Uzbekistan and Human Rights: The Lessons of Sanjar Umarov's

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 001599 SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DRL, P AND D AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/30 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV UZ SUBJECT: Uzbekistan and Human Rights: The Lessons of Sanjar Umarov's Release REF: TASHKENT 1571 CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The release from prison on November 7 of jailed businessman and opposition figure Sanjar Umarov was the most important step the GOU has taken on human rights this year. Umarov's release came about as the result of principled engagement and quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy. It was not the result of efforts to shame the GOU or to isolate the regime, tactics which have proven to be counterproductive in the past. Although it would be wishful thinking to believe that Umarov's release portends some new "enlightenment" on the part of the GOU, it does offer a useful lesson in how to approach these sensitive issues with the Uzbeks. Our challenge now is to develop this dialogue further in the context of the upcoming Annual Bilateral Consultations (ABC). End Summary. ¶2. (C) Sanjar Umarov returned to the United States on November 21 to rejoin his family after four years in Uzbek prisons. Umarov was arrested in the fall of 2005 as he and his political party, the Sunshine Coalition, spoke up about the need for economic and political reform in Uzbekistan. Coming as it did in the aftermath of the Andijon events and the "color revolutions" in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia, Umarov was seen by the Uzbek security services as a threat to the Karimov regime. He was charged with white collar economic crimes and sentenced to ten years in prison. ¶3. (C) Conditions in Uzbek prisons are notoriously bad, but Umarov seems to have earned the particular animus of the regime. In a conversation the day after his release, he said that he was held in solitary confinement in an eight cubic meter cell for eighteen months from 2006 through mid 2007. He had no contact with other people or with the outside world; there was no television, no radio and no newspapers or books. When his term in solitary confinement ended, he worked in a labor camp in a prison in Navoi province. Umarov said that the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) never saw him during its prison visits in Uzbekistan. Each time the ICRC came, Umarov would be moved to a different location the day before. Once, he said, the vehicle he was in even passed the ICRC vehicles entering through the prison gate. According to Umarov, the conditions of his imprisonment improved in early 2009 (this coincides with the Embassy's sustained engagement with the GOU on his case). Four months before his release, he was brought to the Tashkent prison hospital, where he was able to go for walks, watch television, read newspapers and receive visits from family members. ¶4. (C) Of the approximately twelve political prisoners in Uzbekistan identified by Human Rights Watch, Umarov was the most high-profile. The GOU jails those whom it believes pose a threat to regime stability, and Umarov would have been at the top of that list. Although there is debate about the degree of political influence Umarov and his Sunshine Coalition wielded before his 2005 arrest, Umarov would certainly have been more of a "threat to the regime" than any of the other activists, journalists and dissidents currently languishing in Uzbekistan's prisons. By this measure, Umarov would have been the most difficult case to resolve and the fact that he was freed would seem to indicate that the GOU can be persuaded to take more "risks" on human rights cases than we otherwise might assume. US Engagement -------------- ¶5. (C) Umarov's release came about after a year of behind-the-scenes high-level engagement with the GOU. Initial GOU reactions when Umarov's case was raised were that it was an internal matter - effectively none of our business. However, as we heard from his family of the precarious nature of his health in October 2008 (his wife described him to the Ambassador as being in a nearly catatonic state) and asked the GOU to look into the matter in a letter from the Ambassador to President Karimov, the GOU convened a medical commission to examine Umarov. Although the commission reported back that his health did not justify his TASHKENT 00001599 002 OF 002 release, Umarov's own account indicates that the GOU realized it needed to address his case in some fashion and his treatment improved. The next major push on Umarov came in July 2009 after his son visited him in a prison near Tashkent and reported that he was incontinent and non-communicative. Another letter from the Ambassador to Karimov, and Under Secretary Burns raising the issue with Karimov during his July visit to Tashkent, resulted in Karimov's promise of Umarov's amnesty. Foreign Minister Norov convoked the Ambassador on Nov. 5 to confirm that Umarov would be released imminently, and Umarov did, in fact, step out of prison on Nov. 7. ¶6. (C) The Uzbeks have a hard time believing that we sought Umarov's release on purely humanitarian grounds and came to assume that he was "our guy." They made clear in releasing Umarov that they expected the U.S. not to "politicize" him, i.e. anoint him as an opposition figure, but they know that we cannot and will not "muzzle" him in exile. In this context, they could have made the calculation that releasing Umarov would be a down payment of sorts on better relations with the U.S. However, previous discussions with Karimov and FM Norov gave every indication that the GOU already viewed its agreement to allow non-lethal transit to Afghanistan through Uzbekistan (which is seen here as risky in that it could draw retribution against Uzbekistan from extremist groups) as a significant gesture in favor of closer relations. The GOU no doubt realized that releasing Umarov would kill two birds with one stone by appeasing the EU as well, which lifted sanctions on Uzbekistan on Oct. 27 (releasing him beforehand could have represented a loss of face, but doing so afterwards was a "freebie"). We may never know exactly why Karimov decided to release Umarov. It could have been a gesture; it could also have been a cold calculation that the consequences of Umarov's death in an Uzbek prison would be far worse than any "threat" he could pose from his exile in the United States. The Way Forward -------------- ¶7. (C) The most important aspect of Umarov's release is what it tells us about how to approach human rights issues with the Uzbeks more broadly, and here the evidence could not be clearer. Umarov was released not as a result of public campaigns to "name and shame" the regime. He was not released as a result of "prisoners of conscience events" that even some in his own family had proposed organizing recently. He was not released because of pressure activists brought to bear on the regime from inside or outside Uzbekistan. Umarov was released as a result of quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy that finally convinced the GOU that it was in their interest to get this case behind them. ¶8. (C) Human rights and the related issues of religious freedom and child labor remain the most vexing in our relationship with Uzbekistan. As we look ahead to the ABC process and FM Norov's Dec. 17-18 visit to Washington, we should keep the Umarov lesson in mind. Change does not come easily in this society, with its premium on social control, stability and "saving face." We need to take these issues up constructively, without trying to isolate or criticize the Uzbeks openly. Done right, this is an opportunity to show that small steps can effect significant changes in relations with the United States, such as removing the obstacles to increased military and security cooperation. The Karimov regime is not going to change its spots; we should be under no illusions. However, quiet diplomacy can help us move the GOU in a more positive direction and hopefully enable us to secure the eventual release of other political prisoners. As experience has shown, there simply is no alternative to principled engagement on these issues, but it will require patience and managing our own expectations. NORLAND