- ¶12. (C) Mamadjanov's positive tone and his call for direct contact and engagement are encouraging. Embassy LES Political Assistant has described him as a cautious and career-oriented man, suggesting that many of his comments had been blessed by more senior leadership in the GOU prior to this meeting. Biographic Note: -------------- ¶13. (C) Takhir Mamadjanov, Acting Chief of the Americas Department at MFA, is an ethnic Uzbek who was born in Ferghana Province and graduated from the Tashkent Institute of Foreign Languages. His position at MFA between 2004 and 2006 is unknown. He served as Uzbekistan's Ambassador to France from 1997 until 2003 (he often uses French during interactions with Ambassador Norland). Mamadjanov also was a senior consultant in the Presidential Apparat from 1995 until 1997, and served in various capacities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1987 and 1995. According to Embassy LES Political Assistant, Mamadjanov is from a powerful Tashkent clan (though he was born in Ferghana Province),and his career benefited from the influence of a relative in the Government of Uzbekistan who had handled personnel assignments. Mamadjanov TASHKENT 00000423 004.3 OF 004 rose quickly through the ranks. Embassy LES noted that later on, however, clan rivalries resulted in the ouster of Mamadjanov's relative as well as Mamadjanov's recall from France and demotion to his current position. The GOU has failed to confirm Mamadjanov in his post for the past three years. NORLAND

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