UZBEKISTAN: GOU PROPOSAL ON TERMEZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001639 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/23 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MARR UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: GOU PROPOSAL ON TERMEZ REF: STATE DEPARTMENT UZBEK DESK EMAIL TO TASHKENT 12/23 (NOTAL) CLASSIFIED BY: Robert McCutcheon, Econ Officer, State, Pol/Econ Office; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary. An apparent Uzbek offer of troop transit to Afghanistan via Termez warrants close attention. It is not inconsistent with the gradual improvement in relations across the board, including on human rights, outlined in last week's political consultations with Foreign Minister Norov in Washington. But the proposal would require negotiation not just with the Uzbeks but also with the Germans, who use Termez. And since the prime motivation for the proposal appears to be President Karimov's pique with the Russians, we suspect further elucidation would be required to confirm that it represents a solid option for the U.S. Still, this is worth looking into. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Per Ref A (notal),Embassy understands that the Uzbek Embassy in Washington submitted to the State Department a diplomatic note dated Dec. 21 containing a proposed agreement to offer the U.S. (along with Germany) air transit rights and facilities at Termez to assist with the deployment of U.S. forces to ISAF in Afghanistan, apparently in support of the 30,000 additional troops ordered in by President Obama. The proposed agreement would involve transit of personnel only, not lethal materiel; would set strict limits on the number of flights; would stipulate some degree of involvement with the Uzbek commercial air hub at Navoi; and would involve an undetermined price tag to be negotiated separately. ¶3. (C) The proposed agreement comes as a surprise. Foreign Minister Norov did not remotely allude to such an offer in his meetings with senior U.S. officials during the U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC) process launched in Washington Dec. 17-18. Indeed, Norov seemed eager to dispel any public notion that basing might have been discussed during those talks. Likewise, the senior Americas Division official in the Uzbek MFA, who also took part in the ABC consultations in Washington, professed (convincingly) on Dec. 23 to be totally unaware that this proposed agreement had been conveyed to the State Department. ¶4. (C) The German Embassy here has been speculating for some weeks that the Uzbeks were preparing to make an offer of this nature, but the Uzbeks themselves had heretofore not broached this with us. German Ambassador Wolfgang Neuen told the Ambassador Dec. 23 that he had discussed the matter the same day with President Karimov while presenting his credentials. Karimov had reportedly offered a "bilateral" (sic) agreement on use of Termez and seemed eager to support ISAF and the renewed U.S. commitment in Afghanistan (Comment: Uzbek officials will no doubt glumly have to inform their President that the text of the proposed agreement in fact outlines a trilateral arrangement. End Comment.). ¶5. (C) The timing of this proposal -- the diplomatic note was delivered to State Department on Dec. 21 -- coincides with the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to Tashkent on Dec. 21-22. Given Uzbek perceptions of Russian "pressure," including reported Russian interest in establishing a military facility in Osh, Kyrgyzstan or some other Central Asian location in part to counter the American military presence at Manas, it is possible that the Uzbek proposal to allow us to use Termez is intended as much to signal Tashkent's displeasure with Moscow as it is to make a genuine offer to the U.S. Still, Termez in many ways offers a technically and politically viable way of augmenting our troop presence in Afghanistan, and we should treat this proposal as a serious one. ¶6. (C) Politically, using Termez would have advantages for the U.S. It is less high-profile than Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) and would carry much less political baggage. Termez is already used by German military transports, and while having U.S. aircraft land there would be a significant ramping up of our presence in Uzbekistan, it would not be the same as creating a new U.S. "base" but rather would constitute a marginal additional use by NATO aircraft of a facility that already supports UN mandated efforts in Afghanistan. As stipulated by the Uzbeks, use of these facilities would be limited both in terms of quantity of flights and in quality of cargo -- non-lethal only. For their part, the Uzbeks TASHKENT 00001639 002 OF 002 would be taking a risk in raising their profile vis-C -vis the Taliban by allowing the U.S. to use Termez, but not so much as if they allowed us to go back into K-2 (which is unlikely). ¶7. (C) There are some technical considerations that go along with Termez as well. First and foremost, it is not clear that the Germans would welcome sharing the facility with the Americans. It has limited ramp space and would, according to the German Ambassador, require expansion (note: Amb. Neuen, who served in Tajikistan some years ago, made a personal pitch for the old airfield at Kulyob in Tajikistan as a more suitable facility). Ambassador Neuen recommended that if the U.S. is seriously interested in the Uzbek offer of Termez, DOD should approach the German DATT in Washington to discuss the matter. The German Defense Attache tells us that only eight C-160's can park at Termez at one time, and that the runway cannot handle C-17's or C-5 aircraft. Significant capital improvements would be required to facilitate expanded operations, according to the Germans. ¶8. (C) The bottom line from our perspective in Tashkent is that the Uzbek offer of limited use of Termez to augment and sustain our forces in Afghanistan is one we should explore further as a potentially important piece of the larger transit framework needed to support the deployment of 30,000 more troops within a fairly short period of time. To be sure, there would be issues along the way. Negotiating a final agreement with the Uzbeks would not be easy, and there could be friction with the Germans too. In addition, we could expect criticism from some on the Hill and in the human rights community, who remain rightly concerned about the situation in Uzbekistan. Still, Termez offers a modest step forward in engagement that could not only help us on Afghanistan but could also fuel the improvement in U.S.-Uzbek relations that was crystallized in last week's ABC talks in Washington and lead, eventually, to improvements with respect to human rights and civil society as well. What remains unclear is how solid is the motivation behind the Uzbek offer - if it merely represents pique at the Russians, that may not augur well for a long-lasting arrangements that serves both sides' interests. We should dig deeper. NORLAND