MFA Drubbing Over Tadjibayeva Award

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000281 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-03-13 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UZ SUBJECT: MFA Drubbing Over Tadjibayeva Award CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Uzbek Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov convoked the Ambassador on March 13 to convey GOU displeasure over the March 11 International Women of Courage Award for Mutabar Tadjibayeva. Delivering in an icy tone a message that likely came on instruction from President Karimov, Norov said that giving this award was not in keeping with the spirit of cooperation of General Petraeus' recent visit. He said that the GOU had hoped for better from Secretary Clinton, but it now seemed apparent that the "Rice policy" would continue, asking if the next step would be a Nobel Prize for jailed oppositionist Sanjar Umarov. ¶2. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the GOU's release of Tadjibayeva last year had sent a positive signal and this award should be viewed in that context. He also raised with Norov the recent CNN report on Abdul Dadahanov, the former exchange student currently jailed in Uzbekistan, saying that human rights continues to be an important part of the bilateral relationship and that such stories are extremely unhelpful for those who would like to see a more constructive relationship with Uzbekistan. Norov, for his part, seemed to have none of it, saying that every country has people in prison and, alluding to Uzbekistan's moderate incarceration rate, added that it was perfectly normal for a country of 27 million to have people in prison. Norov concluded the meeting by saying to the Ambassador, "you are free to go" and left without shaking hands. Comment -------------- ¶3. (C) Norov did not specify what consequences this incident may have and we can largely speculate at this juncture. This is yet another reminder (if we needed one) of how sensitive this regime is to criticism or even the slightest act that it may interpret as meddling in its internal affairs. If today's drubbing does not result in an outright set back, we can expect that it will at least earn us the "silent treatment" from the Uzbeks in the near term. We have a number of important issues on the table right now, including the Afghanistan transit (NDN) framework, the return of DEA and a DTRA visit that gets under way next week. Our recommendation, particularly on Afghanistan transit, is that we not approach the GOU immediately. At the very least, the atmosphere has been soured and we will need to let Karimov's pique pass. ¶4. (C) It is our hope that the GOU understands sufficiently the importance of stability in Afghanistan from the perspective of its own national security not to make problems for us on transit. Nevertheless, rationality cannot be taken for granted in Tashkent. The mercurial nature of this regime underscores the value of taking the long view on Uzbekistan and working to establish a structured dialogue that would enable us to engage on these sensitive issues. NORLAND