Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09TASHKENT345
2009-03-23 11:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:
Uzbekistan: Timing is Not Conducive for Demarche on
how-toVZCZCXRO7017 RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHNT #0345 0821115 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 231119Z MAR 09 FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0645 INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE CIS COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0004 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0003 RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 0154 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000345
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Timing is Not Conducive for Demarche on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
REF: A.) STATE 24186; B.) 08 TASHKENT 1029; C.) 08 TASHKENT 1420
D.) TASHKENT 108; E.) TASHKENT 183
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy P Buckley, Second Secretary; REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000345
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Timing is Not Conducive for Demarche on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
REF: A.) STATE 24186; B.) 08 TASHKENT 1029; C.) 08 TASHKENT 1420
D.) TASHKENT 108; E.) TASHKENT 183
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy P Buckley, Second Secretary; REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)
1. (C) Post determined that it would be counterproductive to
deliver ref A demarche to the Government of Uzbekistan encouraging
it to resist signs of de facto recognition for Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. Uzbekistan has to date consistently resisted strong
Russian pressure to recognize both breakaway republics, including
at the SCO summit in Dushanbe last year and separate visits to
Tashkent by both Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry
Medvedev (refs B - D). Uzbekistan already sees itself as in a very
delicate position in balancing relations with Russia. We believe
Uzbekistan would resent any further pressure from the U.S. on the
issue, especially regarding the travel of its officials stationed
in Moscow, which would prompt complaints of U.S. meddling in its
bilateral affairs. The demarche could also lead Uzbekistan to
conclude that it enjoys added leverage over the U.S. at a time when
we are already working hard to dispel the notion that our need for
Afghan transit networks trumps other interests.
2. (C) We do not believe that Uzbekistan will recognize either
breakaway republic -- nor will it recognize Kosovo (ref E) -- since
authorities are concerned about ethnic divisions and borders in
Central Asia itself.
NORLAND
SIPDIS
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PASS TO AMCONSUL HYDERABAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018-12-22
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan: Timing is Not Conducive for Demarche on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia
REF: A.) STATE 24186; B.) 08 TASHKENT 1029; C.) 08 TASHKENT 1420
D.) TASHKENT 108; E.) TASHKENT 183
CLASSIFIED BY: Timothy P Buckley, Second Secretary; REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)
1. (C) Post determined that it would be counterproductive to
deliver ref A demarche to the Government of Uzbekistan encouraging
it to resist signs of de facto recognition for Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. Uzbekistan has to date consistently resisted strong
Russian pressure to recognize both breakaway republics, including
at the SCO summit in Dushanbe last year and separate visits to
Tashkent by both Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry
Medvedev (refs B - D). Uzbekistan already sees itself as in a very
delicate position in balancing relations with Russia. We believe
Uzbekistan would resent any further pressure from the U.S. on the
issue, especially regarding the travel of its officials stationed
in Moscow, which would prompt complaints of U.S. meddling in its
bilateral affairs. The demarche could also lead Uzbekistan to
conclude that it enjoys added leverage over the U.S. at a time when
we are already working hard to dispel the notion that our need for
Afghan transit networks trumps other interests.
2. (C) We do not believe that Uzbekistan will recognize either
breakaway republic -- nor will it recognize Kosovo (ref E) -- since
authorities are concerned about ethnic divisions and borders in
Central Asia itself.
NORLAND