UZBEKISTAN PREPARES FOR DECEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TASHKENT 001548 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/CEN AID/W FOR ASIA/EA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN PREPARES FOR DECEMBER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS ¶1. Sensitive but unclassified. Not for public internet. ¶2. (U) SUMMARY: The parliamentary elections in Uzbekistan slated for December 2009 are likely to result in minimal changes to the overall structure of decision-making in the country; however, what may define the development of government responsiveness and transparency in Uzbekistan is not the outcome of the elections, but how political parties are learning to run for office. The elections represent a possible evolutionary shift in how the government- sponsored political parties in Uzbekistan run election campaigns, interact with the electorate, and compete in a closed political system. The upcoming elections will be an opportunity for the Government of Uzbekistan to forestall possible social instability through political competition and consensus building, while laying the groundwork for greater receptivity to democratic principles. BACKGROUND: Political Parties in Uzbekistan ¶3. (SBU) The December 2009 parliamentary elections offer an important, albeit limited, opportunity for parties and civic groups to engage citizens in decision-making. The five political parties-- Adolat, Ecological (Green) Movement, Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, Milliy Tiklanish, and the National Democratic Party-must compete with each other for seats in the lower house. Although these parties are loyal to the executive and they remain the only groups that can run campaigns and whose members can be nominated for election, the prospect of gaining or losing seats is a powerful motivation for improved campaigning. While there continue to be constraints on political speech and association within Uzbekistan, the political parties are provided with sufficient space by the executive branch to compete in elections. ¶4. (SBU) Despite this limited freedom to campaign provided to loyalist groups, parties remain relatively unaware of how democratic processes take place, how to engage the electorate, and how to run a campaign. Indeed, many party members do not view the public as constituents and in the vacuum of Uzbek politics and media, representational government is a wholly alien concept. Lack of public pressure and incentives to work with the public has meant that political parties do not have �A;the experience and skills needed for assessing the demands and needs of the public, developing programs that address those priorities, and communicating these programs to the public. For example, despite recent demonstrations, the parties have yet to address growing frustration with declining economic opportunities in their platforms or legislative agendas. Continued inability to react to the demands of the people is potentially destabilizing; May bombings in the border region with Kyrgyzstan may portend future destabilizing acts. The Weak "Opposition" ¶4. (SBU) In Uzbekistan, there is essentially no opposition to the current administration. Human rights activists, journalists and others who speak out for change lack the ability to collectively advocate and make demands due to continued harassment and infighting between groups. The clash of personalities preventing collaboration between movements is evinced in their genesis: the major unregistered political groups--Agrarian, Birlik (Unity),Erk (Liberty),Ozod Dekhon (Free Farmers), TASHKENT 00001548 002 OF 003 and Sunshine Uzbekistan--all originated from the Soviet-era Birlik movement. The government readily exploits the larger-than-life personalities of their leaders (three of whom are in exile outside of Uzbekistan) to further rifts; grants provided to these groups are sometimes met with allegations of donor favoritism by those who are not funded. None of these non-registered political groups can participate in political decision-making or in elections. Generally, these groups have failed to offer the public independent points of view on issues due to weak organizational capacity. Neither the exiled leaders nor those inside Uzbekistan have viable plans for building the bases of support for these groups. Remaking Parties to Be More Democratic ¶5. (U) Despite the generally poor record on elections and the development of diverse, responsive political parties, the position of the Government of Uzbekistan towards outside help on these issues (and human rights) appears to be slightly shifting. The government proclaims the abolition of the death penalty and its adoption of the right of habeas corpus as evidence that Uzbekistan shares certain democratic values. In February 2009, Uzbekistan became a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of Peoples with Disabilities, demonstrating that there are selected policy areas in which parliament has limited autonomy to set policy in social spheres. ¶6. (SBU) Perhaps more critically has been the unprecedented access of USAID grantee the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to political parties for training purposes. In a country where donors lack the ability to directly collaborate with legislators, NDI's experience assisting parties in techniques such as developing campaigns, voter outreach, codes of ethics and candidate selection indicate a sea change in how parties relate to the public. Since the last election in December 2004, NDI has maintained a presence in Uzbekistan and maintained relationships with the GoU, even as many international NGOs were forced to close. Starting with workshops and conferences to discuss best practices in elections with international experts, trust between this American partner organization and the Government of Uzbekistan has been rebuilt, resulting in parties directly participating in the first of a series of trainings for the December 2009 elections in August 2008. NDI provided information about best practices for assessing voters' concerns and priorities and gave practical tools to party members on how to mobilize a grassroots campaign. The nine-day seminars also included discussions of up-to-date citizen outreach methods, communication techniques, candidate selection, and message development. A series of workshops in the run-up to the election are building upon basic concepts (e.g. advertising, press conferences) with the same group of representatives from different groups to enhance the depth of knowledge and practical tools available to all parties. ¶7. (SBU) In the workshops, party members are showing they know how to apply their new knowledge: in an August 2009 training, party members designed mock campaigns for their candidates. While presenting their ideas, participants suggested using SMS technology, public polls, and direct interaction with vulnerable groups like the homeless to give their candidates the edge. Anyone familiar with politics in Uzbekistan will agree that these tactics are ground-breaking and may indicate parties are ready to actively listen to the demands of the TASHKENT 00001548 003 OF 003 populace. Signs of Competition between Parties ¶6. (SBU) Although the outcomes of these trainings cannot fully be gauged until the candidate nomination process and elections have taken place, anecdotal evidence of the change in the orientation of parties is appearing. In April 2009, Uzbek language newspapers (such as newspaper Tashkent XXI Asr) began reporting that the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan had "set itself a main goal of increasing, in every possible way, its influence in neighborhoods" to affect election results. This article is significantnot only because the PDP is led by the presidentas it shows that the PDP is seriously considering how to become more competitive against other parties (a characteristic generally lacking in the political landscape of Uzbekistan's parties) or at least points to criticism of the ruling party in the media. This article was followed by two similar articles indicating increasing competition among political parties over successive months, including an article where the PDP struck back against criticism, stating that the Liberal Democratic Party had begun campaigning too early; ostensibly a clear violation of the 2008 election law (Vesti Newspaper, June 09, 2009). ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The unexpected energy and innovation of political party members in trainings paired with public criticism of government- sanctioned parties may indicate that the attitudes and perceptions of those standing for election in Uzbekistan are changing. Clearly the enthusiasm of political party workshop participants demonstrates that lower-level government representatives are open to new methods of campaigning and listening to the electorate. Over the long-term, the type of training and support provided to parties and civil society through USAID programs has the potential to extend the impact of these incremental improvements. NORLAND