UZBEKISTAN: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING THE USE OF CHILD LABOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 001966 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ECON PHUM SOCI SENV UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING THE USE OF CHILD LABOR IN THE COTTON HARVEST REF: 1567; 1547; 1511; ASTANA 1953 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: This USAID-drafted cable examines strategies for addressing the problem of child labor in the cotton sector in Uzbekistan. (Please see Ref A for an analysis of the cotton sector overall and a specific look at this year's harvest.) Uzbekistan's cotton economy remains state-driven and little changed from Soviet times. As a consequence, usual market signals are absent. Furthermore, societal attitudes and structures in rural areas of the country place a great emphasis on collectivism, where the participation of children in the family economy is not viewed in a negative light, and, indeed, can represent a vital supplement to a family's income. Efforts to address the problem of child labor need to focus both on encouraging structural reform in the agricultural sector as a whole and on influencing attitudes more generally. Additionally, mechanization can play a role in reducing the dependence on manual labor during the cotton harvest. There are some indications that the Uzbek government is already taking steps in this direction. The international community, through the UN and the U.S. (through USAID),can play an important role in helping Uzbekistan rationalize its agricultural sector and, eventually, eliminate the use of child labor. There may be a dimension involving efforts to revive the Aral Sea. This effort will need to be a cooperative, long-term strategy that takes account of local sensitivities and avoids trying to isolate the Uzbeks over this issue. It will also require a sustained financial commitment. END SUMMARY. COTTON REMAINS THE KEYSTONE OF AGRICULTURE ¶2. (SBU) Uzbekistan is the fourth-largest cotton producer in the world. As the central export crop, cotton accounts for roughly 12% of all exports and 7-8% of the country's GDP. Although cotton has been planted in Uzbekistan since the late 1800's, greater attention has been paid to Uzbekistan's cotton harvest recently due to concerns about the use of child labor. For decades, each autumn, schoolchildren, university students, rural inhabitants, and government workers throughout the country have been mobilized for two to six weeks to pick cotton. The use of children in the harvest is rooted in practices set up during the Soviet era, but perpetuated by laws and practices that force farmers to meet strict cotton quotas, the overdependence of the Uzbekistan economy on one crop, the depressed economic climate, and the cultural significance of the harvest. Eliminating the use of child labor in the cotton harvest will require sustained and well-designed programs to address these underlying factors. COTTON CULTIVATION TIGHTLY CONTROLLED ¶3. (SBU) After the fall of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan undertook agrarian reforms that restructured the collective farms into standalone plots that farmers could rent from the state for private use. Although the new laws created individual household farms, these private farms did not replace the previous system, making the new farms parallel institutions. As a result, private farmers remained under the control of local elites (from whom inputs such as seed and fertilizer are obtained),crops to meet state quotas were still sold to the government at fixed prices, and the economy remained dependent on cotton as a major export crop. ¶4. (SBU) This legal structure and its associated trade mechanisms are reinforced by a pricing system that puts a premium on generating output to meet state-set quotas imposed on a national, provincial, district and even local farm level, often without regard to varying degrees of soil fertility throughout the country. As a result, the farming collective will put pressure on its members and on subcontracting household farms to maximize cotton output to fulfill the quota, thus reinforcing the tendency toward monoculture and stifling initiatives to diversify or find niche outputs other than for private consumption. TASHKENT 00001966 002 OF 005 GOU OFFICIALLY DENOUNCES CHILD LABOR ¶5. (SBU) In 1992, Uzbekistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Last year, on September 12, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a resolution on the implementation of two ILO conventions against child labor that the GOU had signed earlier in the year (ILO Convention 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment and ILO Convention 192 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor). The GOU has also formulated a national action plan to carry out the ILO Conventions, but implementation of this action plan is still nascent. Also at the national level, a landmark law "On the Guarantees of the Rights of the Child" was introduced in 2008 and a Children's Ombudsman was established. These laws ostensibly prevent the use of child labor in the cotton industry, and the GOU claims to be enforcing these laws, as evinced by reported dismissals of hokims (governors) who used child labor in their districts. Post continues, however, to receive reports of some school districts mobilizing children to help meet quotas at local farms. DE-MECHANIZATION AND RE-MECHANIZATION IN UZBEKISTAN'S COTTON INDUSTRY ¶6. (SBU) Following independence, the Soviet-era mechanization of Uzbekistan's cotton industry collapsed, as machines became unserviceable and funds for repairing and replenishing machine-parts disappeared. Consequently, harvesting practices reverted to their pre-Soviet state, where they have languished ever since. ¶7. (SBU) While mechanization was used in Uzbekistan in the past, a return to mechanization will require costly complementary adjustments, including the development of simultaneously ripening strains, the straightening of furrows and planting rows in the fields, and the application of herbicides and defoliants. Without these prerequisite conditions, the efficacy of the equipment is reduced. Moreover, using mechanized harvesters has meant the application of defoliants; problems with the availability of foreign exchange to procure appropriate defoliants means that many farmers do not have the resources to purchase these required inputs (even if the local elites make such chemicals available). ¶8. (SBU) In 1995, a push to re-mechanize cotton harvesting began as the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources directed local farm machinery maker Tashkentselmash to provide extra harvesters. A year later, Case Corporation announced plans to establish a joint-venture with the GOU to assemble cotton harvesters in Tashkent to be ready in time for the 1997 harvest. In 1997, Case shipped $80 million worth of equipment to Uzbekistan to launch 13 service centers for agricultural equipment throughout the country. These service centers remain in operation; in April 2009, Case New Holland announced it had established new agreements with the GOU to begin production of tractors and to refurbish the service centers set up 12 years earlier. In addition to production and service, Case New Holland offers options for farmers to lease equipment, including harvesters and other agricultural equipment. ¶9. (SBU) The GOU appears to be headed once again towards mechanization and recently passed a resolution to re-equip four enterprises that produce agricultural equipment at a cost of $26 million. One of the firms, Technolog, will produce about 100 harvesters in 2009. There are concerns that the effort to quickly re-start the industrial production of harvesters will compromise the quality of the machines. Nevertheless, the machines priced at $16,000 are cheap compared to those produced elsewhere but still too expensive for most individual farmers to purchase and a collective approach would likely be taken. PROSPECTS FOR ENDING HAND-PICKING OF COTTON TASHKENT 00001966 003 OF 005 ¶10. (SBU) At present, power structures in rural areas prevent farmers from making personal decisions about what to grow; this intimidation is manifest in the control over resources and inputs provided to farmers - a few decision-makers have the potential to ruin the livelihoods of individuals who do not comply. Compounding these problems is the lack of a financial system where farmers can acquire loans to circumvent the control over resources exercised by local elites. As a result, initiatives to fight the problem of child labor in cotton harvesting must address traditional power structures that reinforce the current system. SHORT TERM INTITIAVES TO COMBAT CHILD LABOR ¶11. (SBU) Preventing the use of child labor should focus on supporting the efforts of the UN (led by UNICEF) to engage cooperatively with the GOU in order to help the GOU meet its obligations under international conventions. The first step should be to try to meet with decision-makers at ministerial levels (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection) to discuss mutually beneficial ways to address the issue of child labor and to enforce existing laws. Secondly, economic groups, such as the Center for Economic Research, should be consulted to identify trends in the cotton industry and determine how to maximize yields through provision of equipment, transfer of technology, and improvement of infrastructure. Thirdly, USAID should determine whether the World Bank's pilot program to provide funding for farm equipment to farmers who agree not to employ child labor is working. Fourth, USAID should investigate ways in which the U.S. and other nations might support mechanization of cotton harvesting in Uzbekistan. ¶12. (SBU) USAID will soon be launching the Local and Regional Development Initiative (LRDI) to improve public services, safeguard natural resources, enhance effective use of water and repair infrastructure through capacity building for local officials and through block grants. Expanding the regional LRDI program (whose budget for Uzbekistan is only 1/12 of the total budget for the regional program despite Uzbekistan's large population) to address issues such as alternatives to child labor through use of mechanization and improved resources management can be a quick win for both the GOU and the USG on this issue. However, greater funds must be made available for activities like LRDI. ¶13. (SBU) These initial steps will provide a framework for moving forward on the issue and help all parties to extend responsibility for ending the use of children in the cotton harvest from the upper levels of government to the hokimyat (provincial) level. Involvement of Uzbek government officials at all levels will be critical to reducing the problem, beginning with clear instructions from the top. Close coordination with the UN in this process is essential. LONG-TERM INITITATIVES ¶14. (SBU) Over the long-term, working with the UN, the USG should consider how to address the interlinked socio-economic, political and cultural issues that underlie the use of children in harvesting. These initiatives should leverage the existing work of USAID, while providing the necessary funding and support to promote a diversified agricultural base, an appropriate policy framework, and community-level support for sustainability. AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION ¶15. (SBU) Cotton has been the keystone of the Uzbekistan economy for generations; moving away from this crop will require sustained support in terms of technical assistance, provision of equipment and facilities, and transfer of technology. The climate of Uzbekistan makes the country an optimal place for growing fruits and vegetables; however, farmers are not effectively connected to processors, traders and export markets. Improving the value chain TASHKENT 00001966 004 OF 005 by training farmers, establishing facilities for storage and processing, and developing linkages with markets will not only lessen the reliance of the country on cotton as its main crop, but also heighten the resiliency of Uzbekistan's economy. This diversification can be the engine for sustained economic growth in Uzbekistan, contributing to improved social and economic stability. ¶16. (SBU) To achieve such diversification, the USG should expand programs like the Agricultural Linkages (AgLinks) program and invest in community-based groups such as Water User Associations. Currently, under AgLinks, USAID is establishing value chains for stone fruits and grapes. The program stimulates linkages between market-driven producers, for-profit agri-business intermediaries, and private wholesalers, processors and retailers of agricultural products. The project also cooperates with private agro-processors for specific crops while identifying potential market outlets for sale of produce. Improving the export potential of agricultural products while enhancing the capacity of groups such as Water Users Associations can build the economy while empowering farmers to advocate for the best use of land. ¶17. (SBU) A factor is any long-term approach to the cotton issue should be prospects for restoring the Aral Sea, whose gradual disappearance over the past decades has been closely linked to cotton production and wasteful irrigation practices. Until recently, experts had given up on the idea of restoring the Aral Sea. However, as reported in Ref D (Astana 1953),it appears the Kazakhs are having some success in restoring the northern portion of the Aral Sea back to life for fishing purposes. This leaves a southern portion in Uzbekistan whose "eastern basin" is considered too far gone to revive but whose "western basin" some experts believe could be brought back to life. This could be hugely expensive but would almost certainly involve reducing Uzbekistan's dependence on cotton production as part of the economy - and lessen the use of child labor. Because reviving the Aral Sea has broader implications as well with respect to climate change, it could be that U.S. interests on multiple issues will be advanced by exploring prospects for a broad international effort to revive the western basin of the Aral Sea. NECESSARY POLICY REFORMS ¶18. (SBU) Advocacy for policy reform must cover both economics and agriculture. Although engaging the GOU on policy reforms will be a long, delicate process and will require sustained funding, there have been recent successes in pushing for reform. First, the USG should look for ways to quietly support farmer groups, private entrepreneurs and associations as they engage in policy advocacy with key government agencies (such as with the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, the Ministry of Trade, and the Customs Department) on issues related to agricultural and trade policy. Second, the USG should encourage the Uzbek parliament and others in authority to review the institutions that allow local elites to control key resources and revitalize the reform process that started during independence. Transforming the system whereby local decision-makers provide inputs to farmers and promise to meet demanding quotas to one where farmers make choices about planting will eventually contribute to the diversification of the agricultural base while making space for private enterprise. Third, changes in the financial products and services available to farmers would help to encourage diversification and increase innovation and crop yields. Complementary activities in microfinance can assist rural residents in filling gaps in agricultural inputs, while also helping farmers to purchase technology and equipment. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN REFORMS ¶19. (SBU) Initiatives should consider the economic circumstances in the country that preclude immediate changes to systems and policies. At the same time, actions should address the entrenched cultural significance of the cotton harvest. For generations, children have taken part in the harvest and there have been several campaigns trumpeting the need for everyone to "do their share." TASHKENT 00001966 005 OF 005 The general attitude about cotton is not one that policy changes or provision of inputs can diminish: there should to be a cognitive/behavioral replacement for the cultural meaning attached to the cotton harvest. Initiatives should incorporate changing of attitudes about the practice on a broad scale while also offering economic alternatives and cultural substitutions. ¶20. (SBU) Interventions of this type have been successful in ending harmful traditional practices (e.g. FGM, early marriage) in different countries (at relatively low cost); however, they are only one central piece of the larger socio-economic and political equation. It is not sufficient to have a policy in place; there has to be a practical way for the policy to be enforced which can involve the different actors who perpetuate the practice. Community involvement would engage parents, teachers, hokims, mahallahs (neighborhood councils) and other community institutions to determine the most appropriate way to confront the problem of child labor and develop viable alternatives. One of the sharpest issues to tackle will be the notion that any shift to mechanization will deprive farming families of the small but important additions to their income that come from each family member who picks cotton being paid for it by the kilo. DONOR RESPONSE ¶21. (SBU) Various donors to Uzbekistan have attempted to tackle different parts of the child labor issue: the World Bank has pledged to provide financing to farmers; UNICEF has begun work with local government structures (including the development of community action plans to respond to the needs of children) and is advocating for the rights of children; and the Asian Development Bank is supporting agricultural reforms and infrastructural rehabilitation. The USG must become better aware of the efforts of other donors and identify how to use its technical development expertise and capacity to help the UN develop and present to the GOU a holistic approach to improving the cotton industry and transforming agricultural practices. Regular coordination on programs with donors and the GOU is vital to the initiation of any activity to address child labor. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ¶22. (SBU) Significantly reducing the number of children involved in the cotton harvest cannot be accomplished overnight, and it cannot be achieved without concerted effort and dedicated financial resources of the USG and others in the international community. This problem also cannot be addressed solely by mechanization. The USG should work closely with the UN and Uzbek counterparts to devise strategies and systems to confront the problem. At the same time, putting greater resources towards USAID programs that work on local governance (i.e. LRDI) and agricultural productivity/diversity (i.e. AgLinks) will offer quick wins while providing a strong basis for reforms at the systemic, political and institutional levels requisite for lasting change. NORLAND