Uzbekistan Scenesetter for General Petraeus

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 000162 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA CENTCOM FOR POLAD TRANSCOM FOR POLAD AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-02-11 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan Scenesetter for General Petraeus REF: a) TASHKENT 141 CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D) For General Petraeus from Ambassador Norland ¶1. (C) Summary: Your visit to Uzbekistan is the first by a senior U.S. official since the new Administration took office and comes at a pivotal moment in regional politics. In Tashkent, as elsewhere in the region, there is concern about the course of events in Afghanistan and doubts as to whether or not the United States and NATO have a strategy for success and the will to see it through. The situation surrounding Manas has only added to this uncertainty, leading many to question whether or not Russia is actively seeking to undermine our mission as it reasserts its influence in its "near abroad." In the conspiratorial logic of the region, Uzbekistan and the other states imagine themselves as the object of great power rivalry. Unsurprisingly, our difficulties with Kyrgyzstan are fueling speculation here as to our next steps and adding to doubts about the strength of our commitment in Afghanistan. The overall objective of your discussions with President Karimov and other GOU officials should be to listen to their concerns and then help put these doubts to rest by demonstrating that the U.S. has a comprehensive plan to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan that makes use of the full spectrum of our military and civilian resources. Knowing that we are committed to this mission and that the Taliban will not be returning to power in Kabul will go a long way towards eliciting greater GOU cooperation on a host of related issues, including the Northern Distribution Network (NDN),counter narcotics and others. This is a time of strategic reassessment for the Uzbeks who, with time, may again be willing to consider closer cooperation with the U.S., including use of a base. The question of bases will inevitably be in the background of your visit, but is best not addressed explicitly at this juncture. End Summary. Political Context -------------- ¶2. (C) Uzbekistan is the largest country in Central Asia in terms of population, its 27 million people nearly as many as the other four former Soviet republics combined. Although less developed economically than neighboring Kazakhstan, it has nonetheless managed to maintain economic growth and remain substantially better off than the other states in the region, all in a context of authoritarian political stability. Uzbekistan, however, has proven to be a difficult partner for the United States, a non-democratic regime with a troublesome human rights record in the center of a strategically important, but unstable region. ¶3. (C) Bilateral relations with Uzbekistan in this decade have gone from close cooperation in the aftermath of 9/11 and the beginning of operations in Afghanistan to a virtual severing of relations following the May 2005 events in the city of Andijon when the U.S. and Europe publicly condemned the regime and threatened sanctions. Since reaching a nadir in early 2007, we have gradually begun to rebuild our relationship with Uzbekistan through a strategy of quiet engagement, but a significant level of mistrust remains on both sides. Although there has been some progress on beginning a dialogue on human rights, religious freedom and other issues, this progress is still tenuous and the Uzbeks remain highly sensitive to criticism and pressure. TASHKENT 00000162 002 OF 005 ¶4. (C) President Karimov and the close circle of insiders that holds power in Uzbekistan believe themselves to be encircled by threats from within and without. (Note: Uzbekistan has faced real terrorist threats from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU),whose members have reportedly found refuge in the border areas of Pakistan. End Note) In this worldview, political and economic liberalism are sources of instability and vectors of foreign influence, both of which Karimov has sought to contain and control. Karimov, 71, remembers Gorbachev's downfall and believes "color" revolutions were aimed at regime change here. This view permeates perceptions of the U.S., Russia and the other states in the region, leading Karimov to adopt a foreign policy of constant balancing and realignment as political winds shift. Although this behavior has made Uzbekistan unpredictable, it has also enabled Karimov to maintain a greater degree of autonomy vis a vis other actors such as Russia, limiting the ability of Moscow to pressure Uzbekistan in the way that its weaker neighbors know all too well. Uzbekistan and Russia -------------- ¶5. (C) Even when relations with the West were at their worst, Uzbekistan never fully aligned with Russia in the way that Moscow hoped and has limited its engagement with Russian-dominated organization such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC). The Uzbeks seem to be in another period of strategic reassessment in light of Kyrgyz announcements about the closure of Manas and the suspicion that Russia is behind this. The Uzbeks, although linked to Russia by history, culture and economics, are suspicious of their former colonial rulers. We have been careful never to lend credence to the "Great Game" interpretations of politics in Central Asia. The Uzbeks, however, believe that they are in the middle of this chess board and must calculate their moves accordingly. Although we should discount facile conjecture that the Uzbeks are "leaning" one way or another, we do believe that the present moment provides an opportunity for the GOU to pursue greater engagement with the U.S. across a range of issues, beginning with Afghanistan. Uzbeks and Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) Sharing a border, religion, history and culture, the Uzbeks believe that they understand Afghanistan. Additionally, many Uzbeks have first hand experience in Afghanistan and view the conflict through the prism of their role in the Soviet occupation. Consequently, they tend to view Afghanistan with a measure of skepticism, coupled with the fear that the U.S. and NATO will not have the will to stay for the long haul. The message that has been conveyed to us at all levels in Tashkent is that the GOU does not have confidence that our strategy will succeed. They believe the government of President Karzai is hopelessly corrupt and, having failed to win the fealty of regional tribal leaders, cannot effectively govern the country. The Uzbek preference is for a 'strong man' to replace Karzai. ¶7. (C) At the same time, our Uzbek interlocutors tell us that an increase in military forces in Afghanistan will not bring TASHKENT 00000162 003 OF 005 stability. In fact, they worry that it will further alienate the population, driving more Afghans into the arms of the Taliban. This skepticism accounts for or justifies the heretofore limited Uzbek engagement in the post-2006 period, which has been largely limited to the provision of electricity, the facilitation of some transit and repeated calls for a revival of the 6 plus 3 format, a forum combining Afghanistan's neighbors plus Russia, the U.S. and NATO that we have opposed on the grounds that it excludes the legitimate government of Afghanistan. However, the Uzbeks would also like to reap a share of reconstruction contracts in Afghanistan and have talked about their ambitions to participate in railroad construction as a means of establishing a southern corridor to ports in Pakistan and Iran. Reality for Uzbekistan is that Afghanistan will always be its neighbor and if a war weary West allows the country to degenerate to its pre-2001 status, Tashkent could be faced with a Taliban regime on its doorstep again. ¶8. (C) Your meetings with GOU officials are an opportunity to help turn these impressions around. Listening to Uzbek concerns, engaging them on these issues and reinforcing our view that additional forces are the key to the stability that is the sine qua non of any development in Afghanistan, will go a long way towards assuaging these fears and achieving some of our key objectives. Other Key Objectives and Points -------------- ¶9. (C) Northern Distribution Network - The GOU has been generally supportive of NDN since giving its commitment to General McNabb in November. However, progress has been slower than we hoped as we attempt to agree on an acceptable format for an agreement. The Uzbek side has proposed an exchange of letters at the level of Ministers of Defense that is currently under review in Washington. Key for the Uzbeks are assurances that NDN will be used only for non-lethal cargo and that they have visibility into the pipeline through a system of pre-clearances. We are hopeful that we will find an acceptable mechanism. Another problem has been a GOU prohibition on commercial air cargo operations between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, although we have some indications that this policy could be revisited, possibly coinciding with your visit. Your discussions are an opportunity to stress the importance of NDN and push for quick agreement on the issues that leaves us with maximum flexibility, including the ability to use commercial air cargo between Navoi and Afghanistan. ¶10. (C) Local Purchase - DLA came to Tashkent in January to assess the prospects for local purchase of construction materials, prepared foods, beverages and fresh fruits and vegetables in support of NDN. The GOU pulled out all the stops to accommodate DLA, which is an indication of the importance the Uzbeks attach to this issue. GOU officials, including Foreign Minister Norov, have said to us that the lack of economic benefit and local purchase was a major factor influencing the decision to close the base at Karshi-Khanabad (K2). We believe this is an essential element to secure cooperation on NDN and you should use the opportunity to reiterate our commitment to local purchase. ¶11. (C) Counter Narcotics (CN) - We have been working to secure the return of DEA to Uzbekistan in 2009 (DEA was forced to leave in TASHKENT 00000162 004 OF 005 early 2007). The GOU is concerned about narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan and Tajikistan and views this as a major threat to Uzbekistan's national security. The GOU is very interested in CN assistance from CENTCOM, which we have said is contingent upon our successful re-establishment of a "counter narcotics section" in the Embassy staffed by DEA personnel, as DEA must be the coordinating agency for U.S. CN efforts. This is an opportunity to reiterate this point. ¶12. (C) Termez Transit - U.S. personnel assigned to ISAF are able to transit Uzbekistan on a case by case basis via the German Air Bridge at Termez. Unfortunately, the clearance process for this transit has proven to be overly complex and unreliable. As a consequence, we have requested from the GOU via diplomatic note that U.S. personnel be allowed to use the German Air Bridge under the same conditions as other NATO nations - i.e. without pre-clearance. You should remind the GOU of the importance of this issue. ¶13. (C) Mil to Mil Cooperation - Uzbekistan will host the CENTCOM Action Officer Working Group (AOWG) meetings 24 - 27 February 2009. There are 33 small scale military-to-military contact events on this year's slate plus the Marshall Center courses, plus continued assistance at Kagan and conferences. This is an increase from just 14 events the year before and formed the basis for expanded cooperation during the U.S.-provided assistance at Kagan last summer and during initial NDN discussions in Fall 2008. The GOU sent the Deputy Defense Minister to the Change of Command in October 2008. In the next months, the GOU will likely send a general officer to the CENTCOM Central Asia Chiefs of Defense Conference in late March 2009 and Deputy Defense Minister General-Major Rustam Niyazov will attend ARCENT's Land Force Symposium in late April 2009. The U.S. has offered to provide a final EOD expert visit on 27 March 2009 in order to help prepare GOU EOD experts for render-safe procedures to tackle remaining unexploded ammunition dangers at Kagan and at other deteriorating ammunitions storage sites in Uzbekistan. ¶14. (C) Human Rights - We have continued to make the point to the Uzbeks that we consider human rights to be part of the full spectrum of our bilateral relations. Although we are making efforts not to isolate or antagonize the GOU, we have continued to raise these issues and underscore the importance of sending positive signals, particularly with a new Administration having just taken office in Washington. One area of progress on this front last year was the resumption of prison visits by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Although this program was successful, the ICRC was not given access to all detention facilities and is currently trying to get GOU agreement for access to facilities run by the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and the National Security Service (NSS). Raising this point would serve as a useful reminder that security cooperation will not supplant our engagement on human rights issues. Bases: Not Never, but Not Now -------------- 15 (C) We doubt that any GOU official will raise this issue explicitly. Nevertheless, there will be substantial interest in the situation surrounding Manas, combined with a certain feeling of TASHKENT 00000162 005 OF 005 vindication on the part of the Uzbeks, who have long maintained that Kyrgyzstan was a corrupt and unreliable partner. Despite their sometimes mixed messages, the Uzbeks share a border with Afghanistan and therefore may see higher stakes in U.S. success than their Kyrgyz neighbors, inevitably begging the question of whether or not the U.S. can win in Afghanistan without use of a base in Central Asia. The Uzbeks are guided by a go slow approach to rapprochement with the U.S. ("postepenno" in Russian, or "step-by-step"). Although we do not exclude the possibility that conditions could permit some U.S. use of an Uzbek base in the future (reftel),raising that issue now would send a signal of desperation that the bazaar mentality of Central Asia is quick to exploit. Furthermore, it is simply unlikely that the Uzbeks are ready to take this step, particularly given indications that they may be under strong Russian pressure to reduce military cooperation with the U.S. for now. We suspect that the base issue will remain the quiet elephant in the room. Your Meetings -------------- ¶16. (C) We anticipate that you will have two meetings with GOU officials in Tashkent. First you will meet with Foreign Minister Norov and Defense Minister Berdiyev, who will likely be joined by the Chairman of the National Security Council Atayev (Atayev will likely take the lead in this meeting). We have arranged breakfast with Ambassador Miroslav Jenca, head of the UN's regional preventative diplomacy center based in Ashgabat, who should have useful insights into regional dynamics post-Manas. We also plan a short meeting with the local ICRC rep to signal to the Uzbeks that we take the prison visit issue seriously (Adm. Fallon and Gen. Dempsey did the same). ¶17. (U) We look forward to welcoming you to Tashkent. NORLAND To view the entire SMART message, go to URL http://repository.state.sgov.gov/_layouts/OSS SearchResults.aspx?k=messageid:eee82f79-d7ce- 459c-9553-d3b97390f8df