UZBEKISTAN: GOU PROPOSAL ON TERMEZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001639

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MARR UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: GOU PROPOSAL ON TERMEZ

REF: STATE DEPARTMENT UZBEK DESK EMAIL TO TASHKENT 12/23 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Robert McCutcheon, Econ Officer, State, Pol/Econ
Office; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D)


1. (C) Summary. An apparent Uzbek offer of troop transit to
Afghanistan via Termez warrants close attention. It is not
inconsistent with the gradual improvement in relations across the
board, including on human rights, outlined in last week's political
consultations with Foreign Minister Norov in Washington. But the
proposal would require negotiation not just with the Uzbeks but
also with the Germans, who use Termez. And since the prime
motivation for the proposal appears to be President Karimov's pique
with the Russians, we suspect further elucidation would be required
to confirm that it represents a solid option for the U.S. Still,
this is worth looking into. End Summary.




2. (C) Per Ref A (notal),Embassy understands that the Uzbek
Embassy in Washington submitted to the State Department a
diplomatic note dated Dec. 21 containing a proposed agreement to
offer the U.S. (along with Germany) air transit rights and
facilities at Termez to assist with the deployment of U.S. forces
to ISAF in Afghanistan, apparently in support of the 30,000
additional troops ordered in by President Obama. The proposed
agreement would involve transit of personnel only, not lethal
materiel; would set strict limits on the number of flights; would
stipulate some degree of involvement with the Uzbek commercial air
hub at Navoi; and would involve an undetermined price tag to be
negotiated separately.


3. (C) The proposed agreement comes as a surprise. Foreign
Minister Norov did not remotely allude to such an offer in his
meetings with senior U.S. officials during the U.S.-Uzbekistan
Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC) process launched in Washington
Dec. 17-18. Indeed, Norov seemed eager to dispel any public notion
that basing might have been discussed during those talks.
Likewise, the senior Americas Division official in the Uzbek MFA,
who also took part in the ABC consultations in Washington,
professed (convincingly) on Dec. 23 to be totally unaware that this
proposed agreement had been conveyed to the State Department.


4. (C) The German Embassy here has been speculating for some
weeks that the Uzbeks were preparing to make an offer of this
nature, but the Uzbeks themselves had heretofore not broached this
with us. German Ambassador Wolfgang Neuen told the Ambassador Dec.
23 that he had discussed the matter the same day with President
Karimov while presenting his credentials. Karimov had reportedly
offered a "bilateral" (sic) agreement on use of Termez and seemed
eager to support ISAF and the renewed U.S. commitment in
Afghanistan (Comment: Uzbek officials will no doubt glumly have to
inform their President that the text of the proposed agreement in
fact outlines a trilateral arrangement. End Comment.).


5. (C) The timing of this proposal -- the diplomatic note was
delivered to State Department on Dec. 21 -- coincides with the
visit of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to Tashkent on Dec. 21-22.
Given Uzbek perceptions of Russian "pressure," including reported
Russian interest in establishing a military facility in Osh,
Kyrgyzstan or some other Central Asian location in part to counter
the American military presence at Manas, it is possible that the
Uzbek proposal to allow us to use Termez is intended as much to
signal Tashkent's displeasure with Moscow as it is to make a
genuine offer to the U.S. Still, Termez in many ways offers a
technically and politically viable way of augmenting our troop
presence in Afghanistan, and we should treat this proposal as a
serious one.


6. (C) Politically, using Termez would have advantages for the
U.S. It is less high-profile than Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) and would
carry much less political baggage. Termez is already used by
German military transports, and while having U.S. aircraft land
there would be a significant ramping up of our presence in
Uzbekistan, it would not be the same as creating a new U.S. "base"
but rather would constitute a marginal additional use by NATO
aircraft of a facility that already supports UN mandated efforts in
Afghanistan. As stipulated by the Uzbeks, use of these facilities
would be limited both in terms of quantity of flights and in
quality of cargo -- non-lethal only. For their part, the Uzbeks

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would be taking a risk in raising their profile vis-C -vis the
Taliban by allowing the U.S. to use Termez, but not so much as if
they allowed us to go back into K-2 (which is unlikely).


7. (C) There are some technical considerations that go along with
Termez as well. First and foremost, it is not clear that the
Germans would welcome sharing the facility with the Americans. It
has limited ramp space and would, according to the German
Ambassador, require expansion (note: Amb. Neuen, who served in
Tajikistan some years ago, made a personal pitch for the old
airfield at Kulyob in Tajikistan as a more suitable facility).
Ambassador Neuen recommended that if the U.S. is seriously
interested in the Uzbek offer of Termez, DOD should approach the
German DATT in Washington to discuss the matter. The German
Defense Attache tells us that only eight C-160's can park at Termez
at one time, and that the runway cannot handle C-17's or C-5
aircraft. Significant capital improvements would be required to
facilitate expanded operations, according to the Germans.


8. (C) The bottom line from our perspective in Tashkent is that
the Uzbek offer of limited use of Termez to augment and sustain our
forces in Afghanistan is one we should explore further as a
potentially important piece of the larger transit framework needed
to support the deployment of 30,000 more troops within a fairly
short period of time. To be sure, there would be issues along the
way. Negotiating a final agreement with the Uzbeks would not be
easy, and there could be friction with the Germans too. In
addition, we could expect criticism from some on the Hill and in
the human rights community, who remain rightly concerned about the
situation in Uzbekistan. Still, Termez offers a modest step
forward in engagement that could not only help us on Afghanistan
but could also fuel the improvement in U.S.-Uzbek relations that
was crystallized in last week's ABC talks in Washington and lead,
eventually, to improvements with respect to human rights and civil
society as well. What remains unclear is how solid is the
motivation behind the Uzbek offer - if it merely represents pique
at the Russians, that may not augur well for a long-lasting
arrangements that serves both sides' interests. We should dig
deeper.
NORLAND