A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: SHOULD THE OSCE MONITOR ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001555 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/27 TAGS: AORC KDEM PGOV UZ SUBJECT: A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: SHOULD THE OSCE MONITOR ELECTIONS IN UZBEKISTAN? CLASSIFIED BY: Peffley, Katrisa, Pol/Econ Officer, DOS, Pol/Econ; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) officials face a difficult decision as they consider whether to send a team to monitor Uzbekistan's parliamentary elections, slated to take place on December 27. Whatever its decision, the OSCE will be sending a message to the Government of Uzbekistan. Uzbek elections will not be free or fair by OSCE standards. Monitoring the elections on the GOU's terms would convey tacit acceptance of the status quo. On the other hand, boycotting the elections entirely would be a slap in Uzbekistan's face-and the GOU would likely respond accordingly. The OSCE's best course of action under these circumstances is the de minimus option of "election support." END SUMMARY. UZBEK ELECTION STAGNATION LEADS TO OSCE FRUSTRATION -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶2. (U) An OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) visited Tashkent on October 21 and 22 in order to analyze and report on Uzbekistan's pre-election situation. At issue is the utility (or lack thereof) of sending a team to monitor the elections in December. The NAM delegation met with Charge and PolEcon Chief on October 22 to discuss the OSCE's options and the potential implications of those options. The OSCE team also met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Election Committee of Uzbekistan, representatives of all registered political parties, members of the new Ecological Movement, and representatives of key embassies, civil society groups, and the media. The ODIHR team was looking for guidance from member state embassies in Tashkent. (In a separate debriefing, Anna Chernova from the Parliamentary Assembly Secretariat urged the Department to instruct USOSCE on the USG position on this issue.) ¶3. (C) The OSCE has monitored many Uzbek elections over the last ten years, with very little to show for its efforts. After previous observation missions, the OSCE has published reports enumerating flaws in the election process and making specific recommendations for improvement. Uzbek authorities have never followed up on these recommendations. In fact, two changes to Uzbek election law in 2009-one mandating preferential treatment for the new Environmental Movement, and the other requiring that candidates run as a member of a political party-actually make elections less free and fair. (Previously members of "citizens' groups" who were not political party members could also run for office.) Neither of these changes is consistent with Uzbekistan's OSCE commitments under the Copenhagen Agreement, and members of the NAM expressed frustration that the GOU would introduce these laws without consulting OSCE standards. Konrad Olszewski, Deputy Head of OSCE/ODIHR and head of the NAM delegation, noted that the Environmental Movement was actually created in violation of Uzbekistan's own election laws. (NOTE: Despite all evidence to the contrary, the GOU seems to think that the international community will see these changes, especially the preferential treatment of the Environmental Movement, as a positive step. This is yet another illustration of the disconnect between the GOU and the international community. END NOTE.) Olszewski bluntly summed up the situation by stating that the chances of an election monitoring team seeing progress during the elections are "less than zero." ¶4. (C) The members of the NAM believe that meaningful competition will be wholly absent from the upcoming parliamentary elections. In Uzbekistan, the Central Election Committee (CEC) plays an "overwhelming role" in elections. It controls every aspect of election campaigns, including finance. For example, donations to any party or candidate must be turned over to the CEC to be divided equally among all candidates. All campaigns will receive equal attention from the media, with all media-related decisions made by the CEC. In a nutshell, the only information available to voters will be strictly controlled by the CEC. In addition, the agendas of the political parties are virtually interchangeable, and are invariably controlled by the presidential apparatus. For these reasons, OSCE representatives expect that a report on this election would be identical to, or even worse than previous reports on Uzbekistan's elections. The OSCE does not wish to expend significant resources merely to produce an insignificant report. OSCE ELECTION MONITORING-OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Uzbekistan has already invited the OSCE to send a team of 25 to 30 observers to monitor December's parliamentary elections. However, the invitation itself puts limits on the size of such a delegation-making it fairly clear that the GOU does not have any intention of turning over a new leaf in terms of free and fair elections. At this point, the OSCE/ODIHR mission must recommend one of five options for monitoring the elections: A) Full Observation Team: The first option is to recommend a full-scale election observation team, which would include long-term observers who would be present during the run-up to the election, and short-term observers who would come to Uzbekistan in order to monitor the elections themselves. Given the pre-set limitations in the Uzbek invitation, this option is not very realistic. A full-scale election observation usually includes a team of hundreds; it is unlikely that the GOU would approve so many observers. In addition, the NAM fears that such a full-scale project would be a total waste of OSCE resources. B) Limited Observation Team: Another possibility would be to send a limited election observation team, which would not include any short-term observers. This option is often used in situations where there is limited value to conducting a full-scale observation. A team of long-term election observers would publish a report on their findings and make recommendations to the GOU. C) Election Assessment Mission: An "election assessment mission" would include a group of experts deployed to Uzbekistan for two to three weeks in order to monitor the election process without critiquing it. D) Election Support Team: An "election support team" is a group of five to ten experts deployed to familiarize themselves with the election process, provide technical support, and maintain dialogue with the host government officials during the elections process. An election support team would provide recommendations to the GOU, but would not publish any statement or report about the status of the elections. E) No Election Observation: Finally, and most drastically, the OSCE could opt not to send any observation team. Such a decision would loudly and clearly send a message to the GOU that the OSCE thinks that Uzbek elections are so flawed that they are not even worth monitoring. The NAM team admitted that this course of action would probably have negative repercussions on the diplomatic community in Uzbekistan. COMMENT -------------- ¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: If the OSCE sends a mission to observe the upcoming elections within the parameters set by the GOU, it will tacitly imply that the OSCE approves of the political status quo in Uzbekistan (or at least that the OSCE has no intention of pressing the GOU to ensure free and fair elections). On the other hand, not sending a mission at all would send a very strong, negative message which would almost certainly result in a backlash from the GOU which could affect the entire international community. Post believes that choosing a middle path and sending an "election support team" would preserve good working relationships with the GOU without putting the stamp of approval on elections that will likely fall far short of OSCE standards. END COMMENT. NORLAND